The Economic Climate of the `Young Turk Revolution` in
Transkript
The Economic Climate of the `Young Turk Revolution` in
The Economic Climate of the `Young Turk Revolution' in 1908 Author(s): Donald Quataert Source: The Journal of Modern History, Vol. 51, No. 3, On Demand Supplement (Sep., 1979), pp. D1147-D1161 Published by: The University of Chicago Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1878813 . Accessed: 08/02/2011 05:15 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use. Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at . http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=ucpress. . Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission. JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org. The University of Chicago Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to The Journal of Modern History. http://www.jstor.org The Economic Climate of the 'Young Turk Revolution' in 1908* Donald Quataert University of Houston did not come from below, from debased city This revolution but from above, from all that mobs or ignorant pIasantry, (1909) is best in Turkey. It is a sign of the times that, whereas it has been impossible in the past to bring the Turkish masses into line against the throne, because to them it represented an inthey have semi-political, tangible Idol, semi-religious, been awakened by their sufferings into a nation of solidarity, the underlying element of which is a ne~-born spirit (September of criticism in regard to the Sultan-Caliph. 1908) On a dit partout-et tout le monde l'a cru--que le ble absolument gefaut en Turquie et que la famnine faisait (January 1908) etait d nos portes. - - - - - - - - - - A profound disequilibrium, arising from the industrialfoodstuffs of Europe and its quest for raw materials, ization and markets, confounded the world in the early 20th century. the Russian Revolutions of 1905 and From a global perspective of a 1917, as well as World War I, are European indicators systems and political among social more widespread inability states to absorb the onrush of economic of the underdeveloped the Ottoman In China, Persia, change. and technological varying in intensity outbreaks of violence, Empire and Mexico of the strains acand outcome, proclaimed the universality of companying the deepening European economic penetration the world. *My thanks to Leo Grebler, Andreas Tietze and the colloquium group of the University of Houston History Departversions of this ment for their comments on earlier I also am grateful to the staffs of the Deutsche paper. Staatsarchiv Bank Archives (Frankfurt/M), Zentrales (Potsdam arLd Merseburg), and the Bas Bakanl3k Arsivi A and cooperation. for their assistance (Istanbul) version of this paper was presented to the 1978 Annual Meeting of the Middle East Studies Association A History E. F. Knight, The Awakening of Turkey. 114. (Philadelph a, 1909) the Turkish Revolution of "The Turkish Revolution," A. Rustem Bey de Bilinski, The Nineteenth Century and After, LXIV, September, 1908, 354. mensuel de la 3Revue commerciale du Levant, bulletin (herede Constantinople chambre de commerce franeaise 192. after Revue), Nr. 250, ll//1908, D1147 Copyright1979 by TnieUniversityof Chicago. All rightsreserved.Requests to reprintin whole or in partmustbe submitted to The Universityof Chicago Press. JOURNAL OF MODERN HISTORY. Vol. 51 No. 3, September1979. OrderNo. IJ-00049. D1148 earlier The Ottoman Empire confronted these challenges Massive imports of machine-made European than most areas. goods began in the late 1830s, undermining the Ottoman handicraft system and gradually weakening the guilds while the inexorably transagriculture development of export-oriented relations with the world outside the vilformed cultivator in the intensified lage. The pitch of European penetration probed deep into Railroads two decades before World War I. the interior of Ottoman provinces and more tightly bound the The spread expanding agrarian economy to world market needs. of European corporative enterprises in the empire, for its part, brought along an unfamiliar work day and discipline. corroded Ottoman These cumulative innovations and intrusions relationships and the assumptions upon values, traditional Ottoman with its subjects. which the government interacted economic, ideological, "institutions at all levels--social, political--were attacked and destroyed or drastically modified."4 tensions finally exploded in a phenomenon These secular Whether or not this called the Young Turk Revolution of 1908. we do is uncertain:5 a "real" revolution outbreak constituted assessnot yet have enough information to make a conclusive even the ment. Little is known about the Ottoman actors, and officers. In the case of the Young famed intellectuals denotes developments which began in Turks, the term revolution their hopes July of 1908. Military officers sought to realize for a strong state and successfully demanded the immediate introduction of parliamentary government, free speech, press and association--restoration of the 1876 Ottoman constitution. But when the unleashed internal forces threatened to move social achievements and upset existing beyond those political the Young Turks reversed themand economic relationships, labor organizations restricting selves by outlawing strikes, political freedom. A key to and, ultimately, curtailing understanding this interplay of government and subject and even the transformation of post-World War I Turkey involves of the social at the time and economic conditions an analysis of the initial Our knowledge is sequence of events in 1908. On the social side, we are dimly aware critically scanty. that a new professional bureaucracy, an often-rich but polita group of cash crop cultiically impotent merchant class. labor force and an vators, a small but growing European-style studies artisan group in disarray had emerged, but detailed 4Andrew C. Hess, "Consensus or Conflict: The Dilemma of Islamic Historians," The American Historical Review, Vol. 81 (October, 1976), 796 . 5For important insights into the place of the 1908 events in the typology of revolution, see Serif A. Mardin, "Ideology and Religion in the Turkish Revolution," International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 2 (July, 1971), 197-211. More generally, see, for example, the still useful Chalmers Johnson, Revolution and the Social Structure (Stanford, 1964). D114? concerning the economic milieu is Scholarship are lacking. of post-July 1908 Before the constellation sparse. similarly events can be understood, these lacunae in our knowledge need effort to make the This essay is apreliminary to be filled. of the period more and relationships occurrences political examining the economic climate in which the intelligible--by took place in 1908. of the constitution reinstitution differs from most studies of the The present article foci. Young Turk Revolution in both its geographic and topical has stressed events in the EuroFirst, previous scholarship erupted, but those from which the revolution pean provinces, and the capital has ignored conditions both in the Istanbul and manpower heartland of the empire--the Anatolian financial and Anatolia. This study focuses on Istanbul provinces. surrounding the economic conditions Second, it investigates and rather than the leadership the outbreak of the revolution demonstrates that the early Summer of 1908 was a period of The intent here is not to detract severe economic crisis. officers from the notable achievements of the revolutionary Nor is it to estab(or their historians). and intellectuals and causal link between economic crisis lish a cast-iron Such an effort would require a mobilization. political one carrying the story forward at least broader investigation, officers of power by the revolutionary 'seizure' to the actual in 1913 and backward to similar economic crises in 1898/1899 Yet to sketch the economic climate within or even 1873-1875. events occurred clearly should open political which crucial this period of Ottoman history to new inquiry, insightful and possiblY new relationships. questions, - - - - - - - - - - During the eighteen months preceding the July 1908 revoconfronted a series of domestic the Ottoman population lution, The crises began with a economic crises. and international severe winter in early 1907 which raised the price of practiof the laboring cally every comestible and made "the existence By March, 1907, the Istanbul price of class very difficult."6 such as legumes were double normal levels. meat and staples Firewood was up 250 per cent over normal and charcoal had as much as tripled in price. countenance, Poverty, horrible poverty of a sinister of this city and it reigns as has taken possession for us to dislodge it.7 it appears impossible mistress; A prolonged Spring drought then sharply reduced the grain harArab areas and apparently, vest in many European, Anatolian, threatened to of the empire and according to some observers, were estimating By August, pessimists bring famine. 6Revue, Nr. 240, the author's. 3/31/1907, 530-532. Translations are Omer Sami Cosar, 7lbid. and Nr. 238, 1/31/1907, 236. I (Istanbul, 1973, Atatiurk Ansiklopedisi, hazirlayan, hereafter Atati2rk Ans. ), 386, for reports based on Sabah, 3/2911907. D1150 Anatolign wheat and barley harvests 50 and 40 per cent below normal. The government responded and, between August and October 1907, forbade grain exports from six Anatolian regions and from all the European provinces. It also suspended the duty on foreign wheat imports to Istanbul while reducing the foreign flour duty by nearly half.9 The brief but severe American financial crisis then added to the prevailing uncertainty by causing Istanbul and Anatolian bankers and merchants to tighten their credit.10 Food provisioning prospects in early 1908 appeared promising and the year started with optimistic assessments of the next harvest. Gradually, however, area after area, in a pattern repeated throughout much of the empire, abandoned those rosy predictions and replaced them with harsher, if more accurate, prophecies. On the edge of Asia along the Dardanelles, continuing drought into late June produced numerou lreligious processions to seek the intervention of Providence. Further afield in Anatolia, similar conditions prevailed. The town of Merzifon reported the crop of 1907 as 50 per cent below normal and the situation by April, 1908 was critical. Every bag of flour, every bite of bread, has cost local consumer just about double the usual pricls, that makes a very hard condition for the poor.1 the and The new governor of nearby Kastamonu province on the Black Sea reduced bread prices in a number of urban centers during April and May; rains in late June reportedly saved the population from disaster and local bread prices were expected to remain stable until the harvest. 1 The Aegean municipality of Izmir Le journal de la chambre 8Revue, Nr. 244, 8/31/1907, 152. de commerce de Constantinople (hereafter JCCC), 10/12/ 0TO7, 473, placed the'wheat decline at 20 per cent for Anatolia and 33 per cent for the European provinces. 9Hariciye Arsivi (Foreign Office Archives, Istanbul) Dosya 191 also records a 19 September 1908 prohibition on cereal exports from certain Arab areas. Also see Revue, Nr. 247, 10/31/1907, 608; Nr. 246, 9/30/1907, 393-395; and Nr. 253, 4/30/1908, 588. 10For example, Revue, Nr. 248, 11/30/1907, 197-198; 250, 1/3111908 I'49; and Stamboul, 7/15/1908. 11Levant Herald (hereafter trom Edirne and Selanik reflect the increasing see LH, 1/13, 1; 2/17, 6/1972 and 6/23/1908, 7/4; 7/9/1908. LH, 4/1/1908, Nr. For reports LH), 6/24/1908, 2. in7the European provinces which drought, suffering and pessimism, 2-3; 4/27, 2; 5/21, 3; 6/2, 3; 3. Stamboul, 6/2; 6/4; 6/26; 1. 3LH, 5/7, 3; 5/25, 772/1908. 3; 5/26, 1; 5/30/1908, 3. Stamboul, D1151 in late May, 1908 by making "small" responded to its own crisis depending on or "'notable" reductions in bread and meat prices, In mid-June, reports of diswhich observer is to be believed. drought, began emanating content, stemming from the persistent Inland, from the usually rich hinterland of the port city.14 town June and July rains lowered wheat prices at the railroad in the week of the revolution, of Eskisehir; however, their Normal levels remained double those of the previous year. wheat exporters such as this area and the Adapazar region further up the line were importing wheat for their own needs.15 generally had Harvest reports from Konya, also on the railroad, But in late June, despite recent and abundant rains, been good. residents were said to "fear the droug>p and also famine," and the governor prohibited grain exports.-LO Elsewhere, in the central Anatolian town of Sivas, wheat of 165 prices in January, 1908, stood at 257 piasters/kile years. After dropping okkes, the highest level in thirty-five biytwelve per cent in late February, they rebounded to new formed heights in the first week of June while inhabitants A to mosques and churches and prayed for rain. processions crept upwards, to week later, rains did come but prices still On the morning a level 24 per cent higher than in January.17 came into the town, of June 23, women from neighboring villages protested the price and quality of flour and demanded bread. By noon, some 500 townspeople joined the women at the governThe ment house, stoned the building and smashed its windows. crowd then ransacked the grain warehouses and confronted a Towards evening some military unit unwilling to open fire. 60 persons with wheat in their homes were arrested and the riot apparently subsided.18 At Kayseri, the 1907 crop had been about one-third below of 17 Flour which had sold for 3-4 piasters/batman normal. lbs. av. in mid-1907 had tripled in price by November; then, to 7-8 piasters. with better weather in December it declined, Although good rains fell in mid-May 1908, tne drought resumed were "suffering enormously ... and on June 12, the inhabitants While 12,000 high price of floi.''l9 from the extraordinarily 14LH 5/25, 2 and Sabah, 5/24/1908, 1; LH; 5/26, 1 and See Atatark Ans., I, e.g. 297. 396-397, 6717/1908, 2. unrest around for accounts of military and civilian Izmir dating back to 1902. 15Stamboul, 7/10; 7/23/1908. 2-3 and Stamboul, 5/29/1908. 6/16; 5/21; 16LH, 6/25/1908, 7/6; 17LH, 1/22, 2-3; 2/5, 2; 3/5, 2; 611, 3; 6/17, 3; and unit, nominally oneU724/1908, 2; piaster--monetary of measure; hundredth of a Turkish pound; kile--unit okke--unit of weight, 2.8 lbs. av.. 18Atatiurk Ans., consul. 19Stamboul, 1908 . I, 404-405 6/23/1908. after Also, reports LH, 1/24, of the French 1; 5/20, 3; 6/27/ D1152 persons gathered to pray for rain, the local government intervened and sold subsidized flour, but at the level of 13 piasters. On June 15, a correspondent reported on affairs in the town. "Seldom have I seen such a constant watching of the rain." By then, sky, such a deep longing for the 'latter' flour prices were about quadruple those of the previous year.20 Near the east-central Anatolian town of Erzurum, authorities were aiding some villagers with exemptions from the usual duties on imported grain.21 There, the people had been A taxpayers' revolt in varying stages of unrest since 1906. in 1906-1907 had resulted in the destruction of the government of several officials, thewounding of the building, the killing to suppress the governor, and the refusal of some officers rising. Erzurum again exploded in September, 1907 when bread of prices "suddenly" doubled. A crowd stormed the properties flour merchants, lynched one and badly wounded two others. The central Again some military personnel refused to act. government took the initiative in October, imprisoning or exofficers.22 ecuting rebel ringleaders while exiling disobedient The sources then fall silent on events in Erzurum but, from September 1907 until the following May, bread prices remained more than double their earlier, normal, levels.23 A distinct pattern emerges from this survey of events in the Anatolian provinces. TWheat/flour/bread prices shot up after mid-1907, then slipped very modestly at the end of the of the future harvest. Prices, however, year in expectation and then rose to new never fell from the late 1907 plateaus Many heights as widespread drought again became evident. areas, with the increasing certainty of a second consecutive crop failure, possessed only the thinnest of margins against the growing possibility of famine. For the regimte, the continuing deterioration mocked its subsidy programs and made the hazardous. policy of arrest and exile increasingly Conditions in the imperial and favored city of Istanbul of reflected those in the provinces and affected all classes the population. As 1908 began most commodity prices still prices remained were well above normal. Fruit and vegetable 25 per cent, firewood 58 per cent and charcoal 250 per cent above the levels prevailing at the beginning of the 1906-1907 20 _, 6/27/1908; also sources cited in n. 19 above. Not far away, 21Sabah, 2/20/1908, 1 and LH, 2/20/1908, 2. at Harput, "Prices of almost all articles of food are double the prices of ordinary years." LH, 6/25/1908, 1. 22Atattirk Ans., I, 358-360, 380-383 and Mehmet Nusret, Erzurum (Istanbul, 1328), 57-71 which forms Tarihge-i the source of the encyclopedia account. 23LH, 4/10, 3; 4/22, 2; 5/7/1908 and AtatCirk Ans., I, 382. Also flour prices cited in the above newspapers as well as in LH, 5/28, 3 and 6/24/1908, 3. For bread riots in the Arab provincial centers of Aleppo and Beirut in November, 1907, see Atattirk Ans., I, 384, after reports of the French consuls. Dl1 153 In addition, the city suffered a meat shortwinter crisis.24 In age during the Winter of 1907-1908 and the Spring of 1908. January, 1908, the price of mutton, consumed mainly by the midwas at least 50 per cent above normal. dle and upper classes, By March, the price of meat had reached "unbelievable figto a variety of factors ures."25 The shortage was attributed conversion of including the export of animals, the increasing and a combination of pasture to cropland, high fodder prices, in both European heavy snows, prolonged drought and epizoots Turkey and Anatolia.26 in January, began setting The municipal administration, meat prices on a weekly basis as the imperial government ordered the provinces to ship their herds to the capital.27 Through March and April 1908, Istanbul newspapers lavished extensive coverage on the shipment of animals to the city, for By midenumerating the arriving animals. example, precisely April, thanks in part to the rgceipt of sheep from Syria, the Reports now focused on the crisis apparently had passed. in Still, of epizoot from the various areas.29 disappearance early May, one newspaper could report that the "rise in meat as does that of the general preoccupation prices constitutes all other objects of alimentation."30 Department of Commerce and Labor, Bureau 24United States, of Manufactures, Monthly Consular and Trade Reports January 1908, 202-203 (hereafter U. S. Monthy Reports), and Revue Nr. 2407 [73719U07737T0-532. For meat LH, 3/18/1908, 2; Revue cited in n. 24 above. Sabah, 3/7, 2; 3/27, 1; prices during March-June see: 2; and LH, 3/18, 4/5,1; 4/6, 1; 4/17, 2; and 6/14/198, 2; 3/27, 2; 4/8, 1; and 4/27/1908, 1. 26Sabah, 2/12, 2; 3/18, 2; 3/27/1908, 1-2 and LH, 4/8/1908, Potsdam, Auswart'loes Amt 2. 7entrales Staatsarchiv, See Sabah, 2/27, ZStA,AA), Nr. 6722, Bl. 70. (hereafter 1-2; 2/28, 2; 3/7, 2; 3/12, 1; 3/15, 2; 3/187 2;and 3/26/1908, 1 for government counter measures. 27LH, 1/28, 3; 2/18, 2; and 3/28/1908, 1-2. 21_3/26, 1; 4/5, 1; and 4/8/1908, 1. Sabah, 3/11, 28Several meat purveyors to the army contracted for the a shipment of 30,000 sheep from Syria to the capital, measure winning them the gratitude of the press, later contracts and, probably, considerable provisioning See, for example, Sabah, 3/25, 1; 4/2, 1-2; profits. LH, 3/26, 1; 3/27, 4/6, 1; 4/17, 2; and 6/14/1908?; 2; and 4/2/1908, 1. 295Sabah, 6/14, 2; 6/17, 2; 6/22, 1; 6/24, 2; 6/29, 1; and Also LH, 4/23, 2; 4,/24, 2; 5/12, 2; and 772071908, 1-2. of For contrary reports or indications 6/3/1908, 2. see LH, 6/29/1908, 3; Stamboul, 7/7/ epizoot revival, 1908, and Atattirk Ans., I, 404. For "'buffalo" 30LH, 5/8/1908, 2. EH, 3/27/1908, 1. meat sales in Izmir, see D1154 While confronting and apparently resolving the meat shortage, Istanbul faced another, most serious, of food supcrisis ply. The upward spiral in the price of wheat, flour and bread severely threatened the well-being of the broad Ottoman masses for whom bread was the major item of consumption: the average Ottoman ate an impressive 2.2-3.0 lbs. av. daily.31 During the several decades preceding the crisis being related here, Istanbul wheat prices had fluctuated according to a certain pattern. Usually, average monthly prices rose or fell moderately, within a range of T- 10 per cent, with an increase during one month generally being offset by subsequent seasonal price declines. Annual price fluctuations commonly were of modest proportions. In 1907-1908, however, the pattern was broken; the divergence began in the late Spring of 1907. As evidence of a poor crop accumulated, the average April wheat price of 38.31 paras/okke jumped to 43.00 in June. Nervousness in the market mounted and when prices reached 50.50 in September, trading temporarily ceased. At this juncture, the government intervened with its measures to assure bread supplies. When trading resumed, however, prices continued their upward course and, in the final three months of the year, averaged 41 per cent above the April price (with a peak of 55.40 paras/okke in November). During the year, the average quarterly wheat price had advanced steadily from 36.77 to 40.74 in the second quarter, to 46.06 and, in the final sing quarter, to 54.19 paras/okke. The fixed price of bread, determined after negotiations between the municipality and the bakers' guild, rose accordingly. After the first wheat price increase, the "years old" fixed retail price of 40 paras per loaf of standard weight bread was moved up to 45 in June 1907. In September it was allowed to increase again, to 50 paras.33 By the end of 1907, bread and wheat prices respectively had increased 25 and 45 per cent in six months. 31For bread consumption patterns see, for example, Nr. 256, 7/31/1908, 156; ZStA,AA, Nr. 53736, Bi. U. S. Monthly Reports, January 1909, 71. Revue, 39 and 32 Prices derived from semi-weekly market reports in JCCC, 1907, and calculated in constant value monetary and weight units. Forty paras equal one piaster. Prices are for Ankara Nr. 1 wheat; other grades follow similar price trends. A table stating average annual prices for standard grade wheat in Istanbul, 1876-1908, is available from the author. Generally, prices fell during the late 19th century price depression and gradually rose after 1896. The indexed table shows that if wheat cost 100 in 1906, it had risen to 123 in 1907 and 145 in 1908. 33JCCC, 7/20/1895, 339; Ataturk Ans., I, 386-387. In reto loaf weights, French language papers in eFing Istanbul usually stated kilogram while Ottoman language sources alternatively employed kilogram and okke (of 1.28 kgs.). Ikdam, 8/27/1908, 2 and Revue, Nr. 257, 8/31/1908, 322, make clear that the weight standard is the kilogram and not the okke. Pressure on bread prices- already was evident in 1906; see, e.g., Revue, Nr. 227, 2/28/1906, 247-249. D1155 In early 1908, Istanbul newspapers began publishing If the reports on crop prospects inthe provinces. detailed the scheme must have backfired: intent was to reassure readers, market had The international the news was bad. generally, however, so that the year in Istanbul, sufficiently stabilized In its in wheat prices. slippage began with a fractional eagerness to regain lost revenues, the government reacted perthe export prohihaps too quickly and, in February, repealed in wheat and flour import bitions as well as the reductions ns then lowered the fixed price of bread to Negotiati duties. 45 paras per loaf A4 But as another poor season unfolded, from the year's low of 49.25 paras/okke Istanbul wheat prices, upwards through March, in late February, crept fractionally During the first six months of April, May, June, and July. In 1908, they were 35 per cent higher than the year before. wheat prices reached 55.00 paras! the month of the revolution, The bread price moved correokke, their peak for the year. spondingly and on May 7, ro e to 50 paras, a level maintained until after the revolution.15 Bread prices increased much more than the quoted statisIstanbul bakers In this era of rising prices, tics indicate. felt caught in the squeeze between government efforts to keep bread prices at a minimum, and their own desire to maintain some bakers produced and In response, certain profit margins. In the first five months of 1908, the sold shortweight bread. over 100,000 loaves which it considconfiscated municipality On the average, the bread weighed 30 per ered underweight. cost cent less than the officially-set standard, an additional The quality of the bread also borne by the Ottoman consumer.36 was declining. Normally, when indigenous sources dwindled, 34Sabah, 2/8, 1; 2/16, 2; 2/25, 1; 2/26, 1; 2/27, 1; and LH, 2/26, 1; 2/27, 1; and 2/28/1908, 1. U/2871908, 1. Hariciye Arsivi, Dosya 191, 2/2/1908; Revue, Nr. 251, R2/1717, 2/29/1908, 255 and Bundesarchiv (Koble 2/26/1908. 35Bread prices in Bas Bakanlik Arsivi (Prime Ministry hereafter BBA), Bab-i Ali Evrak Archives, Istanbul, BEO) 247951; LH, 5/3, 1-2; 5/5, 2; Odast (hereafter Stamboul, 5/4/1908, 2; 5/6, 1-2; and 5/7/1908, 1-2. Sabah, 5/4, 1 and 5/7/1908, 1. Wheat prices for 1908 derived from JCCC weekly market reports according to procedures sketched in n. 32. The bread price rose immediately after the revolution, of changing food The implications to 55 paras/loaf. between the Ottoman masses and the prices on relations Young Turk regime are being studied by the author. 36LH, 1/28, 1; 2/19, 1; 3/5, 1-2; 3/19, 4; 4/21, 1; 5718/1908, 1; 6/11/1908, 2; Stamboul, 7/1/1908; Atatturk 256 and Nr Ans., I, 386. Revue, Nr. 22172728Jl906, Osman Nuri, Sehri Eminleri T56, 7/31/19087-Is6-157. 1927), 198-199, for stronger municipality (Istanbul, measures to prevent weight fraud beginning c. early 1906. D1156 wheat and flour imports helped to maintain low bread prices. In 1907, however, world wheat production slumped as many other countries suffered varying degrees of crop failure. The great American granary reported a 15 per cent shortfall in 1907 while in early 1908 a drought threatened its Spring crop.37 More immediately important to the Ottomans was production in Bulgaria and Rumania, countries which normally were significant suppliers both in the international and Istanbul markets. In 1907, Rumanian output was do 4 63 per cent while Bulgarian production fell 40 per cent.38 Istanbul millers and bakers therefore turned elsewhere and, in 1908, procured a record 73 per cent of the flour consumed in Istanbul from France (Marseilles) and Italy. These two sources provided a cheaper but lower quality flour than the Danubian, Russian or Ottoman areas. 9 The procurement of this less-expensive flour, although its price had risen 50 per cent in two years, made it to keep bread prices within the state-imposed easier limits.40 But the widespread use of poorer-grade flours, coupled with the practice of short weights, did place the Ottoman consumer at a great disadvantage. Istanbul residents, in the several months before the revolution, were eating lower-quality bread of lesser weight, and paying more f2j their loaves than at any time in the past twenty-five years. '"Nos estomacs et nos bourses protestent.'42 All the while, they received continuing 37 Historical 10/12/19097, global Abstracts 473, of the United States, indicate wheat production an 11 per cent 511; decline between 1906 and 1907. JCCC, in 38United States, Department of Agriculture, Yearbook of the United States Department of Agriculture (Washington, 1909) and ibid., 1910, 606-607 and 444-445 respectively also note that world-wide wheat production in 1907 and 1908 was down about 8 per cent compared with the preceding two years. the JCCC, 5/2/1908, 145, places Rumanian decline, compared with average 1902-1906 levels, at 50 per cent. 39During the period 1889-1906, Marseilles and Italy typically provided 2-12 per cent of the flour consumed in Istanbul--1899 with 28 per cent and 1900 with 52 per cent are the only exceptions. In 1907, the two sources shipped 45 per cent, Market summaries in LH, 1889-1890, and JCCC, 1892-1908. 40Market reports in JCCC, 1906-1908. The procedures explained in n. 32 were employed to obtain flour prices. 41This assertion is based partially on the record use of Marseilles and Italian flour and contemporary reports, Revue, Nr. 256, 7/31/1908, 159. e.g., Also, the table cited in n. 32 demonstrates that comparably high wheat prices had not prevailed in Istanbul since 1880-1882. For the direct linkage between wheat, flour, and bread prices see Ikdam, 8/17/1908, 2. 42Revue, Nr. 256, 7/31/1908, 159. D1157 that the situation was not worsening.43 if unfounded assurances The uncertainty and high prices in the first half of 1908 The 1908 harvest was perhaps the worst fully. were justified the year ended famines of the mid-1870s: since the killing in and near-famine conditions with widespread crop failures such as the volume of rail Several indicators many areas.44 and sea shipments of grain during 1907 and 1908 attest to the severity of the shortages. The Anatolian Railway after its completion in 1895 had anbecome the major Istanbul wheat (but not flour) supplier, nually shipping up to 94 per cent of that grain received in the rose from 238,000 Annual average shipments of cereals capital. 1896-1901, to tons during its first years of full operations, With the 1907 crop failure, 310,000 tons between 1902 and 1906. merchants in the interior drew on existing stocks and shipped By the Spring of 1908, 240,000 tons, down nearly one-fourth. stocks were depleted and grain shipments for the year plummeted, to 93,000 tons.45 if less clearly evident in cereal are similarly Declines centers of Mersin, Izmir and Samsun. exports from the coastal During the period 1876-1906, grain shipments from these cities Annual average (at least 50 per cent). had risen considerably port of Mersin rose dramatgrain exports from the southeastern ically between 1876-1880 and 1891-1895, slipped during the and war but by crop failures 1898-1899 turnaround occasioned to perhaps twice the levels of the 1870s and again increased, During these five years, the 1880s, in the 1902-1906 period. 43JCCC, the organ of the merchant community, optimistically Fithroughout the wheat crisis. manipulated statistics 405, it admitted that nally, in the 12/26/1908 issue, The other newsyear. 1908 had been a "most difficult" also often predicted a papers, in their news sections, from letters promising harvest but, in the same issues, the reverse situation. indicated correspondents provincial derived its magnitude not only from 44The 1907-1908 crisis internal Ottoman conditions but from the concomitant crop abroad. or shortfalls failures in 1907-1908 with those of earlier To compare conditions du chemin de fer ottoman d'Anatolie, see: Societe periods, Betriebsj'ahr uber das... Bericht des Verwaltungsrathes for the years 1889-1908 (1. Januar bis 31. December...) Accounts and Great Britain, (hereafter Annual Report(s); Papers, Parliamentary Papers (hereafter A&P), reports on the trade and commerce of Smyrna/Izmir, Samsun, Trabzon and Adana/Mersin, 1876-1908. bread continued to derive mainly from flour 45Istanbul the "Limited Revolution: milled abroad: see my article, Impact of the Anatolian Railway on Turkish Transportation Business 1890-1908," of Istanbul, and the Provisioning Annual Reports, History Review, Summer, 1977, 139-160. shipments fell below thoe of 1908 Ifrea1908.Cereal in 1898 and 1899 only once, in 1899, after crop failures new. was relatively still and when the railroad D1158 annual value of Mersin cereal exports averaged 293,000 British pounds but in 1907, even with inflated prices, declined to 193,000 pounds. Cereal shipments from Izmir had risen steadily and, in 1906, were at least double those of three decades before. Between 1902 and 1906, they annually averaged 571,000 British pounds but in 1907 and 1908, fell to 328,000 pounds (again with higher prices). At the Black Sea port of Samsun, the value of cereal exports in the late 1880s and early 1890s was approximately twice that of the preceding ten year period but then slipped badly between 1902 and 1906, to about the level of the early 1880s. In 1908, exports fell further, to 23,000 British pounds, about one-third the annual average level of the preceding fivg years and one-ninth that of Samsun's best export half-decade.4 of the Agricultural Loan statistics Bank, a government agency providing low-interest credit to cultivators, also reveal the depression in Ottoman agriculture during 1907-1908. While secured bank loans annually averaged 679,000 Turkish pounds between 1902 and 1906, their value rose to 1,097,000 pounds in 1907 and to 1,143,000 pounds in 1908. Perhaps a better indicator of the crisis are bank loans to those unable to furnish real estate as collateral, a group usually ignored by the bank and to which it annually lent, between 1902 and 1906, only 40,000 Turkish pounds. In 1907 and 1908, the annual value of such unsecured loans rose more than six fold.47 - - - - - - - - - - The available concrete evidence of unrest triggered by these grave and deteriorating economic conditions has been summarized above. Although this documentation is relatively sparse, a reflection, perhaps, of the lack of research, contemporary reporting and/or actual passivity, it does suggest widespread provincial discontent and distress. In Istanbul, signs of unrest also are visible among the workers, a group which had been in a fairly favorable position. In a possible 46A&P reports on the trade and commerce of Smyrna/Izmir, Samsun, and Adana/Mersin and Revue, Nr. 253, 4/30/1908, 598. The 1907 Mersin exports, originally reported at 157,000 pounds, were revised upwards to 193,000 pounds. The available sources suffer from several major deficiencies. First, exports often are given under the general rubric "cereals," which include wheat, barley, maize, and oats. Second, the export statistics most often are stated in units of monetary value and not weight or measure. Third, we have annual price data for Istanbul but not the three ports. Actual production figures do exist for the region as well as some provinces but not in a sufficiently continuous series. Furthermore, the sources employ terms--Anatolia, Asia Minor and Asiatic Turkey--which are not necessarily interchangeable. And finally, the fundamental accuracy of both region-wide and provincial figures is questionable. 47 YusufSaim Atasagun, Tarkiye Cumhuriyeti Ziraat Bankasi, 1888-1939 (Istanbul, For 1939), tables on 261 and 345. loan assistance to cultivators at the end of 1908, see BBA BEO 258442, 259441, and 259832, and ZStA,AA, Nr. 15052, Bl. 55. Policy changes introduced by the Young Turk government account for some of the increases. D1159 response to the worsening economic conditions, Ottoman railroad workers established a union on October 30, 1907.48 The next day, the Oriental Railway Company raised its workers' daily wages and "accepted" salary increases for its officials while, at the end of the year, the Anatolian Railway Company created a pension fund for its employees. Istanbul dock workers agitated in July 1907 and mid-June 1908 and, on the earlier date, some apparently lost their jobs after seeking pay increases.49 During the first half of 1908, office workers in the capital sought to organize but, fearing the "great risks," gave up the effort until after the revolution.50 Public health employees there received 10-15 per cent raises in late February 1908, an action one newspaper lauded as exemplary if, unfortunately, unique in the city.51 Another indication of discontent is an imperial decree of early June which ordered the immediate payment of a month's salary to state employees and officials.52 In the absence of more complete data on the wages of Ottoman urban workers, average family size, frequency of supplemental income within a family and/or second jobs for household can only be approxheads, the impact of food price increases imated. Before the 1907-1908 downturn, the average common laborer, if unimarried and supporting only himself, used 10-15 per cent of his income for his own daily bread needs. Railroad workers at the lower end of their occupation's pay scale, as well as some printing house workers, devoted 14-19 per cent of their wages for bread. laborers such as bricklayers Skilled and carpenters spent only 5-6 per cent.53 If we then assume that the above workers had a family with wife and two children 48Stefan Velikov, "Sur le mouvement ouvrier et socialiste en 1908," jeune-turque en Turquie apres la revolution Growing consciousEtudes Balkaniques, 1964, Nr. 1, 41. ness among the workers, noted by Velikov and others, surely played a role as well. 49Atatairk Ans., I, 387, quoting the newspaper Moniteur BBA BEO Annual Report, 1907, 8. 11/12/1907. Oriental, 231817, 250105, and 250219. 8/20/1908 indicates 50Stamboul, 8/22/1908; ibid., association 1908 formation of an international mercial employees in Istanbul. 51 H, 2/25, 1908, 2. LH, 2; 2/27/1908, 6/10/1908, 1; and Sabah, 2/25, a March of com- 1; 2/28/ 2. are for Istanbul workers' wages related 53The percentages Annual Reports, clipping from to Istanbul bread prices. of the an unspecified 1908 magazine in collection ZStA,AA (MerseDeutsche Bank, bound after the reports. burg), Rep. 93, Abt. E, Nr. 396, B1. 107r; A. Gabriel, des chemins des fer Les dessous de l'administration et de Bagdad (Istanbul, ottomans d'Anatolie 1911), 131; Tevfik Cavdar, Milll MIicadelenin Stamboul, 8/12/1908. 1974), 129-130. ekonomik kOkenleri (Istanbul, D1160 and provided the whole family income, we can obtain a notion of what the bread price increases might have meant to some families. The common laborer in such a situation would initially have devoted 40-60 per cent of his income to bread needs and, other things equal, 50-75 per cent by July 1908. Similarly, railroad workers and printing house employees would have been paying 56-76 per cent of their wages for bread before the crisis and an implausible 72-100 per cent thereafter. For skilled laborers, bread now would have drained about 25-30 per cent of wages. Put more simply, all individuals, regardless of income and marital status, were paying 25 per cent more for their bread in July 1908 than 13 months earlier and few enjoyed even partially compensating wage increases. Considering other necessities such as rent and other minimum food and clothing needs, some of these statistical calculations strain credibility. There is no indication in the materials available for research on this essay how the spending pattern of workers as a group changed in response to the extraordinary and sometimes absurd proportion of income needed just for bread. There were presumably some consumption substitutions. Some families had two or three breadwinners while the statistical illustrations assumed only one. Other workers may have borrowed from relatives, from moneylenders, or obtained retail store credit. And some simply may have eaten less. The wage hikes noted above were the exception; more generally, "neither profits nor salaries have followed the upward tendency (in prices]... "54 Most wages remained fixed during the inflationary period, a reversal of what one writer has described as a rise in real wages during most of the half century before the revolution.55 Ottoman workers were less well off in July 1908 than thev had been for several decades and were confronting a sharp, sudden decline in their level of living.56 One theorist suggests that a long period of relative 54U. S. Monthly Reports, January 1908, 203. 55Charles Issawi issued a preliminary report on "Wages in Turkey, 1850-1914," to the "First International Congress on the Social and Economic History of Turkey, 1071-1920" held at Hacettepe University, Ankara, Jtuly 11-13, 1977. He noted that at the turn of the century, real wages for common laborers were almost "twice as high as those of 1850" and those for "skilled laborers perhaps one and a half times as high." Fragmentary information, however, suggests little increase in real wages after the end of the 1873-1896 price depression. Compare, for example, the 1908 wages of common laborers in Izmir noted by Issawi with those of "day laborers" in 1896 cited in United States, Department of State, Bureau of Statistics, Special Consular Reports, "Money and Prices in Foreign Countries," report by Consul Madden of Smyrna/Izmir, 8t26/1896, 209. 56Revue, Nr. 257, 8/31/1908, 233-236, discussed the outbreak of strikes after the revolution and said that to understand the workers' position several infactors, cluding the rising cost of living and unjustifiably high prices which made it impossible to live on some of their former salaries, had to be considered. .D1161 prosperity followed by a "short period of sharp reversal" and gratifications which creates a "gap between expectations At this juncture, quickly widens and becomes intolerable."57 prosperity of Whether the relative violent action ensues. predecades and its sudden turnabout in the 1907-1908 crisis or change candisposed the Ottoman urban workers to violence not be determined here but the question is posed as a spur to further research. of 1907-1908 hardly For the rural masses, the shortfalls deprivation, impoverishment represented a unique experience: and the cycle of abundance followed by want were familiar pheand price rises of seemingly nomena. Also, crop failures comparable magnitudes had occurred within living memory, most in 1898-1899, without sparking revolution. Therefore, recently, the economic setbacks in 1907-1908 cannot be viewed as the sole What seems new in July 1908 is motive force of the revolution. that an economic crisis unfolded in the presence of an orgaFor the first time in cadre. nized, widespread revolutionary decades, there was a favorable juncture of economic and political conditions. a In sum, this preliminary investigation has indicated days of 1908: a rapidly second side to the prerevolution among workers, deteriorating economic environment, restiveness and an a suffering and sometimes riotous rural population, of The existence abiding pessimism for the future harvest. between elements of these various urban and direct contacts Alrural groups and the Young Turk officers is uncertain. climate though the officers clearly acted in a socio-economic as to it remains a matter of conjecture favorable to success, whether or not the revolution would have occurred in the abinternational sence of such a climate. To summarize the case: (both extreme cold, drought, crop failure financial crisis, and epizoot created unstable domestic and international) economic conditions and pushed food prices to unprecedented Prospects in July 1908, heights on the eve of the revolution. before the new harvest and when stocks were low, seemed grim, with little hope for improvement. Frustrated urban workers reason There was little faced a declining standard of living. for either the urban or rural populace to aid a regime apparently unable to alter conditions. favoring the Young Turks in July The economic conditions 1908 also created the backdrop for the subsequent evolution of of the populace The acquiescence relations. government-subject of to the July events carried with it implicit expectations into action during the economic benefits which were translated and strikes following weeks when new workers' organizations the expectations stifled Government repression proliferated. supported population the disappointed and, nine months later, The present of the Sultan. the unsuccessful counter-revolution the economic setting of the 1908 revolustudy, by establishing tion, suggests that the flow of events in Young Turk and early if the tie between republican Turkey can be made more sensible and government economic conditions, popular expectations, action is explored further. "The J-Curve of Rising and Declining 57James C. Davies, and as a Cause of Some Great Revolutions Satisfactions Hugh D. Graham and Ted R. Gurr, a Contained Rebellion," (New York, eds., Violence in America, revised edition 1970), 690-730. Society for Comparative Studies in Society and History Economic Bases of Revolution and Repression in the Late Ottoman Empire Author(s): Carter Vaughn Findley Source: Comparative Studies in Society and History, Vol. 28, No. 1 (Jan., 1986), pp. 81-106 Published by: Cambridge University Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/178681 . Accessed: 08/02/2011 05:18 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. 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Cambridge University Press and Society for Comparative Studies in Society and History are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Comparative Studies in Society and History. http://www.jstor.org Economic Bases of Revolution and Repression in the Late Ottoman Empire CARTER VAUGHN FINDLEY Ohio State University Centralto late Ottomanhistory is a series of events that marksa milestone in the emergence of modem forms of political thoughtand revolutionaryaction in the Islamic world. The sequence opened with the rise of the Young Ottoman ideologues (1865) and the constitutionalmovement of the 1870s. It continued with the repression of these forces under Abdiilhamid11 (18761909). It culminated with the resurgence of opposition in the Young Turk movement of 1889 and later, and especially with the revolution of 1908. Studiedso far mostly in political and intellectualterms,1 the sequence seems well understood. The emergence of the Young Ottomans-the pioneers of political ideology, in any modem sense, in the Middle East-appears to result from the introductionof Western ideas and from stresses created within the bureaucracyby the political hegemony of the Tanzimatelite (ca. 1839-71).2 The repressionunderAbdiilhamidfollows from the turmoilof the late 1870s, the weaknesses of the constitutionof 1876, and the craft of the new sultan in creatinga palace-dominatedpolice state. The emergence of the Young Turks shows that terrorultimatelyfostered, ratherthan killed, the opposition. Too, theireventualrevolutionarysuccess shows how much more effective than the I Ernest E. Ramsaur, Jr., The Young Turks:Prelude to the Revolution of 1908 (Princeton, 1957);BernardLewis, The Emergenceof ModernTurkey,2d ed. (London, 1968), 150-74, 194230; Serif Mardin,The Genesis of YoungOttomanThought(Princeton, 1962); idem, Jon Tiirklerin Siyasi Fikirleri [Young Turk political ideas] (Ankara, 1964); idem, "LibertarianMovements in the OttomanEmpire, 1878-1895," Middle East Journal, 16:2 (1962), 169-82; idem, "Power, Civil Society, and Culturein the OttomanEmpire," ComparativeStudiesin Society and History, 11:3 (1969), 258-81; Feroz Ahmad, The YoungTurks:The Committeeof Union and Progress in TurkishPolitics, 1908-1914 (Oxford, 1969); StanfordJ. Shaw and Ezel K. Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey (Cambridge, 1977), II, 263-67, 273ff.; CarterVaughn Findley, "The Advent of Ideology in the Islamic Middle East, PartII," Studia Islamica, 56 (1982), 147-66; Donald Quataert, "The 1908 Young Turk Revolution: Old and New Approaches," Middle East Studies Association Bulletin, 13:1 (1979), 22-29. 2 Mardin,Genesis, 121-32; idem, "Power, Civil Society, and Culture," 277; idem, "Super Westernizationin Urban Life in the Ottoman Empire in the Last Quarterof the Nineteenth Century," in Turkey:Geographicand Political Perspectives, PeterBenedict et al., eds. (Leiden, 1974), 403-46. 0010-4175/86/1481-2342 $2.50 ? 1986 Society for ComparativeStudy of Society and History 82 CARTER VAUGHN FINDLEY Young Ottomans they were as political mobilizers.3 Finally, international political forces played a part, as indicated by the role of refugees from the RussianEmpirein the developmentof Turkishnationalism,and by the excitement that the Russo-JapaneseWar and the Russianrevolutionof 1905 roused in the OttomanEmpire, as elsewhere in Asia.4 No doubt, this political-intellectualinterpretationcovers many of the most importantpoints. Yet, it remains to ask whether analysis of additionallinkages between the sequence-ferment-repression-revolution-and its historical context would not add significantly to understandingof the sequence. This essay answersthe question positively by showing that the sequence was linked to economic, as well as intellectual and political, developments.5 In fact, as 1908 approached,the economic situationevolved into a variationon a well-known theory that seeks the origins of revolutionin a "sharp reversal" following a "prolonged period . . . of economic and social development."6 Evidence for the interpretationoffered here emerges from comparisonof two sets of quantitativedata:the salariesrecordedin the personneldossiers of the OttomanForeign Ministry, and the commodity prices publishedin Istanbul newspapersof the period 1851-1914. The method of analysis is to produce time series, of salary statistics in the one case, and commodityprices in the other, and then, by comparingthese series, to arriveat conclusions about changes over time in the economic position of a key sector of the bureaucratic intelligentsia.7 3 Since I have treated problems of ideology and political mobilization in another study, discussionof these topics here will be schematic. Interestedreadersshould see Findley, "Advent of Ideology, Part II." 4 Nikki Keddie, "Religion and Irreligionin EarlyIranianNationalism," ComparativeStudies in Society and History, 4:3 (1962), 265; L. S. Stavrianos,Global Rift (New York, 1981), 38890; David Kushner,The Rise of TurkishNationalism (London, 1977), 10-14. 5 A similar argument for the years right around 1908 appears in Donald Quataert, "The Economic Climate of the 'Young Turk Revolution' in 1908," Journal of ModernHistory, 51:3 (1979), D1147-D 1161 (available from University Microfilms, Ann Arbor, Michigan, orderno. IJ-00049). See also idem, "Commercializationof Agriculturein OttomanTurkey, 1800-1914," InternationalJournal of TurkishStudies, 1:2 (1980), 52-53. 6 James C. Davies, "Toward a Theory of Revolution," in When Men Revolt-and Why, James C. Davies, ed. (New York, 1971), 134-47. Some scholars question whether the term revolution is appropriatefor the Young Turk case of 1908. The view taken here is that it is meaningfulto speak of revolutionarytransformationof a political system-a fundamental,violent, restructuringof the political game-as distinctfrom more drasticrevolutionsthattransform socioeconomicrelations,and perhapsculture,as well. Revolutionarytransformationof a polity is also distinguishablefrom the less drasticcoup d'6tat, an irregularand usually violent change in the identity of those who wield power, without necessarily any restructuringof the political process. The view of political revolutiontaken here is congruentwith the ideas of Davies, and other theorists of revolution. Considering what the Ottoman Empire was like before 1908, a strongcase can be made that the Ottomanexperience of 1908 was a political revolutionas here defined. 7 For assistancein this research,I am indebtedto the late WilfordL'Esperance,andto Charles Issawi, Mehmet Genq, Andreas Tietze, Russell Major, David Landes, Metin Heper, Yilmaz Esmer, Lars Sandberg, Donald Quataert,,evket Pamuk, Feroz Ahmad, Justin McCarthy,Tom Whitney, and Jim Wagner. ECONOMIC BASES OF OTTOMAN REVOLUTION 83 While bureaucraticsalaries, particularlythose of a single agency, may seem to have little bearingon the subjectindicatedin the title of this essay, the Foreign Ministry-aside from being the one Ottoman government agency whose personnel records are available to researchersas a discrete corpus of manageable size-was particularlyimportantin the rise of the modernist intelligentsia. This was especially true in the generation of the Young Ottomans, almost all of whose leaderswere associatedwith this ministry.While less strong in the generationof the Young Turks, whose leaders came from both militaryand civil services, the link to the civil bureaucracywas a significant fact of thatperiod, too.8 The economic fortunesof less elite segments of Ottomansociety are now becoming betterknown,9 and we shall make at least some comparativecomments aboutthem in this discussion. Given limited but growing political mobilizationin this period, however, the economic fortunes of the elites surely had more to do with the origins of majorpolitical movements than did those of the masses, however importantthe latter were in respondingto opposition appeals. I. FOREIGN MINISTRY SALARIES In 1877, the Ottomangovernmentbegan to keep official personnel records, includingregularmentionof salarychanges. Data collected from all recoverable files of career officials of the Foreign Ministry provide the basis for a study of bureaucraticsalaries throughoutroughly the second half of the nineteenth century. Analysis of the salaries presents problems pertainingto the representativenessof the data, the monetaryunit of payment, the relationof the salary figures in the records to the actual receipts of the officials, and variations over the years in the numbers and seniority of the officials for whom thereare data. Once the observationsand adjustmentsthatcan be made in response to these problems, as set forth in the appendix, have been carried out, we are in position to open discussion of the salarystructureby presenting series of adjustedmeans and medians. These figures are shown in Table 1, and are presented graphically in Figure 1. Considerationof the means and 8 Phrasesliked bureaucraticintelligentsiaarejustified in speakingof the Ottomanelites in the sense that, historically, governmentservice was the predominant,almost the exclusive, way for intellectuals to earn their livelihoods. One of the best-chartedthemes of nineteenth-century Ottomanhistory is the link between reformand the creationof a Western-oriented"modernist" segment within the bureaucraticintelligentsia. In the civil bureaucracy,the Foreign Ministry played the key role in shapingthe modernistleadershipthatdominatedthe governmentduringthe Tanzimat. The rise of the Young Ottomans in the 1860s representsthe emergence from the "modernistintelligentsia" of a movement opposing the leading Tanzimatstatesmen. About the same time, bureaucraticand literarycareerswere also beginningto differentiate,a process linked especially to the rise of journalism(Mardin,Genesis, 124-27; idem, Jon Turklerin,94 et passim; Lewis, Emergence, 88-89, 147-50; CarterVaughn Findley, Bureaucratic Reform in the Ottoman Empire (Princeton, 1980), 126-40, 209-17; idem, "Ideology, Part II," 151-52). 9 KorkutBoratav, A. G. Okgiin, and S. Pamuk, "Ottoman Wages and the World Economy, 1839-1913," Review (publishedby the FernandBraudelCenter, State Universityof New York, Binghamton), forthcoming. CARTER VAUGHN FINDLEY 84 TABLE 1 Monthly Salaries of Ottoman Foreign Ministry Officials Serving in Istanbul, Adjusted Means and Medians (gold kurus per month) Means 1863 1864 1865 1866 1867 1868 1869 1870 1871 1872 1873 1874 1875 1876 1877 1878 1879 1880 1881 1882 1883 1884 1885 1886 5,536 4,137 2,691 2,668 1,655 2,674 2,600 2,960 3,386 3,331 Medians 4,550 3,100 1,500 3,050 1,550 3,017 3,025 1,844 1,916 1,991 1,150 1,150 1,044 1,050 1,339 1,035 1,011 1,218 1,174 1,212 1,215 1,216 1,201 2,070 1,231 2,151 1,242 2,148 2,773 2,680 2,216 2,461 1,917 1,887 1,666 1,753 1887 1888 1889 1890 1891 1892 1893 1894 1895 1896 1897 1898 1899 1900 1901 1902 1903 1904 1905 1906 1907 1908 1909 1910 1911 Means Medians 2,024 1,889 1,740 1,668 1,604 1,522 1,511 1,604 1,534 1,599 1,716 1,686 1,256 1,255 1,231 1,213 1,188 1,181 1,144 1,144 1,039 1,153 1,062 1,193 1,201 1,230 1,169 1,723 1,821 1,932 1,910 1,947 1,964 1,960 1,473 1,530 966 1,242 1,218 1,278 1,218 1,315 1,347 1,266 1,414 1,212 1,177 1,169 925 SOURCE:Salary statistics are computed from the salary notations in the personnel files of 366 officials of the OttomanForeign Ministry. The sources and proceduresfor the computationsare explained more fully in the appendix. medians leads on to analysis of long-term change in the salary distribution, and to an initial consideration of what the salaries shown in the table meant in terms of living standards. Perhaps the most conspicuous point in these salary statistics is that the means are almost invariably higher than the medians. The greater the gap, the stronger the indication that the salary distribution was inegalitarian, with many low salaries and a few higher ones. The greater the inequality, the greater the extent to which the median-the midmost salary when all salaries the mean as an indicator of the fortunes of are ranked by amount-excels most members of the group studied. The mean-median gap does narrow over ECONOMIC BASES OF OTTOMAN REVOLUTION 85 10,000 Medan C 1,000 t Median 1860 1870 1880 1890 1900 1910 FIGURE 1. Monthly Salariesof OttomanForeignMinistryOfficials Serving in Istanbul,Adjusted Means and Medians time, since the means tend to fall, while the mediansremainnearlyon a level. The exceptionally high values in both curves for the early years may be anomalies due to computation from small numbers of cases. Or they may signal that salarieshad been much higherduringthe Tanzimat(ca. 1839-71), a political period when the civil bureaucracydominatedthe polity as never again. The ideal way to learn more about the salary distributionwould be to compute statistical measures of dispersion, but this is not possible with the manipulateddata distributionthat emerges from the controls for seniority. One way to get around this problem, and incidentally to learn more about salariesin the precedingperiod, is to comparethe salaryof the highest official of the ministry, the foreign minister, with the lowest salary paid there. Since Ottoman officials normally began their careers as unpaid apprentices, verificationof the lowest salarypresentsno problem.Therewere always officials with a salaryof zero. The salariesof the ministers,however, variedover time in ways that reinforce the implications of the mean-mediangap shown in Figure 1. Because indications of these salaries appearboth in the personnel recordsand in other sources, extending back to the 1830s, the available data on this point cover a much longer span of time than the statistics in Table 1. Examiningnotationsof the amountsof foreign ministers' salaries, we find that, of eight mentions for 1838-76, seven were in the range of 60,000 to 75,000 kuru?per month; and the one anomaly, in 1872, was 50,000-still 86 CARTER VAUGHN FINDLEY more than forty times the median for that year, shown in Table 1.10 Recent studies indicate that an Ottomanlaborer would have been fortunateto earn 250 kurus per month in the early 1870s; thus the dimensions of Ottoman bureaucraticelitism emerge clearly from these figures."I The military and fiscal crises of the late 1870s lowered the minister's salaryto around40,000 kurusper month.12For 1880-84, it fell again, by half, to an all-time low of 20,000 kuru. 13In 1885-95, the figure was again 30,000 per month.14 From 1896 throughthe Young Turk revolution, the salary wavered in the range of 36-46,000 kuru?.In the purges and salary cuts that followed the revolution, the minister's salary fell to 25,000.15 That was still about twenty times the adjustedmedian Foreign Ministry salary shown in Table 1, while the successor of the lucky laborerwho earned 250 kuru?per month in 1872 would perhapshave earned 350 by that date.16 World War I broughta cut of 50 percentto all bureaucraticsalaries. By 1916, inflation forced a restorationof the amountcut and even the additionof cost-of-living supplements,although these proved inadequate.17 Since the highest salary indicates the range of salaries, the lowest salary 10 Salaries mentionedfor 1838-76 (and data sources) are: 75,000 kurus per month (Haus-, Hof-, and Staatsarchiv,Vienna, Turkei VI/67, 18 April 1838); 65,000 (BasbakanlikArchives, Istanbul(cited as BBA), Maliyeden Miidevver (cited as MM) 11738, p. 11, entry of 17 Safer 1256/20 April 1840); 75,000 (BBA, Dahiliye sicill-i ahval defterleri(cited as DSA) II, 218, entry of 1273/1856-57); 61,455 (BBA, MM 10531, p. 20, entry of 27 Mart 1277/8 April 1861); 75,000 (BBA, MM 10529, pp. 11, 22, entries of 26-27 Mart and 10 Nisan 1279/7-8 and 22 April 1863); 50,000 (BBA, DSA II, 416, entryof 2 Cemaziyilahir 1289/7 August 1872); 75,000 (BBA, DSA XXII, 37, entry of I Rebiyulahir1291/18 May 1874); 75,000 (BBA, DSA II, 416, entry of 8 Zilhicce 1291/16 January1875, incumbentin office until May 1876). 1 To compute this wage estimate, I have multipliedthe highest daily wage estimates in the appendixof Boratavet al., "OttomanWages," by twenty-six, the averagenumberof workdays per month assuming a six-day workweek and full employment. See also Charles Issawi, The Economic History of Turkey, 1800-1914 (Chicago, 1980), 37-43. 12 Salaries for 1876-79 (and data sources): 39,000 kurus (BBA, DSA II, 416, entry of 25 Cemaziyulevvel 1293/18 June 1876); 40,000 (ibid., entry of 16 Safer 1295/19 February1878); 39,000 (ibid., entryof 9 ?aban 1296/29 July 1879). In all notes mentioningministerialsalariesof 1876 and later, consistency with the procedureoutlined in the appendixwould requiremultiplying the salaries by 0.975 to convert them into gold kurus. Since the highest salaries may have been paid in gold (Findley, BureaucraticReform, 237)-one more inequity of the salary system-I have not done this here. 13 BBA, DSA IV, 114, entries of 5evval 1297/September 1880, 14 Muharrem 1300/25 November 1882, 19 Cemaziyulahir 1301/16 April 1884; BBA, DSA I, 576-77, entry of 20 Cemaziyulahir1299/9 May 1882. 14 BBA, DSA I, 576-77, entry of 15 Zilhicce 1302/25 September 1885, incumbentin office through 1895. 15 Mentionsof salaries for 1896-1908 begin with 45,000 kurus(BBA, DSA I, 576-77, entry of 15 Receb 1313/1 January1896). The following are from HariciyeArchives, Istanbul(cited as Har.), Sicill-i Ahval collection (cited as SA) 429: 40,000 (entry of 18 Cemaziyulevvel 1313/6 November 1895); 36,000 (9 Sevval 1314/24 March 1896); 46,000 (4 Receb 1318/28 October, 1900); 25,000 (17 ?aban 1326/14 September 1908). 16 Boratavet al., "Ottoman Wages," appendix. 17 Ahmed Emin [Yalman], Turkeyin the World War (New Haven, 1930), 151-53; Zafer Toprak, Turkiye'de "Milli Iktisat," 1908-1918 [Economic nationalism in Turkey] (Ankara, 1982), 334-35. ECONOMIC BASES OF OTTOMAN REVOLUTION 87 being zero, it is clear that the scope of inequality within the ministry was fantasticallywide. The elitism of this ministryand probablyothers, especially that of the top officials, was also of grotesqueproportionswhen comparedto the statusof humble folk. The rangeof ForeignMinistrysalariesdid fall over time, however, especially with the government bankruptcy in the late 1870s,18the revolutionin 1908, and WorldWar I. Whatfinally destroyedthe economic elitism of the ruling class was the dilemma, from 1914 on, of the person on fixed income faced with runawayinflation. This inflationarycatastropheraises a question so far neglected for earlier dates: what the officials' salaries shown in Table I meant in terms of their living standards.This question is difficult to deal with, but there are indications of what Ottomanofficials regardedas a living wage. For the end of the period, there are also two systematic, but contradictory,calculationsof living costs. From these sources, some inferences emerge. Analysis of the bureaucrats'estimates of a living wage confronts several problems. Some of the estimates rangequite high, telling perhapsmore about what bureaucratswanted than about what they needed to supporttheir families. 19Only infrequently,moreover, do specifics aboutthe size of the family to be supportedaccompany the estimates. On the other hand, the difference between nominal entitlements and net receipts (discussed in the appendix) ceases to be a concern in analysis of these estimates, for the officials obviously knew that their salaries would not be paid regularly and must have made allowance for this disparity. Fortunately,there are some estimates of the 1890s that yield a consistent and seemingly realistic indication of what officials then thought it took to supporta family. For example, one bureaucraticmemoirist recorded some calculations, aroundthe turnof this century, abouthow much he would need to retire. He wrote that since he had a small family, he could get by on 5 liras a month, or about 540 kuru?in silver.20Such a sum would not have sufficed, then, for a man with full family responsibilities.As if to supportthis point, a petitionerasserted in 1897 that he could not accept a post at a salary of 600 kuru?because he could not supporthis family on that.21For officials with large families, or with bad habits such as alcoholism, the definition of an inadequatesalary could be much higher.22 18 A. Du Velay, Essai sur l'histoirefinanciere de la Turquie(Paris, 1903), 316-461; Donald Blaisdell, EuropeanFinancial Controlin the OttomanEmpire(New York, 1929), 74-107; Shaw and Shaw, History, II, 221-27; Issawi, An EconomicHistoryof the MiddleEast and NorthAfrica (New York, 1982), 64-65. 19 E.g., Levant Herald, 4 August 1875, p. 276, circular from grand vezir to provincial governors, implying a figure of 3,000 kurus. 20 Asqidede Halil Ibrahim,Hatiralar [Memoirs], R. E. Koqu, ed. (Istanbul, 1960), 114-15. 21 BBA, Bab-i Ali Evrak Odasi 6641, Hasan Tahsin to Grand Vezir, 20 Kanun-i Sani 1312/1897. 22 Har., SA 531, entry of Cemaziyulahir 1314/1896: unable to manage on 920 kuru?per month because of size of family and alcoholism; Har., SA 270, entry of 17 Nisan 1327/1911: 2,000 kurus per month inadequatefor large family at Aleppo. 88 CARTER VAUGHN FINDLEY Still, it appearsthat an official of the mid-1890s would have considereda salaryof 1,000 kuru?per monthadequateto supporta family. Saying that she had only a very small pension, and that her son's salary was only 250 kuru? per month, an official's widow petitioned in 1892 for the son's salary to be raised to 1,000 kuru?.23Also referringto the 1890s, when he, too, was an official, the writer H. Z. Usakligil discussed the significance that a raise to 1,000 kuru?had for him on accountof an "importantdeath" in the family.24 On this basis, the adjustedForeign Ministry medians for the 1890s appear comfortable,althoughby definition half the officials made no more than the median, and some of those with lower salaries must have had large families. By the Young Turkperiod, the most nearlycomparablesalaryestimatesare fifty to one hundredpercenthigher. In a reporton a proposedreorganization of 1912, the director of the Foreign Press Office, a part of the Foreign Ministry, said that salaries of 1,500-2,000 per month would be necessary to attractproperlyqualifiedofficials. The directorgeneralof anotherdepartment reportedthat his staff should be reorganizedin classes receiving 800-1,000, 1,000-1,200, 1,200-1,500, and 1,500-2,000 kuru? per month.25 It is a matterof judgment to estimate at what age, on average, such an individual would become the chief providerfor his family, presumablyan extendedone. The assumptionthatthis occurredat aboutage thirty-fivewould again probably suggest a needed salary of 1,500. The latest medians shown in Table 1 offer little confidence that most bureaucratsmade that much in 1912. Systematic estimates of living costs computed from prices of a typical shoppinglist of goods, with the prices weighted by likely amountsconsumed, are available only for the eve of World War I. Even then, there are wide disparitiesin the estimates. One places the budgetof a "mid-level" official in 1914 at the low figure of 235.25 kuru?.26The budgetis incomplete, however, since it omits such predictableexpendituresas tobacco, transportation,andmost important-housing. There is a more complete estimate for 1914 that sets the budgetfor a family of middle standing(orta halli), as reckonedby the Istanbul Chamberof Commerce, at 945 kuru?.27Of this, 150 is for rent; tobacco and transportationagain do not appear. In the present state of research, it is not clear how the difference between these estimates should be explained. The fact that the lower one comes from the European-controlled Public Debt Administration,which paid its Ottomanemployees regularlyand 23 Har., Terciime Kalemi Evraki 1406, no. 226, petition of Enise Hanim, 20 Agustos 1308/1892. 24 Halid Ziya U?akligil, Kirk Yil [Memoirs] (Istanbul, 1969), 358. 25 Har., Mutenevvi 249, both reportsenclosed in dossier on reorganizationof ForeignMinistry, ca. 1912. 26 Toprak, Turkiye'de "Milli Iktisat," 332-33. 27 Vedat Eldem, OsmanliImparatorlugununIktisadi5artlari Hakknda bir Tetkik[Economic conditions in the OttomanEmpire] (Ankara, 1970), 214-15. ECONOMIC BASES TABLE OF OTTOMAN REVOLUTION 89 2 Percentage Relatives, Ottoman Foreign Ministry Salaries (Istanbul), Adjusted Means and Medians (base period 1880-82) Means 1863 1864 1865 1866 1867 1868 1869 1870 1871 1872 1873 1874 1875 1876 1877 1878 1879 1880 1881 1882 1883 1884 1885 1886 SOURCE: note 30. Medians Means Medians 316 1887 236 153 152 94 152 375 256 124 1888 1889 1890 1891 115 108 99 95 91 104 104 102 100 98 252 1892 87 128 249 250 95 95 1893 1894 1895 1896 1897 1898 1899 1900 1901 1902 1903 1904 1905 1906 1907 1908 1909 1910 1911 86 91 97 94 148 169 193 190 122 158 153 126 140 109 108 95 100 105 109 114 118 123 86 87 110 85 83 100 97 100 100 100 99 102 102 87 91 98 96 98 104 110 109 111 112 112 84 87 55 81 67 94 86 95 88 98 99 101 96 102 100 105 100 108 111 104 100 96 76 These statistics were computed from those in Table 1, using the procedureoutlined in so was able to get good service at modest rates, may have depressed the figure.28 Since, to judge from workers' wages, it must have been possible for a family to subsist on the lower budget, the difference may stem from variant concepts of what was appropriate for the ill-defined mid-levels of Ottoman society. Given the medians in Table 1, however, the larger budget seems more realistic. An official of 1914 with a nominal salary of 1,500 kurus might perhaps have taken home 945 a month on average. Because extrapolation from the latest medians in Table 1 suggests that most officials of 1914 did not have a nominal salary of 1,500 kurus-yet did have one several times the 28 Robert G. Landen, The Emergence of the Modern Middle East (New York, 1970), 173. 90 CARTER VAUGHN FINDLEY lower of the two budgets-to accept the higher estimate fits the assertionof one qualified observerthat official salaries before World War I amountedto "scarcely . . . a living wage."29 These figures from 1914 take us as far as it is possible to go with currently available cost-of-living estimates. We can, however, preparefor a different approachto the salary-pricecomparison by converting the adjusted salary statistics shown in Table 1 into percentage relatives, which we shall later compare with a grain price average expressed in the same terms.30Table 2 presents the salary relatives, analysis of which follows in the last section of this study. II. ISTANBUL COMMODITY PRICES To date, no scholar has computed-or even found the sources for-a time series based on a comprehensivemarket-basketcalculation of Istanbulconsumerprices for the late nineteenthcentury.31Except for 1914, when we have the two contradictorycost-of-living figures, determinationof living costs for thatperiodthereforedependson some proxy for a systematiccalculation.One recent study uses Britishconsumerprices as a "crude indicator"of Ottoman prices.32Growing integrationof the Ottomaneconomy into the world market argues for this approach.Yet, a look at the goods used to compute the 1914 cost-of-living estimatesdiscussed in the previous section suggests that 60-75 percent of either budget went for local goods whose prices must have responded to local factors: perishable foodstuffs, from fruit to fish; firewood and charcoal; housing.33 Persons with discretional income, businesses, or 29 Ahmed Emin [Yalman], Turkey, 151. 30 The point of recomputingtime series as percentagerelatives is to convert values expressed in other terms into percentages, with the value for an arbitrarilyselected base period set equal to 100. This techniquenot only facilitates analysis of change over time in a single statisticalseries, but also-if the base period used for all series is the same-permits the comparisonof different series. For computationof percentagerelatives on a common base period turnsdisparatevalues and measures(salary per month, price per unit) into comparablevalues expressed on a common scale. To convertthe salariesstatedin kuru?in Table 1 into percentagerelatives, we use 1880-82 as the base period. For the means, the divisor used to computethe relativesis the arithmeticmean of the three annual means falling in the base period. Since medians are not mathematically manipulable,I have taken as the divisor the middle value of the three salarymediansfor the base period. To computethe relatives, the values in kuru?for each year are divided by the appropriate divisor, and the result is expressed as a percentage. By this procedure, as Table 2 shows, the averageof the means for the base period (1880-82) equals 100. In the case of the medians, it is the middlevalue-here appearing(becauseof roundingin calculation)as a pairedvalue-for the same years that equals 100. 31 Boratavet al., "OttomanWages," second section;cf. Issawi, EconomicHistoryof Turkey, 44-50, 332-36; Safi Yorulmaz, "IstanbuldaToptan E?ya Fiyatlari (1884-1911 Yillannda)" [Wholesale commodity prices], Konjonktur(1946), 45-55; and Donald Quataert, "Ottoman Reformand Agriculturein Anatolia" (Ph.D. diss., Universityof California,Los Angeles, 1973), 21-23, 366-70, which uses the same sources analyzed here. 32 Boratavet al., "Ottoman Wages," second section. 33 Toprak, Tiirkiye'de "Milli Iktisat," 333; Eldem, OsmanlhImparatorlugununIktisadi 5artlarl, 214-15. In computingthe percentagefor the estimate in Toprak,I added 100 kuru?for ECONOMIC BASES OF OTTOMAN REVOLUTION 9I governmentagencies may well have spent more on imports. As a guide to the fortunesof the average Ottoman, however, British prices are not necessarily preferableto even a narrowlybased indicatorfrom the local market. In this study, we shall use a composite average of Istanbulgrain prices. It can be objected that grain prices give a better idea about the living standards of the poor than about those of relatively affluent officials, that most grains tradedin Istanbulwere imported,at least until the mid-1890s, or thatthe price of grain fell faster than that of other items duringthe price decline extending into the same decade.34 Yet, movements in grain prices help us locate times of economic distress that, as other sources show, did have an effect on the official class. The figures will show, too, that Istanbulgrainprices responded to local forces as well as to ones from far afield; and allowances can be made in discussion for the exceptional extent of the price decline. The prices analyzed here come from commodity quotations of the years 1851-1914.35 To reduce distortion from seasonal price fluctuations, these have been averagedon a quarterlybasis, with all prices stated in gold kuru? per okka, a unit of weight equal to 2.828 pounds (1.283 kilograms).36Initial rent (cf. 150 in the larger Eldem estimate). On integrationinto the world economy, see ?evket Pamuk, Osmanli Ekonomisi ve Diinya Kapitalizmi(1820-1913) [Ottomaneconomy and world capitalism] (Ankara, 1984), chs. 2, 7. 34 On provenanceof grains tradedin Istanbul, see note 36. With the extension of the railroad into Anatolia, Ottoman-growngrains began to assume an important-in some years, preponderant-place in the Istanbul market, but starting only in the 1890s (Quataert, "Economic Climate," Dl 157; idem, "Limited Revolution:The Impactof the AnatolianRailway on Turkish Transportationand the Provisioning of Istanbul, 1890-1908," Business History Review, 51:2 (1977), 151, 154-58). Boratavet al., "OttomanWages," emphasize the exceptionaldecline in grain prices after 1873. 35 I collected quotations from newspaperspublished on, or soon after, I March, 1 June, 1 September, and 1 December of each year. The publications (followed by abbreviations),with quartersand years for which they served, are:Journalde Constantinople,1851-2d qtr. of 1865 (I found no quotationsfor 1850); LevantHerald (LH), 3d 1865-2d 1875; La Turquie,3d 1875-3d 1880; ConstantinopleMessenger (CM), 4th 1880-2d 1881; LH, 3d 1881-1st 1882; Eastern Express (EE), 2d 1882-1884; Journal de la Chambrede Commercede Constantinople(JCCC), lst-3d 1885;EE, 4th 1885; LevantHerald and EasternExpress(LHEE), lst-2d 1886;JCCC, 3d 1886-1887; LHEE, 1888-1891; JCCC, 1892-2d 1914; Moniteuroriental, I August 1914. ConstantinopleMessenger, Eastern Express, and Levant Herald and Eastern Express are alternate names, inspired by the censor, for Levant Herald. 36 I converted newspaperquotationsinto gold kurus per okka by relying, whereverpossible, on notations,publishedwith the prices, on the value of the monetaryunits and measuresin which the quotationswere given. In other cases, the best guidance came from "Poids et mesures en Turquie,"JCCC, no. 456, 23 September1893, pp. 446-67; no. 460, 21 October 1893, pp. 49596; no. 466, 2 November 1893, pp. 567-68. Since, for every commodity, several varieties or provenanceswere quoted, I computedcommodity averagesas averagesof varietalsubseries. The procedurewas to select for each variety all years in which there were quotationsfor at least three quarters.From each subseries, all other years were excluded as offering insufficient control for seasonal fluctuations. Averaging the quotations for the selected years produced varietal price series, which were then averagedto producethe commodityaveragesin Table 3. To minimizethe impactof price differences amongcommoditieson the composite grainprice average, I computed it as an average of percentage relatives (Table 4). The computationof percentagerelatives is explainedin note 30. Again 1880-82-an intervalintermediate,in termsof both time and price- 92 CARTER VAUGHN FINDLEY efforts to take accountof a largerrangeof commoditiesfounderedon the fact that many of the items quoted were not consumergoods, or not directly so, while varieties and quality grades of some consumergoods, such as tea and sugar, varied so widely over time as to be unintelligible. While concentrationon grains was more a matterof necessity than choice, grain products were and are extremely importantin the Turkish diet. The prime example of this is bread, of which the average Ottomanat the turn of this centuryreportedlyconsumed a kilogramor more a day.37As a Levantine womanof Istanbulonce explainedto an Englishman, "vous etes carnivore,je suis carnipain."38The price of breadwas officially controlledin Istanbul,so thatthe effects of shifts in wholesale wheat and flourprices were passed on to the consumeronly intermittently.This does not, however, deprive wheat and flour prices of value as indicatorsof movements in the economy. Too, Ottoman bakershad ways, at times, of "disadjusting"the official breadprice, for example, by decreasingloaf size.39 And Ottomansconsumedother baked goods, various types of noodles, cracked wheat (bulgur), and other grain products. With this introduction, we may now examine the price tables. Table 3 presents annualaverage prices for four cereal items-hard and soft wheats, barley, and flour. The table states the kuru?prices in decimals; in fact, the subdivisionof the kurus was the para, at forty to the kuru?.40 Of the four commodities, hard wheat was normally used for making levels, between the highest and lowest prices recorded-served as the base period. For want of indicationsof consumptionvolumes, the composite grain average is necessarily an unweighted one. This limits its value from an economic point of view, and could be takento indicateuse of a single commodityseries for comparisonwith salaries. Here, the unweightedaverage is preferred as having fewer gaps. Varietalsubseriesfor each commodity, with the dates for which each is quoted, follow. Hard Wheat: Azov-Taganrog, 1850-90; Ismail-Bessarabia, 1850-90; Galatz-Danube-Constantza, 1851-90; Rumelian (Balqik, Burgaz), 1850-96; Edime, Rodosto, 1862-1903; Anatolia-Bandirma, 1896-1906; AnatolianFirst, 1905-14; Anatolian Second, 1907-14. Soft Wheat:Rumanian (Galatz, Galatz-Braila,Danube, Braila), 1850-88, 1893-96, 1906-13; Rumelian(BurgazVarna-Balqik,Varna-Balqik), 1850-96; Burgaz-Plovdiv, Plovdiv-Zagora, Zagora, 1880-96; Konya First, 1904-15; Konya Second, 1904-14; AnkaraFirst, 1904-12; AnkaraSecond, 190412. Barley: Braila, Danubian, 1851-1913; Rumelian, 1858-1908; Black Sea, Odessa, 18881900; Mersin, 1899-1914; Anatolian First, 1903-14; Anatolian Second, 1903-14. Flour: Odessa 2d, 000, 1, and successor grades, 1869-1914; Odessa 3d, 00, and successor grades, 1868-1914; Danube 2d, Braila 3d, and successor middling grades, 1870-80, 1882-85, 1888, 1890-1908, 1911-14; Danube 3d, Braila00, 4th, and successor lower grades, 1868-76, 187879, 1890-97, 1899-1902, 1907-08, 1911-14; Local, local Braila, local kirma, 1868-1914. 37 Quataert, "Economic Climate," Dl1154. 38 Bulletin mensuel de la Chambre de commercefrancaise de Constantinople,no. 256 (31 July 1908), 156. 39 Quataert, "Economic Climate," D1155, events of 1908. 40 Gaps in the price series have two possible explanations.Some signify insufficientnumbers of quarterlyquotations.Others, especially longer gaps like that of 1896-1903 for soft wheat, or shortgaps across all series, signify that no quotationswere being published. The reason is never stated, but sometimes (i.e., 1855, 1915-18) it was obviously war. TABLE 3 Annual Averages of Istanbul Grain Prices (in gold kurus per okka) Hard Soft Wheat Wheat Barley Flour 1851 1852 1853 1854 0.79 0.87 1.16 2.05 0.63 0.76 0.95 1.89 0.45 0.49 0.57 1856 1857 1858 1859 1860 1861 1.81 1.51 1.20 1.29 1.43 1.33 1.35 1.05 0.98 1.03 1.19 1.17 0.84 0.60 0.68 0.66 0.70 0.68 1864 1865 1866 1867 1868 1869 1870 1871 1872 1873 1874 1875 1876 1877 1878 1879 1880 1881 1.00 0.97 1.27 1.59 1.51 1.17 1.27 1.33 1.23 1.54 1.47 1.22 1.14 1.27 1.29 1.46 1.52 1.36 0.91 0.88 1.13 1.41 1.43 1.03 1.14 1.18 1.09 1.47 1.27 1.15 1.09 1.28 1.28 1.31 1.47 1.32 0.50 0.49 0.63 0.89 0.93 0.64 0.71 0.75 0.63 0.75 0.84 0.78 0.63 0.65 0.77 0.78 0.90 0.74 1.75 1.84 1.83 1.82 1.86 2.15 2.08 1882 1.26 1.12 0.72 1.84 2.11 1.77 1.87 2.05 1.79 Hard Soft Wheat Wheat Barley Flour 1883 1884 1885 1886 1887 1888 1889 1890 1891 1892 1893 1894 1895 1896 1897 1898 1899 1900 1901 1902 1903 1904 1905 1906 1907 1908 1909 1910 1911 1912 1913 1914 1.12 0.96 0.95 1.04 0.99 0.93 0.89 1.02 1.34 1.01 0.90 0.69 0.76 0.79 0.70 0.59 1.37 1.17 1.13 1.15 0.94 0.96 0.95 1.10 1.27 1.26 1.13 1.03 1.19 0.56 0.53 0.52 0.63 0.74 0.62 0.56 0.41 0.47 0.51 0.51 0.62 0.67 0.65 0.55 0.60 0.61 0.58 0.63 0.70 0.87 0.85 0.89 0.78 0.80 0.97 1.72 1.45 1.49 1.76 1.63 1.39 1.60 1.60 1.87 1.57 1.32 1.02 1.04 1.13 1.50 1.59 1.42 1.33 1.33 1.26 1.31 1.36 1.38 1.37 1.64 1.82 1.72 1.51 1.54 1.65 1.22 1.14 1.21 1.13 0.93 0.78 1.67 1.60 0.91 0.94 1.01 1.01 0.98 0.97 0.96 1.30 0.98 0.89 0.59 0.61 0.69 0.90 1.07 0.98 0.87 0.81 0.80 0.88 0.90 0.94 0.98 1.14 SOURCES:Price statistics are computedfrom commodity price quotationspublishedin contempo- raryIstanbulnewspapers.The sources and proceduresfor the computationsare explained in notes 35 and 36. TABLE4 Percentage Relatives, Annual Averages of Istanbul G (base period 1880-82) Composite Grain Price Average Hard Wheat Soft Wheat 1851 1852 1853 1854 57 63 84 149 49 59 73 145 57 62 72 54 61 77 147 1856 1857 1858 1859 1860 1861 131 109 87 94 104 96 104 81 75 79 92 90 106 76 86 84 89 86 114 89 83 85 95 91 Barley Flour Hard Wheat 1883 1884 1885 1886 1887 1888 1889 1890 1891 1892 1893 1894 66 68 73 73 71 70 70 94 71 65 43 1864 1865 1866 1867 1868 1869 1870 1871 1872 1873 1874 1875 1876 1877 1878 1879 1880 1881 1882 SOURCE: 73 70 92 115 109 85 92 96 89 112 107 88 83 92 94 106 110 99 91 70 68 87 109 110 79 88 91 84 113 98 89 84 99 99 101 113 102 86 63 62 80 113 118 81 90 95 80 95 106 99 80 82 98 99 114 94 91 105 88 93 102 89 87 91 91 90 92 106 103 91 69 67 86 112 110 83 91 96 85 107 104 91 84 91 95 99 111 99 90 1895 1896 1897 1898 1899 1900 1901 1902 1903 1904 1905 1906 1907 1908 1909 1910 1911 1912 1913 1914 44 50 65 78 71 63 59 58 64 65 68 71 83 99 85 82 83 88 83 outlinedin note30. Thesestatisticsarecomputedfromthosein Table3, usingthe procedure 96 CARTER VAUGHN FINDLEY 200 Grain Price Average 50 - i 3020- 10 1850 i I 1860 1870 i 1880 i i 1890 1900 1910 FIGURE 2. Grain Price Average, Istanbul (in percentagerelatives, base period 1880-82) noodles. Soft wheat was chiefly used for makingbread.Barley, while the second most widely cultivated grain in Turkey after wheat in the 1920s and the preferredgrain for breadmakingin some provinces at that time,41 was not a majorconstituentof the diet of Istanbuldwellers. In Istanbul,most barleywas consumedby horses, a fact that affected living costs to the extent that people used horses for transportation.Barley was also a raw materialfor the brewing industry,which dates back to the late nineteenthcenturyat least, and whose productswere surely not unknownto the official class. The mainjustification for including barley in the average is that its record is the longest and most nearly uninterruptedof the commodity series. Includingboth flour and soft wheat in the average will have the effect, in years when prices for both are available, of reinforcingthe representationof the commodities most directly related to breadmaking. Since the main interestof this study is in the composite cereal price average, we may proceed, without further comment on Table 3, to the price relatives, which provide the basis for computationof this average. These statistics are listed in Table 4 and presentedin graphic form in Figure 2. The composite grain average will serve for comparisonwith the adjusted salary means and medians. Before looking at this comparison, it will be helpful to examine the fluctuationsin the composite average and to compare them with otherinformationabouteconomic conditionsin Istanbulduringthis period. 41 G. Stratil-Sauer,"Cereal Productionin Turkey," Economic Geography, 9:4 (1933), 324, 327-39; Quataert, "Limited Revolution," 149. ECONOMIC BASES OF OTTOMAN REVOLUTION 97 The most importantfeatureof the composite grain average is no doubt the extent to which it parallelswell-known fluctuationsin other majormarketsof the period. In the midst of a downward price trend for grains and other commodities that spanned almost the entire nineteeth century, we find a cyclical rise into the 1870s, followed by a decline to depressionlevels in the 1890s, and then an upturnthat lasted, on the world market, until 1920.42 Superimposedon this pattern, however, are short-termpeaks, usually attributableto local or regional crises. The first and sharpestpeak in 1854-56 coincides with the CrimeanWar. That of 1867-68 coincides not only with a price peak in the internationalgrain markets,43but also with the Cretancrisis of 1866-69.44 Occurringat a time when the financialposition of the Ottoman governmentwas steadily worsening, the crisis caused economic strain,which the Young Ottomanideologues did not fail to exploit.45In 1868, distresswas so great in Istanbul that the wives of officials serving in the provinces besieged the Ministryof Financein screamingmobs, demandingtheirhusbands' salaries. The finance minister had to be assigned a special guard. Public security virtually ceased to exist on the outskirts of the city and declined within it.46 The 1870s brought graver troubles. The Anatolian famine of the early 1870s had limited effect on the Istanbulmarketbecause little Anatolianproduce could reachthe capital as yet. Even so, prices went up, for 1873 marked a cyclical high on the world grainmarket.The first half of the 1870s was also a time of troubles for the civil bureaucracy,in the sense that instability of political leadershipheighteneduncertaintyof tenurein office, the probability of nonpaymentof salaries, and even inefficiency in tax collection.47 The second half of the 1870s was one of the lowest points of the entire nineteenth century for the Ottomans, a fact evidenced especially in the government bankruptcyand the Russo-TurkishWar, which broughtthe Russian army to the outskirtsof Istanbul,flooded the city with refugees, and left the Ottoman government saddled with a huge indemnity. One result was the reissue of 42 Brian K. Mitchell, with collaboration of Phyllis Deane, Abstract of British Historical Statistics (Cambridge, 1962), 488-89; United States Departmentof Agriculture(USDA), Yearbook 1921 (Washington, 1922), 146; Quataert, "OttomanReform and Agriculture," 188, 38990; Issawi, Economic History of Middle East, 10; Pamuk, Osmanli Ekonomisi, 131-36. 43 Mitchell, Abstract, 488-89; USDA, Yearbook1921, 146. 44 Shaw and Shaw, History, II, 151-52. 45 Enver Ziya Karal, Osmanli Tarihi (Ankara, 1977), VII, 37; Du Velay, Essai, 279. 46 Politisches Archiv des Auswartigen Amtes (Bonn), Abt. A (856/3), 868, I.A.B.q 95, Brassiervon Saint-Simonto Bismarck, 13 February1868; Uebel to Bismarck,9 July 1868 (T139, mf. roll 354, in the microfilmholdings of the U.S. NationalArchives, Washington,D.C., where I consulted the Germandiplomatic correspondence). 47 Shaw and Shaw, History, II, 156; Du Velay, Essai, 316-461; RodericH. Davison, Reform in the OttomanEmpire, 1856-1876 (Princeton, 1963), 301-10; Archives des Affaires 6trangeres (Paris),Turquie390, 24 October 1871, Vogiiu to Remusat;Turquie391, 9 January1872, idemto idem; Turquie391, 27 March 1872, idem to idem; Turquie404, 17 May 1876, from Bourgoing. 98 CARTER VAUGHN FINDLEY papermoney from 1876 to 1883-the only time, otherthan 1863, duringthe period for which we have salary statistics when papermoney was in circulation. The paper money soon sank as low as 1,300 kuru?to the gold lira.48 Thereafter,in the 1880s, we see that the downwardtrend in prices reappears, through1894. Duringthis interval,thereis only the price peak of 1891, which was due to a crop failure in Russia and a consequentsurge in Ottoman exports. European and American grain prices showed small rises at the time.49 After 1894, when prices turnedup again, the price high of the late 1890s coincided with crop failure in Anatolia, the Greco-TurkishWar of 1897, and the Armeniancrisis of the same period.50 Thereafter,the high of 1907-9 signaled an unusualcombinationof woes-international financial crisis, domestic and internationalcrop failure, exceptionallywidespreaddistress-that providedthe economic backdropfor the Young Turkrevolutionof 1908.51 It is significantthat similar problems, includingprolongeddrought(1905-10), foreshadowedthe Mexican revolutionof 1910. There, the internationalfinancial crisis of 1907, which began in the United States, is recognizedas a major economic factor.52 That crisis should probably be ranked with the RussoJapaneseWar and the Russian revolutionof 1905 as an element in inducing the wave of revolutions and disturbancesthat swept Asia and the colonial world in the years precedingWorld War I.53 Finally, the war-inducedinflation raisedthe cost of living by a factorof morethantwentybetween 1914 and 1920.54 To see what these price fluctuationsmeantin the lives of officials, we must now comparethe composite grain price average with the salary statistics. 48 Shaw and Shaw, History, II, 182ff., 221ff.; Du Velay, Essai, 354-57; Issawi, Economic History of Turkey,326-29, 361-65. 49 Quataert, "Ottoman Reform and Agriculture," 21-23, 211-12; cf. Mitchell, Abstract, 489; USDA, Yearbook1921, 146. 50 Robert Melson, "A Theoretical Inquiry into the Armenian Massacres of 1894-1896," ComparativeStudies in Society and History, 24:3 (July 1982), 481-509. Qualified observers noted at the time how the turmoil in eastern Anatolia affected the grain trade. See "Handelsberichtfur das Jahr1897," Deutsches Handelsarchiv(1898), 511-16 (unfortunately,I have to cite this source from memory, as I can no longer find my photocopy;I have verified the citation from other records). 51 Quataert, "Economic Climate," D1157, D1161; Pamuk, Osmanli Ekonomisi, 135-36. 52 Ram6nRuiz, The Great Rebellion: Mexico, 1905-24 (New York, 1980), 120-35. On the crisis of 1907 in the United States, see Milton Friedmanand Anna Schwartz,A MonetaryHistory of the UnitedStates, 1867-1960 (Princeton, 1963), 156-68. I have not found a good discussion of the worldwideeconomic effects of the crisis; see comments in William C. Schluter,The PreWarBusiness Cycle, 1907 to 1914 (New York, 1923), 13-34. 53 Keddie, "Religion and Irreligion," 265; Stavrianos, Global Rift, 367-427. Detailed researchinto the economic historyof othercountriesthatexperiencedrevolutionjust before World WarI-for example, Iran(1905-11) and China (1911)-might well disclose common factorsin additionto financial crisis, such as the droughtor crop failure that appearsin both the Ottoman and Mexican cases. 54 Ahmed Emin [Yalman], Turkey, 151; Toprak, Tiirkiye'de "Milli Iktisat," 331. III. CONCLUSION: OF POLITICAL ECONOMIC BASES OF OTTOMAN LIVING STANDARDS AND REVOLUTION SHIFTING 99 LEVELS ACTIVISM Fromthe salary-pricecomparisonemerge the conclusions of this essay. Since there is no sign in Ottoman sources that salaries varied systematically with prices priorto World War I,55 the best way to comparethe two is to assume no statisticaldependenceof one series on the other. We shall simply compute two sets of ratios by dividing each year's relatives for the adjusted salary means and medians (Table 2) by the same year's relative for the composite grainprice average (Table 4). In the few years for which the grain average is missing, it will not be possible to compute these ratios. In any year when the relative for the salary statistic is greaterthan that for the grain average, the value for the ratio will be greaterthan one. When the opposite relationship occurs, the ratio will be less than one. The lower the value of the ratio, the greaterthe economic distress it implies. Table 5 presents these ratios. The salary-priceratios show that the economic situationof Foreign Ministry officials varied widely over time. The late 1860s and the 1870s witnessed a marked erosion of living standards. Qualitative evidence confirms this point. In the previoussection, we noted riots by the wives of officials in 1868, followed in the 1870s by problems stemming from administrativeirregularities, governmentbankruptcy,and the Russo-TurkishWar. After 1880, an improvementin official living standardsappears to have begun, as evidenced in the doubling of both of the Table 5 ratios by 1894. Even if the fall in grain prices exceeded that in other goods, there was still room for ratios computedon a broader-basedprice indicatorto show marked improvementduringthis interval. While the Ottomaneconomy was predominantly agricultural,and agriculturalprices were falling between 1880 and 1894, an improvementin the living standardsof officials, or of other social groups, is not implausible.The late nineteenthcenturywitnessed an important railroad-relatedexpansion in Ottoman agriculture, the effects of which in some ways outweighed those of the price declines. Expansionin agricultural outputand exportvalues did not translatedirectly into increasein government revenues or, by extension, into funds available to the governmentfor salary payments, as a growing number of Ottoman taxes passed under control of foreign creditors in these years.56 The significance of this fact for official salary payments is not clear, given the limited informationnow available about how salary payments were actually made. In any case, the qualitative evidence for 1880-94 tacitly reinforces the evidence of Table 5 throughthe 55 Toprak, Tiirkiye'de 'Milli Iktisat," 334, cost-of-living adjustmentof 1916. 56 Quataert, "Ottoman Reform and Agriculture," 15-17, 189-91, 352-54; idem, "Limited Revolution," 143, 159-60; idem, "AgriculturalTrends and Government Policy in Ottoman Anatolia, 1800-1914," Asian and AfricanStudies, 15:1 (1981), 83; Issawi, EconomicHistory of Turkey,353-55; idem, Economic History of Middle East, 105. IOO CARTER VAUGHN FINDLEY TABLE 5 Ratios of Percentage Relatives: Adjusted Salaries to Grain Price Averages Ratio for Means 1864 1865 1866 1867 1868 1869 1870 1871 1872 1873 1874 1875 1876 1877 1878 1879 1880 1881 1882 1883 1884 1885 1886 1887 3.4 2.3 1.8 0.8 1.4 1.8 1.9 2.0 2.2 1.1 1.5 1.7 1.5 1.5 1.1 1.1 0.9 1.0 1.2 1.2 1.5 1.6 1.5 1.5 Ratio for Medians 1888 5.6 3.0 1.1 2.3 1.5 2.7 2.6 1.1 0.9 0.8 1.0 1.3 0.9 0.9 1.0 0.9 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.3 1.4 1.3 1.4 1889 1890 1891 1892 1893 1894 1895 1896 1897 1898 1899 1900 1901 1902 1903 1904 1905 1906 1907 1908 1909 1910 1911 Ratio for Means Ratio for Medians 1.6 1.4 1.2 0.9 1.1 1.5 1.4 1.3 1.0 1.3 1.4 1.9 1.6 1.3 1.8 1.6 1.6 1.4 1.2 1.3 1.5 1.7 1.7 1.6 1.6 1.5 1.1 1.0 0.6 0.8 0.8 1.7 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.5 1.5 1.4 1.4 1.2 1.1 1.0 1.1 0.9 SOURCE: These statistics were computed by dividing the salary relatives in Table 2 by the composite grain price averages in Table 4. absence of reports of distress like that of the 1860s or 1870s, though there was suffering from irregularity in salary payments. After 1894, things changed again, mainly thanks to the rise in prices (Table 4). For this period, both series of salary-price ratios indicate worsening conditions, especially just before 1908. Our narrowly based price indicator may again misrepresent the magnitude of the change. But the witness of other sources, noted in the previous section, becomes eloquent as we approach the 1908 revolution. The international financial crisis of 1907, together with other factors, reminds us that this was a time of economic and political disturbance around the world. After 1908, the situation of Ottoman workers improved,57 57 Boratavet al., "OttomanWages." ECONOMIC BASES OF OTTOMAN REVOLUTION IOI but the ratios of Table 5 show nothing of the sort for officials. Literary sources, already noted, indicate a drastic worsening of their plight during World War I. What is most interesting is the correspondencebetween these economic fluctuationsand the political and intellectual history of the period. Here we find a parallelism clear enough to suggest a causal link between economic distressand political agitation. A statisticalargument,like that centralto this article, cannot in itself prove the existence of such a link; but some of the evidence here considered, and some that emerges from other scholarship, does indicate a causal connection, which we must emphasize as our final point.58 58 One way to appreciatethe strengthof the causal argumentin this case is to obey the dictates of a strict concern for method and consider the null hypothesis that there was no connection between economic distress and political behavior. Aside from some contraryevidence already presented,one of the best ways to assess this hypothesis is to examine how von Wangenheim, thenGermanchargeat Istanbul-he was ambassadortherein 1914-dealt with the same idea in a dispatchof 1901 (Politisches Archiv des AuswartigenAmtes (Bonn), Tiirkei 134, Bd. 18, to von Bulow, 26 August 1901, correspondingto T 139, roll 392, in the microfilm collection of the UnitedStates NationalArchives). Commentingon press reportsthatOttomanofficials in Istanbul and Salonicahad petitionedthe sultanto have theirback salariespaid, on the groundthatthey and their families would starve otherwise, Wangenheimarguedthat it would be wrong to conclude from this that there was any danger of revolution. One of his argumentswas that officials and militaryofficers blamed their problems, not on the sultan, but on their superiors,with the result that complaints like these served the sultan's efforts to maintainhis own political dominance. Anotherargumentconcernedthe likelihood of starvation.The ability of poor Turksto get by on very little excelled even what he had seen in Spain, wrote Wangenheim.To back up the point, he describedhow elderly Turkswould fish on the landing in frontof the embassy summerresidence at Tarabyaon the Bosphorus. Too, poor Turks carried the sharing of goods "to the socialdemocratic ideal," and shopkeepers also would take mercy on the poor, so that the shocking indigence observable in other European capitals was unseen. Turks in office had the added advantageof enjoying influence, which enabled them to extractbribesfrom the public. Knowing that they did so enabled the sultan to accustom his officials to irregularsalary payments. Salary paymentshad thus reachedthe point of being "a special act of grace by the ruler, announcedin the newspapers,and celebratedalmost like a nationalholiday," not only by the officials, but also by the tradesmenwho supplied them on credit between paydays. Only Christiansand foreigners in Ottomanservice suffered, Wangenheimargued,as they lackedaccess to the Muslims' business arrangementsand love for their fellows. Wangenheim'scomments on the sultan's manipulation of salary payments are probablyworth taking seriously. Yet it is quite unclear why a Christian Ottomanofficial could find no supportamong his coreligionists, at any rate. Even more perplexing is the ingenious way Wangenheim'sargumentchanneledthe grievancesof Ottomanofficials into a limbo where they had neithersevere humancosts for the officials nor political costs for the regime. Perhapsin gratificationat this conclusion, a pencil note below Wangenheim'ssignature, probablyby von Billow, states: "very well writtenandcorrectlyobserved." In fact, the argument is a piece of orientalismin the sense of EdwardSaid. Why shouldthe behaviorof poor old Turks, fishing on a landing, have providedany betterguide to the political behaviorof Ottomanofficials and militaryofficers than that of peasantsdigging potatoes in Prussiawould have providedto the behavior of Germandiplomats like Wangenheim?Apart from having discussed these old men with his Montenegrindoorman,as he says, how well did Wangenheimunderstandthem?It is not worthwhileto belabor such questions, since the kind of argumentWangenheimsought to make could be updatedand strengthened.Yet the fact remains that revolutioncame only seven years after he wrote this dispatch and that Salonica and Istanbul, the sources of the news reportson which he commented, were its most importantcenters. 102 CARTER VAUGHN FINDLEY To sum up the evidence for this causal link, we may start from the point that both periods of political and ideological ferment, those of the Young Ottomansand the Young Turks, were times of economic distress. In both periods the distress extended well beyond the official milieu from which the salary statistics derive.59 And in both periods the ideologues and activists displayed at least some responsiveness to economic problems. Among the Young Ottomanleadership, almost all of whom came from extremely privileged backgrounds,the response may not have gone much beyond denunciation of generalgrievances, such as foreigncommercialprivilegesor the public debt.60 Given the massive long-term problems of the Ottomaneconomy, it was perhapsnaturalfor the earliest ideologues to respondmore to them than to specific short-termproblems. Later, the Young Turksappearto have coupled discussion of general issues with exploitation of specific crisis conditions. No doubt, the extent to which the scope of political mobilizationhad broadenedby then contributedto this result. Those who joined or responded to the Young Turk movement included not only civil bureaucratsand large elements of the military,but also nonbureaucraticelites, membersof the nonMuslim communities, sometimes even workers. The connections between Young Turk activists and these various groups are not all well established. The roots of the movement in the civil bureaucraticand militaryelites are, of course, best known.61In the case of the workers, to cite a less-known example that is particularlysignificant where political mobilizationis concerned, Young Turk activists had forged alliances with aggrieved worker groups before revolution broke out in 1908, and had apparentlyled at least one Ludditedisturbance,which resulted in good part from the currenteconomic crisis. Consideringhow little researchhas been done in Ottomanlaborhistory, it is highly likely that more such examples of economically motivated political activism await discovery.62 59 With particularreferenceto agrariandifficulties of 1873-75 and 1907-8, Quataert,"Commercializationof Agriculture," 52-53, makes much the same point by speaking of social and political "dislocations" that arose out of crises in agriculture. 60 Mardin, Genesis, 166-68, 321-23, 354, 388. As noted in the precedingsection, there is evidence that the Young Ottomansdid seize upon the economic problems that surroundedthe Cretancrisis (1866-69), at least. 61 Among the many sources that could be cited on this point, Shaw and Shaw, History, II, 263-66; Mardin,Jon Tiirklerin, 11, 22-27, 32-33, 39-41, 225-26, et passim. 62 Donald Quataert,Social Disintegration and Popular Resistance in the OttomanEmpire, 1881-1908 (New York, 1983), chs. 4, 5; idem, "Ottoman Luddites and the Changing Carpet Industryin Usak, Anatolia, 1860-1914" (Paperpresentedat the ThirdInternationalCongresson the Social and Economic History of Turkey, Princeton, 24-26 August 1983); idem, personal communications,November-December 1983. Furtheron the workingclass and on the beginning of socialist influence, especially among non-Muslims, see Paul Dumont, "Une organisation socialiste ottomane:La Federationouvrierede Salonique," Etudes balkaniques, 11:1 (1975), 78; idem, "Sources in6dites pour l'histoire du mouvementouvrier et des courantssocialistes dans l'empire ottoman au debut du XXe siecle," in Social and Economic History of Turkey(10711920), OsmanOkyarand Halil Inalcik, eds. (Ankara, 1980), 383; idem, "A proposde la 'classe ECONOMIC BASES OF OTTOMAN REVOLUTION 103 In considering the correspondence between economic and politicalintellectualhistory, the interval in the 1870s and 1880s between the Young Ottomanand Young Turkperiods is also significant. Economically, it was a time of relief for the bureaucraticintelligentsia,and probablyfor othersectors of society, too. Politically, it was the period when Abdtilhamidquashedthe oppositionand consolidatedhis palace regime. Makingdue allowance for his intelligenceand the authorityof his office, it seems-unless we supposethese economic and political facts to be unrelated-that the last great flourish of Ottomansultanismwas made possible in some degree by a detente, if it was no more than that, in the general economic decline of the empire. When the benefits of this detente began to dwindle, political opposition re-emerged, sultan or no sultan. After the economic situation took a sharp downturnin 1907, revolution broke out. Here we have another example of James C. Davies's "J-curve" theory of revolution, with the variationthat the period of improvement(in this case not so prolonged:ca. 1880-94) yielded to a period of gradualeconomic erosion (ca. 1894-1907), priorto the "sharp reversal" of 1907, which precipitatedthe crisis.63 In the case of the bureaucraticintelligentsia and, at key moments, other sectors of Ottomansociety, economic patternsthus varied over time in ways that display a clearly intelligible relationshipto the rise and fall of political activism. Extensive documentationof the causal connection will requirefurther researchof a kind different from the statistical analysis presentedhere. Yet, it is clear that the familiar political and intellectual explanationsof the sequence of events that ran from Young Ottomanferment, throughHamidian repression, to Young Turk revolution must, as comparative or theoretical analysis suggests, expand to include the economic dimension. COMPUTATION APPENDIX OF SALARY STATISTICS Sources and Methods The mainsourcefor calculationof the salarystatisticsis the collectionof personnel records(Sicilli-i Ahval, cited in the notes as SA) in the archivesof the Ottoman ForeignMinistryin Istanbul(Hariciye,cited as Har.).This collectionincludes771 on one official. In addition,recordsof envelopes,each containingdocumentation somehigh-ranking individuals associatedwiththeForeignMinistryappearonlyin the PrimeMinisters'Archives(BasbakanllkArsivi, cited as BBA), Istanbul,in the Dahiliye sicill-i ahval defterleri (cited as DSA), consisting of 196 large registers;see Attila Cetin, Ba?bakanlikArtivi Kilavuzu [Guide to BBA] (Istanbul, 1979), 46; and CarterVaughn Findley, Bureaucratic Reform in the OttomanEmpire: The Sublime ouvriere' ottomane a la veille de la revolution jeune-turque," Turcica, 9:1 (1977), 229-52; Georges Haupt and Paul Dumont, Osmanli ImparatorlugundaSosyalist Hareketler [Socialist movements in the Ottomanempire] (Istanbul, 1977; not seen). 63 Davies, "Toward a Theory of Revolution," 136. 104 CARTER VAUGHN FINDLEY Porte, 1789-1922 (Princeton, 1980), 267. Many of the files in the Foreign Ministry personnelrecordsshow only brief careerrecords, since young men often acceptedone or two appointments,but did not continue (cf. Findley, BureaucraticReform, 23439). To distinguish careeristsfrom noncareerists,I collected only files with service recordsspanningfifteen solar years. The result was a groupof 366 individuals,not all in service at once. In the analysis, I recordedthe salaryof each official, as of 1 Juneof the Gregoriancalendar,for every year of service. Since the price datacome only from the Istanbulmarket, only salaries of officials serving in that city have been used in computingthe statistics presented here. As the programfor executing the computer analysis of both salaries and prices, I used the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences. See NormanH. Nie et al., SPSS:StatisticalPackagefor the Social Sciences, 2d ed. (New York, 1975). Problems of Analysis Correctinterpretationof the salary data containedin these sources depends on understanding-and, wherepossible, eliminatingdistortionsthatresultfrom-certain problems of either the documentationor the data collection method. These problems, and the proceduresor assumptionsthat I have used in coping with them, are as follows. Representativenessof the Data. Two questions of this type arise. Was the Foreign Ministryof elite status in relation to the rest of the civil bureaucracy?Was the civil bureaucracyof elite status in relationto the rest of the populace?The only answer for the first question is the impressionisticone that while the Foreign Ministrymay have been exceptionally privileged during the Tanzimat, it was no longer so under Abdulhamid(Findley, BureaucraticReform, 135-37, 153-55, 242-43, 255-57). On the elitism of the civil bureaucracyin relationto the populace, the text presentsevidence of an income gap that was wide, but narrowedwith time. Monetary Units. Because the Ottoman monetary system was complex, and the personnelrecordsare not specific as to money of payment, care is needed to convert the salaries statedin the recordsinto units of constantvalue. The Ottomancoinage of this period was officially bimetallic. The gold lira, nominallyconsisting of 100 kurus, stood throughoutthe period at essentially 1.11 to the pound sterling. The silver coinage was minted in units nominally worth 20 kuru?(the silver mecidiye) and less, the gold-silver ratiohaving been set in 1844 at 1:15.0909. There were also small coins of base metal. Finally, paper money was in circulation, usually much depreciated, duringthe intervals 1839-63, 1876-83, and 1914-22. See CharlesIssawi, The Economic History of Turkey, 1800-1914 (Chicago, 1980), 326-31; idem, An Economic History of the Middle East and North Africa (New York, 1982), 186; George Young, Corps de droit ottoman (Oxford, 1905-6), V, 1; Carl Anton Schaefer, "Geldwesen und Staatsbankfragein der Tiirkei," in Das TurkischeReich, Josef Hellauer, ed. (Berlin, 1918), 33; Roderic H. Davison, "Ka'ime," Encyclopedia of Islam, 2d ed., IV, 460-61; I have also computedmoney marketstatisticsfrom the same newspapers used to compute commodity prices (see note 35). Since gold was mostly hoarded, and paper money circulatedfor only a few of the years for which statisticsappearin the tables in the text, the silver mecidiyemust have been the primaryunit for salarypayment. Convertingsalaries assumed to be stated in silver into units of constantvalue becomes a problemafterthe value of silver began to decline in the 1870s. By the early 1880s, it took 108 kurusin silver to buy a gold lira (equal to 100 kurus in gold). On the world market,the value of silver declined much furtherthereafter.In Istanbul,however, the Ottomansilver coinage held steadyaround 108 kurus to the gold lira through 1914, according to the money rates published in local newspapers. For an explanation of this stabilization, see Salgur Kanqal, "La dualisationde l'espace monetaireottoman" (Paperpresentedat the ThirdInternational ECONOMIC BASES OF OTTOMAN REVOLUTION 105 Congress on the Social and Economic History of Turkey, Princeton, 24-26 August 1983). The Ottomangovernmentrespondedto the decline in silver by decreeing in 1879 thatthe silver mecidiye was worth 19 kurusin gold, ratherthan 20, and proceedingto use this rate in government transactions. The capitalist commercial sector did not accept this rate. In fact, there was an error in it, for if it took 108 kuru?in silver to equal 100 kuru?in gold, 100 kurusin silver were worth92.59 in gold. At one fifth of that, the value of the silver mecidiye should have been reduced, not to 19 kurus,but to 18.52. The new official rate for the mecidiye representedan errorof 2.6 percent of 18.52, or 2.5 percent of 19. The governmentdid not rectify this erroruntil August 1909, when it reset the rate for the gold lira at 102.6 kurusin silver while holding the mecidiye at 19 (Schaefer, "Geldwesen," 30). For the years when governmentpolicy was based on this error, I have interpretedthe personnel-recordsalaryfigures to mean payment in mecidiyes assumed by the payer to be worth 19 kurus in gold. To state salariesin gold kurus, I have compensatedfor the errorof 2.5 percentby multiplying all salariesfor the appropriateyears by 0.975. Since the adjustmentof the official rate was a tardyresponse to the decline in silver, I have made this adjustmentfrom 1876 on, that being the first year when the money rates in Istanbulnewspapersindicate an appreciabledecline in silver. Disparity betweenNominal Salary Entitlementsand ActualReceipts. Ottomanofficials did not get paid regularlyor fully. The salaryfigures in the personnelrecordsthus signify gross nominal entitlements by way of salary, ratherthan net receipts. The differenceconsisted partlyof deductionsfor things like retirementfunds. By 1913, the deductionsamountedto 9 percent (Har., Mutenevvi 156, TurhanPasa to Said Halim Pasa, 9 10bre [sic] 1913). A largerpartof the gross-netdifference consisted of delays of payment, some of which were never made up. Indeterminablylarge gross-net differencesraise questions about the value of the personnel-recordsalarydata;yet, for a varietyof reasons, they remain worthy of study. There are, for example, no known sources from which to verify the actual receipts of substantialnumbersof civil officials. Similarly, despite some efforts (Findley, BureaucraticReform, 277-78, 33132), the Ottomansnever produced any comprehensivegrading of officials and their salaries. Thus, there is no convenient source, like the barem (Frenchbareme)adopted underthe republic,from which to verify salariesof officials of differenttypes. Further, while the problemsof the salarysystem are sometimestakento mean thatsalarieswere unimportantto officials, there is evidence, too voluminous to presenthere, that officials were keenly concerned about their salaries, precisely because they were not regularlypaid (Findley, BureaucraticReform, 236-39; I plan to discuss this evidence more fully in a book on the "Social History of OttomanCivil Officialdom"). Reflection shows, too, that the salary data in the personnel records do tell several things. They indicatethe prioritiesof those with discretionto assign salaries.They indicatethe upperlimit of what officials legitimatelyreceived by way of salary. If we can assume that the gap between nominal and actual salaries did not vary materially over long periods, the nominal salaries yield good relative indicatorsof long-term changes in bureaucraticfortunes. It is essentially as relative indicatorsthat the salaries are used here. Variationover Time in the Number of Officialsfor WhomSalary Data are Available. I calculatedsalarystatisticsfor the period 1850-1914, but found thatthe number of cases droppedoff, and the statisticsbecame erratic,at both ends of that period. For the earlieryears, the cause of the troubleis thatthe personnelrecordswere not created until 1877. The records cover the individual's lifespan from birthforward. Thus, the oldest files containdatafor years long before 1877; yet, the furtherback one looks, the fewer the cases. The problemin the lateryears arises from the purgesthatfollowed the io6 CARTER VAUGHN FINDLEY Young Turkrevolutionof 1908 (Findley, BureaucraticReform, 296-98). Since I had decided to collect records only of officials with at least fifteen years of recorded service, the decline in the numberof cases on which I have data begins, not in 1908, but some fifteen years earlier. The result is a data distributionin which the numberof officials serving in Istanbulwith known salaries begins at 21 in 1850, rises to 203 in 1891, then startsto fall, plunges from 125 to 53 between 1908 and 1909, and standsat 8 for 1914. To cope with this, I have adoptedan arbitrarycutoff point, and show no statistics for years with fewer than fifty cases. ApparentIncrease over Time in the Seniorityof the Officialsfor WhomSalary Data are Available. The factors that caused the numberof cases to rise and fall also created a misleadingappearanceof a long-termincreasein seniority. If the oldest recordsdate from 1877, statistics for earlier years will reflect a populationthat is more and more junior, the furtherback the dates of the statistics. After 1893, my rule excluding officials with fewer thanfifteen years of service, and the decline in maintenanceof the recordsin 1908, will create the appearanceof a populationthat becomes more senior with the passage of time. In the interveningperiod, 1877-93, the seniority distribution, thoughheavy with junior officials, was not changing. The increasein the degree of seniority is thus an artificial product of the data collection procedure and the propertiesof the records, not an attributeof the populationstudied. Given the likelihood of a positive association between seniority and salary, this increase must be broughtundercontrol statistically before the salary statistics can be regardedas reliable indicators. For the means, standardizationprovidesthe needed adjustment.See R. G. D. Allen, Statisticsfor Economists (London, 1968), 111-14. I have standardizedacross time, dividing the salariesquoted for each year into three bracketsdefined accordingto the seniorityof each official at the time, and recomputingthe salarymean for each year as a weighted average of the means for each seniority bracket. The three seniority bracketswere defined as including officials whose recordedcareerscomprised spans of 0-14, 15-29, and 30 or more years. The weights used to recomputethe average representthe proportionsamong the average numberof cases falling into the three seniority bracketsduring the years 1880-82, which I selected to serve as the base periodfor the standardization.The base period falls in the interval 1877-93, when the senioritydistributionapparentin the recordswas not distortedby the factorsdiscussed above. (For a different reason, I shall also use the same base period in computing percentagerelatives of salaries and commodity prices). During the base period, on average60 percentof the officials in service were in the 0-14 year seniority bracket, 30 percent were in the 15-29 year bracket, and 10 percent were in the 30-or-more bracket.I thereforeused 0.6, 0.3, and 0.1 as weighting factorsto recomputethe mean for each year as a weighted average of the means for the three brackets. No statistics are shown for years when there were no cases in one or more of the senioritybrackets. For the median, as a positional statistic, there is no counterpartof standardization. Because the distortions of the seniority distributionlie mostly in the lack of senior officials in the earlier years, and of junior officials after 1893, the best alternative seemed to be to compute medians for only the middle seniority bracket,comprising officials with 15-29 years of service as of each year of computation.Of course, this methodfurtherreduces the numberof cases used in calculation. Since the maximum numberof cases in the 15-29 year bracketin any year is 84, I shall show no statistics for any year without at least 21 cases. Because of differences in the adjustment techniquesfor means and medians, the years for which these statistics appearin the tables differ slightly. ikinci meşrutiyet’i hazırlayan koşullar OSMANLI TARİHİ rumeli’de vergi tahsilatı ve jandarma nadir özbek Yakın tarihimizin önemli bir evresini oluşturan İkinci Meşrutiyet dönemi, Jön Türk devrimini hazırlayan koşullar ve İttihad Terakki rejimi akademik tarihçilerin olduğu kadar Türkiye’nin güncel siyasal gerçekliğini anlama kaygısı taşıyan daha genel bir kitlenin de ilgisini hep çekmiştir. Bu yazıda, söz konusu yeniden değerlendirme çabalarına Rumeli vilayetlerinde İkinci Meşrutiyet’i hazırlayan toplumsal koşullara ve özel olarak da vergi tahsilatı sırasında yaşanan baskılara değinilerek mütevazı bir katkıda bulunmak amaçlanmıştır. çülük, İslamcılık, halkçılık, solidarizm gibi düşünce akımlarının evrimine ilişkin çalışmalar başlangıç noktası olarak bu dönem üzerinde yoğunlaşmıştır. Oysa Meşrutiyet’e giden sürecin geniş halk katmanlarının yaşam koşulları itibariyle değerlendirilmesi veya İkinci Meşrutiyet’in sosyal tarihi diyebileceğimiz çerçevede tarihyazımı hayli sınırlı kalmıştır. 1875 yılında vergilerden şikâyet ederek başkaldıran Hersekli köylüler Osmanlı yetkililerine itaatlerini bildiriyor. Sacit Kutlu arşivinden alınmıştır. 46 Meşrutiyet’in 1908 yılındaki ilanının üzerinden 100 yıl geçti. 2008 yılında bu vesileyle ulusal ve uluslararası düzeyde birçok bilimsel toplantı düzenlendi, tarih dergileri özel sayılar hazırladı. Böylece İkinci Meşrutiyet, Jön Türk hareketi ve İttihad ve Terakki yönetimi enine boyuna bir kez daha tartışmaya açılmış oldu. İkinci Meşrutiyet’e doğru giden toplumsal ve siyasal süreç ve ardından gelen Meşrutiyet dönemi Osmanlı Devleti’nin dağılmasıyla sonuçlanmıştı. Modern Türkiye’nin temelleri, bu son derece karmaşık yerel ve uluslararası siyasal ortam içinde şekillenmiştir. Türkiye tarihçiliğinde İkinci Meşrutiyet dönemi ağırlıklı olarak yüksek siyaset düzlemi ve düşünce akımları bağlamında ele alınmıştır. Tarık Zafer Tunaya’nın işaret etmiş olduğu doğrultuda, Meşrutiyet döneminin cumhuriyet Türkiye’si için bir siyasal laboratuvar olduğu tespiti tarih çalışmalarının ana eksenini oluşturmuştur. Tarihçiler ağırlıklı olarak parlamenter sistemin ve çokpartili siyasal hayatın gelişimi üzerinde durmuşlardır. Türk tarihçiliğinin bir diğer ağırlık noktasını da cumhuriyet Türkiye’sine yön veren siyasal düşünce akımlarının kökenlerinin bu dönemde aranması olmuştur. Türk- Osmanlı vergi sisteminin adaletsizliği ve her milletten köylü yığınları üzerinde oluşturduğu ağır yük genellikle teslim edilmiş olmakla birlikte, bu faktörün İkinci Meşrutiyet’e giden süreçte geniş halk kesimlerinin Abdülhamid rejiminden uzaklaşarak Makedonya ve Anadolu’nun birçok bölgesinde muhalif siyasal hareketlere yönelmesini kolaylaştırmış olduğu üzerinde fazla durulmamıştır. Bu konuda Zafer Kars, Kudret Emiroğlu ve Aykut Kansu’nun çalışmaları bir istisna oluşturmaktadır.1 Donald Quataert, Carter Findley ve Feroz Ahmad devrimin ekonomik ve sosyal arka planlarına değinen tarihçiler arasında yer almıştır.2 Emiroğlu daha çok yerli matbuata dayanarak, 1908 devrimi öncesinde Anadolu’nun birçok vilayetinde halk kesimlerinin rejime yönelik hoşnutsuzluklarının ve isya- Yukarıda kısaca değindiğimiz eserlerin ortak noktasını Jön Türk devriminin bir toplumsal arka planı olduğu veya en azından ülkenin içinde bulunduğu ekonomik ve sosyal ortamın devrimi hazırlayan koşullar arasında değerlendirilmesi gerektiği fikri oluşturmuştur. Ancak bu tespitin imparatorluğun birbirinden çok farklı özellikler taşıyan bölgelerinin her biri için ayrı ayrı araştırılması gerekmektedir. 19. yüzyılın sonu itibariyle imparatorluğu Rumeli veya Makedonya, Anadolu, Doğu Vilayetleri, yani vilayat-ı sitte ve Arap vilayetleri şeklinde dört ana grupta değerlendirmek mümkündür. İttihad Terakki hareketinin gelişimi bakımından önemli bir coğrafya olması itibariyle Makedonya’yı konu alan çalışmaların görece daha fazla olduğunu söyleyebiliriz. Bu yazının da konusu olan Rumeli vilayetlerine ilişkin çalışmalarda vergi adaletsizliğinin ve vergi tahsil yöntemlerindeki gaddarlığın Rumeli köylüsünün Osmanlı rejiminden kopuşunu hazırlayan faktörlerden en önemlisi olduğu, Halil İnalcık’ın 1943 tarihli Tanzimat ve Bulgar Meselesi başlıklı eserinden bu yana önemsenen bir tespit olmuştur.5 Fikret Adanır’ın Türkçeye 1996 yılında çevrilen, ancak 1979 tarihli Makedonya Sorunu başlıklı çalışmasında da bu yaklaşımın izlerini görmek mümkündür.6 Ermeni nüfusun belli bir ağırlığa sahip olduğu Doğu Anadolu vilayetlerinde İkinci Abdülhamid döneminde yaşanan huzursuzlukların vergi ve gelir adaletsizliği eksenli bir boyutunun olabileceği, devletin nizami ve gayri nizami unsurlarının ahali üzerinde şiddetli bir baskı uyguluyor olduğu gerçeği genellikle üzerinde durulmayan konular arasında yer almıştır. Dolayısıyla Ermeni sorunu olarak isimlendirilen mesele Abdülhamid rejiminin Ermeni düşmanlığı ve kimlik siyaseti kavramlarının dar sınırlarına hapsedilmiş, konunun yerel servet paylaşımı ve iktidar mücadelesi, vergi rejimi gibi toplumsal siyasal boyutları genellikle göz ardı edilmiştir. Aşağıda, geniş halk kesimlerinin Osmanlı rejimine yabancılaşmasına yol açan en önemli faktörlerden olan vergi tahsilatı meselesi Rumeli vilayetleri örneği üzerinden kısaca değerlendirilecektir. Osmanlı 19. yüzyılında vergi tahsili meselesi, devletle bireyin birbirleriyle çok yakından temas kurmalarına vesile olan iktisadi siyasi (idari) meselelerden birini oluşturmaktadır. İkinci Mahmut döneminden imparatorluğun sonuna kadar uzanan evrede Osmanlı yöneticilerini uğraştıran en önemli meselelerden birisini, vergi tahsili usulünün ıslahı meselesi oluşturmuştur. Öncelikle iltizam sisteminin kaldırılması ve verginin aracılara başvurmadan doğrudan devlet görevlileri eliyle toplanması hedeflenmiştir. İltizam sisteminin kaldırılması 1840 ve 1879-1885 tarihleri arasındaki denemeler dışında mümkün olamamıştır. Ancak aşar vergisi dışında 1839 yılında gündeme gelen vergi, emlak ve akar vergisi gibi yeni vergiler iltizam kapsamı dışında bırakılmış ve bunlar doğrudan devlet görevlileri aracılığıyla toplanmıştır. Yine de asıl sorunu, bu devlet görevlilerinin kim olduğu oluşturmaktadır. 1869 tarihli Asâkir-i Zabtiye Nizamnamesi’nde de açıkça ifade edildiği üzere, tahsil-i emval işi zaptiyenin görevleri arasında sayılmıştır. Bununla birlikte, 1864 tarihli Vilayet Nizamnamesi sonrasında, daha önceki dönemde tamamı zaptiyenin görevleri arasında bulunan vergi tahsili ve iç güvenlik ve polis işlevlerinin idari ve kurumsal olarak ayrıştırılması yönünde bir niyet oluşmuştur. Tahsilat işlemlerini ve TOPLUMSAL TAR‹H 183 MART 2009 na yaklaşan kalkışmalarının bir dökümünü çıkarmıştır.3 Kansu ise vergi konusuna daha doğrudan yönelmiş ve ağırlıklı olarak yabancı gazeteleri kullanarak, vergi isyanları şeklinde ortaya çıkan siyasal hareketler üzerinde durmuştur.4 Kansu’nun, İkinci Meşrutiyet’in dar anlamda bir siyasal devrim olmayıp İttihad Terakki’nin yerel şubelerinin gayretleriyle organize edilmiş geniş tabanlı bir toplumsal devrim olduğu şeklindeki yorumu tartışmaya açıksa da, vergi nedeniyle yaşanan hoşnutsuzlukları devrimi hazırlayan koşullar arasında değerlendirmiş olması önemlidir. teşkilatını düzenlemek üzere başlıca 1871, 1875, 1879, 1886, 1894, 1902 tarihlerinde olmak üzere çok sayıda tahsil-i emval nizamnamesi çıkartılmış ve bu nizamnamelerle zaptiyeden ayrı bir vergi tahsildarlığı teşkilatı oluşturulması yönünde çaba sarf edilmiştir. Ancak bütün çabalara rağmen başarı sağlanabildiğini söylemek zordur. İkinci Abdülhamid dönemi itibariyle vergi tahsilatının nasıl icra edildiğini, 1897 yılında henüz 19 yaşında genç bir Mülkiye mezunu iken Pürsıçan nahiyesi müdürlüğüne atanan Tahsin Uzer’in kaleminden aktaralım: BOA, DH.TMIK.S, 33/104, 2,1318.12.05. 28 Şubat 1901 tarihli Maliye Nezareti tezkeresinin sureti. Manastır’a bağlı Debre’de bulunan 10 tahsildardan bir fayda görülmediğini ve tahsilat işlerini zabıtalar yaptığından tahsildar memurluğunun lağv edilmesini bildiren yazı. “Halktan istenen vergiler, o zaman zaptiyeler, yani jandarmalar aracılığıyla toplanır ve muhtarlar da, düzenledikleri tutanaklarla parayı, hazineye teslim ederlerdi… Mülkiye amirleri, maliye, alay ve tabur, bölük ağaları; halktan vergi toplama usulünü tespit için, baş başa verip uzun uzun konuşurlar, sonra aldıkları karar üzerine; kaza ve nahiyelere, kol kol jandarma müfrezeleri çıkarıldığı gibi, muhtarlara kocabaşılara ve hatta eşraf, seçkin kişilere yazılı emirler gönderilir. Jandarma komutanları, aldıkları emirleri yerine getirmek için bölgelerinde gerekli tedbirleri alırlar. Kazalardan 150.000, nahiyelerden 70.000-80.000, köylerden ise dere- 47 cesine göre 10.000 den 50.000 kuruşa kadar defterler hazırlanır. OSMANLI TARİHİ Gidecek müfreze komutanlarına yani zulümle para toplayacak bu kişilere bu defterler verilir. (Bu tahsilatı yapamaz veya eksik getirirseniz kafanızı keserim diye sert emirler tebliğ edilir.) Müfrezeler çıkar; Kara Osman Çavuş Ova mıntıkasına, Kürt Ali Çiç’e, Cellad Mustafa Onbaşı Dağ koluna, Gırgır Mehmet Çavuş Ulak ve çevresine, Mülazım Osman Ağa Pürsıçan’a, Kuzey Arnavutluk’ta, Mirdita bölgesinde bir dağ köyü. Sacit Kutlu arşivinden alınmıştır. 48 işte bunlara benzeyen; şanlı şöhretli ‘Çakırcalılar’ birer tarafa giderler. Gittikleri yerlerde ileri gelenleri ve muhtarları çağırırlar, telaşlı ve kızgın bir tavırla, defterdeki paranın üç katını isterler. Zavallı köylü, harman mevsimi ise ve tütünleri de satılmamış ise, imkânsızlıktan dem vurarak, istenilen parayı veremeyeceklerini söyleyince, derhal işkence ve baskı başlar. Kazaya ve livaya borcun bir süre ertelenmesi için başvuranları da, tabur ağaları ve mülkiye amirleri kovarlar. Hatta tahkir ve tehdit ederler. Köyde ağnam (küçük baş hayvan) ve mekâre (katır, at, eşek ve benzeri hayvanlar) varsa köyün uygun bir yerinde toplar ve sahiplerini de bunların arasında tevkif ederler. Zavallıların aileleri de kıymetli eşyalarını veya tütününü yok bahasına rehin etmek için, dört tarafa başvururlar. Toplanan hayvanlar düşük fiyatlarla elden çıkarılır veyahut ileride bunlardan alacağı, yağ veya yapağıya karşılık, korkunç bir faizle para bulmak zorunda kalırlar. Süvari jandarmalar; köylerde yer, içer, arpa, buğday ellerine ne geçerse hayvanlarına yedirirler. Hatta, Hıristiyan köylerinde, rakısına şarabına ve karısına kadar ileri giderler. Nihayet o köyden, istedikleri parayı alıp defolurlar.”7 Aslında asâkir-i zabtiyenin özellikle vergi tahsili sırasında ahali üzerinde tahammülfersa bir baskı oluşturduğu gerçeğinin Osmanlı yöneticileri de farkındaydı. Bu konu, 1878 tarihli Berlin Antlaşması’nın Rumeli vilayetleri için öngördüğü ıslahat programının gündeminde de yer almıştı. Antlaşmanın 23. maddesi de Makedonya’da Avrupa devletlerinin denetiminde idari reformlar yapılmasını öngörmekteydi. Makedonya’da gündeme gelen reformların en önemli başlığını, asâkir-i zabtiyenin, yani iç güvenlik teşkilatının ahali üzerindeki baskılarını önlemek üzere Avrupa devletlerinin doğrudan gözetimi altında olan bir jandarma reformunun gerçekleştirilmesi oluşturuyordu. Bu konu kuşkusuz vergi tahsilatı meselesiyle doğrudan ilişkiliydi ve Osmanlı hükümetinin 1879 yılında çıkarmış olduğu Tahsil-i Emval Nizamnamesi ve daha sonra, 1896 yılında jandarma bünyesinde bulunan tahsildaran fırkasını lağvederek yerine yeni bir tahsildarlar heyeti oluşturma kararı hiç şüphesiz Avrupa devletlerinin müdahale çabasını geçersiz kılma yönünde bir kaygının da ifadesiydi. Ancak 1902 ve 1903 yıllarında Rumeli’de gerçekleşen Cuma-i Bâlâ ve İlinden ayaklanmalarının ardından Avrupa devletlerinin müdahalesi engellenememiş ve jandarma reformu Umum Müfettiş Hüseyin Hilmi Paşa’nın denetiminde olmak kaydıyla uygulamaya konmuştur.8 1879 tarihinden söz konusu ayaklanmaların gerçekleştiği yıllara kadar uzanan evrede vergi tahsilatı alanında planlanan reformların istenildiği ölçüde gerçekleştirilememiş olması kuşkusuz geniş halk kitlelerinin hoşnutsuzluğunu daha da artırmış ve isyanlar için zemin hazırlamıştır. Aşağıda, 1896 tarihli vergi tahsilatı işine jandarmanın kesinlikle karıştırılmaması ve tahsilatın yeni oluşturulan tahsildarlık teşkilatı aracılığıyla gerçekleştirilmesi yö- nündeki talimatı takip eden süreçte Rumeli’nin belli başlı vilayetlerinde vergi tahsildarlığı ıslahatının nasıl gerçekleştirildiği, daha doğrusu gerçekleştirilemediği kısaca incelenecektir. Ergiri, Preveze, Berat ve Yanya merkez olmak üzere dört sancak ve toplam 2378 köyden oluşan Yanya vilayeti Rumeli’nin görece büyük vilayetlerinden birisini oluşturmaktadır. Diğer vilayetler için söz konusu olduğu gibi, Yanya vilayetine de yeni tahsildarlık teşkilatının oluşturulması yönündeki talimat Aralık 1896 tarihiyle gönderilmiş ve vilayet tarafından bu doğrultuda icraata başlanmıştır.9 Vilayetlerden gelen, vergi tahsildarlarının artırılması yönündeki ısrarlı taleplere rağmen hükümet 1897 yılında nahiye meclisleri ve nahiye müdürlerinin tahsilatla ilgili görevleri bulunduğunu hatırlatarak tahsildar sayısında bir azaltmaya gidilmesi yönünde bir talimat göndermiştir. Yanya valiliğinin bu emre tepkisi, beklenileceği üzere hayli sert olmuştur. Vali, Dahiliye Nezareti’ne yazdığı 3 Kasım 1897 tarihli yazıda, “Maliye Nezaret-i Celilesi’ne takdim edilen defterde muharrer tahsildaran adedi ve mahsusatının hiçbir suretle tenkihat icrası kabil olamayacağı gibi işbu tertibatın bile yeterli olamayacağı ve ilerde jandarma muavenetine muhtaç olunacağını” çok açık bir şekilde ifade etmiştir.10 Yanya vilayetinin Dahiliye Nezareti’ne gönderdiği 14 Mayıs 1899 tarihli telgrafta ise, yeni oluşturulan tahsildarlar teşkilatını “köylünün henüz işitmediği ve binaenaleyh bunlara karşı emir ve nüfuzu tamamen cereyan etmemekte olup şu sebeple emr-i mühim-i tahsilatın pek geri kaldığı anlaşıldığından ahali tahsildarlara alıştırılıncaya kadar muavenet için yanlarına muvakkaten birer nefer zaptiyenin terfikinin zaruri olduğu” ifade edilmiştir. Maliye Nezareti’nden Dahiliye Nezareti’ne gönderilen 26 Kasım 1900 tarihli tahriratta ise, vilayetin bazı bölgelerinde tahsilat işlemlerinde “jandarmadan başka asâkir-i şahane müfrezelerinin bile istihdamına lüzum gösteren mahallerinin Bütün bu yazışmalar Yanya vilayetinde vergi isyanlarının hayli yaygın olduğunu, idarenin zora ve askeri güce başvurmadan vergi tahsil etmekte zorlandığını ortaya koymaktadır. Aynı sıkıntıların Düyun-ı Umumiye tahsildar ve kolcuları tarafından da yaşanıyor olması şaşırtıcı değildir. Yanya valisinin 24 Eylül 1905 tarihli telgrafında ifade edildiğine göre, son terhislerden sonra vilayet jandarma alayının mevcudu hayli azalmış ve karakollarda yeteri kadar jandarma bulundurmak zorlaşmıştır. Bu durumda Düyun-ı Umumiye tahsildarlarına refakat etmek üzere jandarmaların görevlendirilmesinin mümkün olmadığı ifade edilmiştir. İfade edildiğine göre, Düyun-ı Umumiye tahsildarlarına refakat eden kolcuların silah taşıma izni bulunmadığından müşkilat iyice artmaktadır. İdare ise kendilerine en azından birkaç tüfek verilmesini talep etmektedir. Dahiliye Nezareti’nin 2 Kasım 1905 tarihiyle Yanya vilayetine gönderdiği yazıda kolculara silah verilmesinin kesinlikle uygun olmadığı bildirilmiştir.12 Manastır vilayetinde de durum farklı görünmemektedir. Vilayet, 28 Mart 1898 tarihli telgrafla nahiye meclislerinin tahsilatta görevlendirilmeleri durumunda bile idare-i maslahatın mümkün olmadığını belirtmiştir. Aynı telgrafta, bazı bölgelerde nahiye meclislerinden faydalanmanın mümkün olduğu, ancak birçok bölgede nahiye meclislerinin henüz oluşturulmadığı ve bu nedenle tahsildar sayısında bir azaltmaya gidilemeyeceği bildirilmiştir.13 17 Temmuz 1899 tarihli valilik telgrafında ise Serfice sancağında tahsilatın ancak zabıta yardımıyla gerçekleştirilebildiği bildirilmektedir. Serfice, 800 civarında köyü bulunan büyükçe bir sancaktır bu sancakta bir önceki yıl da vergi tahsilinde jandarmaya başvurmak durumunda kalınmıştır. Serfice Mutasarrıflığı tahsildarların yanına, mevkiine göre birer ikişer zaptiye süvarisinin verilmesini gerekli görmektedir. Dahiliye Nezareti ise 29 Ağustos 1899 tarihli yazısında öncelikle ıslahat kararlarını hatırlatmış ve tahsildarlara refakat edecek jandarmaların bir neferle sınırlandırılmasını istemiştir. Söz konusu jandarmanın “asla işe karıştırılmaması ve bu muamelenin nihayet-ün-nihaye bir iki aya mahsus tutularak ondan sonra kuraya yalnız tahsildarlar gönderilerek eski usulün katiyen terk olunması lazım geleceği” de ayrıca belirtilmiştir.14 26 Mart 1901 tarihli Manastır Vilayeti yazısında ise Debre Sancağı’ndaki tahsildarlardan hiçbir fayda sağlanamadığı gerekçesiyle tahsildarlığın lağv edilmesi istenmektedir. İfade edildiğine göre, sancakta vergi ancak “zabıtadan ve cihet-i askeriyeden memurlar çıkarılarak” toplanabilmektedir. Maliye Nezareti ise her ne kadar ıslahat kararlarına aykırı da olsa bu durumun onaylanması gerektiği yönünde görüş belirtmiştir.15 İstanbul’a yakın olmasına rağmen Çatalca Mutasarrıflığı’nda da jandarmaya başvurmadan vergi tahsilatının gerçekleştirilemediğini görüyoruz. Örneğin Çatalca Mutasarrıfı 17 Nisan 1897 tarihli telgrafında tahsildar maaşının düşüklüğü ve tahsildarların sayısının azlığı nedeniyle verginin toplanamadığını bildirmiştir.16 Mutasarrıf, 13 Temmuz 1897 tarihli telgrafında ise 400’er kuruş maaşla 14 süvari ve 250’şer kuruş maaşla 4 piyade tahsildar daha istihdam edilmediği takdirde vergi tahsilinin gerçekleştirilemeyeceğini bildirmiştir. Mutasarrıf durumun vahametini ifade etmek üzere, “geçen sene tah- TOPLUMSAL TAR‹H 183 MART 2009 bulunduğu” ifade edilmiş ve söz konusu tahsildarlara birer nefer jandarma refakat etmesi yönündeki geçici kararın bir müddet daha devam ettirilmesi talep edilmiştir. Dahiliye Nezareti’nden Yanya vilayetine gönderilen 5 Ocak 1901 tarihli telgrafta da, söz konusu geçici uygulamaya birkaç ayı geçmemek üzere ve refakatçi jandarmaların “tahsilata asla karıştırılmamaları” şartıyla izin verildiği belirtilmekte ve geçen süre zarfında nahiye meclisleri ve nahiye müdürlerinin tahsilatta görevlendirilmesi yönünde gerekli adımların neden atılmadığı sorulmaktadır. Ayrıca söz konusu geçici uygulamaya “nihayet-ün-nihaye kaç mah daha” ihtiyaç duyulduğunun bildirilmesi istenmiştir.11 silat işi zabıta marifetiyle icra edildiği halde emval-i umumiyeden yüzde seksen derecesi tahsil olunup bu sene ise şimdiki tahsildarlarla ancak yüzde kırkı tahsil olunacağını” ayrıca belirtme ihtiyacı duymuştur.17 Çatalca Mutasarrıflığı’nın 11 Eylül 1901 tarihi itibariyle hâlâ tahsildarların yetersizliğinden şikâyet ettiğini görüyoruz. Mutasarrıf, ya zaptiyelerin tahsildarlara yardım etmesine izin verilmesini ya da 6 nefer süvari zaptiyesinin lağvına ve onlardan kalacak mahsusatla 6 nefer süvari tahsil- darının istihdamına izin verilmesini talep etmektedir. Bu talep Dahiliye Nezareti’nin ilgili birimlerinde görüşülmüş ve reddedilmiştir.18 Rumeli’nin diğer vilayetlerinde de durumun farklı olduğunu söylemek zordur. Örneğin 1897 tarihi itibariyle Selanik vilayetinde, benzer şekilde, tahsilat işlemlerinde zabıta kuvvetine başvurulmaya devam edildiğini görüyoruz. Selanik valiliği çok açık bir ifadeyle, “kuvve-i zabıta ile tahsilata alışmış olan ahalinin nahiye meclislerinin nüfuzuyla tekalifatı vakti zamanıyla ifa etmeyeceklerini” belirtmiştir.19 Kosova vilayeti ise kısmen olumlu bir yaklaşım sergile- BOA, DH.TMIK.S, 26/54, 2,1317.04.21. 17 Temmuz 1899 tarihli Manastır Valiliği’nin telgrafı: Serfiçe’de mevcut tahsildarlarla tahsilat mümkün olamadığından, zabıtanın yardım etmesi yönünde talep. 49 OSMANLI TARİHİ miş, bir an önce nahiye meclislerinin oluşturulması ve tahsildar maaşlarının da uygun bir seviyeye çekilmesi halinde tahsilat işlemlerinde bir sorun çıkmayacağını belirtmiştir.20 Vergi tahsilatında jandarma ve zaptiye kuvvetine başvurulmaya devam edilmesi, hazinenin ihtiyaçlarının her şeyin üzerinde tutularak ne pahasına olursa olsun bütçe gelir öngörülerinin gerçekleştirilmeye çalışılması Osmanlı taşrasında emeğiyle geçinen geniş halk kitleleri üzerinde sürekli bir baskıya yol açmıştır. Osmanlı idaresi, imparatorluğun bütün sathında vergi tahsilat teşkilatının askeri görünümünü ortadan kaldırarak sivil bir niteliğe büründürmek üzere büyük bir çaba sarf etmiştir. Ancak Osmanlı tarım üreticisi için bu değişikliğin ne ölçüde bir rahatlama sağladığı pek açık değildir. Aşağıdaki örnek, Rumeli’nin en büyük vilayeti olan Edirne’de, askeri unsurlarından arındırılmış da olsa vergi tahsilatının ahalinin gündelik hayatında önemli bir değişim getirmediğine işaret etmektedir. Edirne vilayetinin Dedeağaç sancağına bağlı Mekri karyesinde 1903 yılında cereyan eden vaka, tahsildar Bekir Efendi’nin tahsilat esnasında ahaliye kötü davranışıyla ilgilidir. Bekir Efendi, Mekri ahalisinden Yanako’nun 170 kuruşluk vergi borcu için zevcesinin hanesine girmiş ve yanında jandarma Ömer Çavuş, iki muhtar ve ihtiyar heyeti mensupları hazır bulunduğu halde Yanako’nun zevcesinin verdiği 100 kuruşu eksik olduğu gerekçesiyle almamıştır. Kadını, 70 kuruşu daha sonra bulup getireceği yönündeki ricasını da kabul etmeyerek, merdivenden aşağı itelemiştir. Daha sonra oğlu Petro’yu ve bir başka akrabasını darp ve tahkir etmiştir. Olayın bu şekilde cereyan ettiği, şahitlerin ifadesi ve Ömer Çavuş’un kendi beyanı tarafından doğrulanmıştır. Ahalinin mahkeme-i nizamiyeye şikâyeti üzerine tahsildar Ömer Çavuş hakkında 15 gün hapis cezası verilmiştir. Olayın yukarıda özetlediğimiz genel çerçevesi olağandışı bir nitelik taşımamaktadır. Ancak bu vakıa vesilesiyle Maliye, Dahiliye ve Adliye nezaretleri arasında cereyan eden yazışmalar, Osmanlı mali idaresinin, verginin ne koşulla olursa olsun toplanması şeklindeki zihniyetine ışık tutar niteliktedir. Maliye Nezareti, tahsildarların mahkemeye celp, davet veyahut hapis ve tevkif edilmesi gibi durumların tahsilat işlemlerini sekteye uğratmak gibi ciddi mahzurları olacağı görüşünden hareketle, “tahsildarların mahkemeye celbi hususunda memurin-i maliyenin vesaitine müracaat olunmasını” istemektedir. Dahiliye Nezareti de bu isteği Adliye Nezareti’ne aktarmıştır. Adliye Nezareti’nin cevabı ise tahsildarlara kanunda öngörüldüğünden farklı özel bir muamelenin uygulanamayacağı şeklinde olmuştur. Kuşkusuz bu örnek vergi tahsili sürecinde yaşanan baskılar karşısında ahalinin mahkemeler ara- dipnotlar 1 2 50 Zafer Kars, 1908 Devriminin Halk Dinamiği (İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 1997). Zafer Kars, Belgelerle 1908 Devrimi Öncesinde Anadolu (İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 1984). Donald Quataert, “The Economic Climate of the ‘Young Turk Revolution’ in 1908,” The Journal of Modern History 51, 3 (1979): D1147-D61. Donald Quataert, “Rural Unrest in the Ottoman Empire, 1830-1914,” in Peasants and Politics in the Modern Middle East, ed. Farhad Kazemi and John Waterburry (Miami: Florida International University Press, 1991), 38-49. Donald Quataert, “The Young Turk Revolution: Old and New Approaches,” in Workers, Peasants and Economic Change in the Ottoman Empire, 1730-1914 (İstanbul: ISIS Press, 1993), 49-62. Carter Vaughn Findley, “Economic Bases of Revolution and Repression in the Late Ottoman Empire,” Comparative Studies in Society and History 28, 1 (1986): 81-106. Feroz Ahmad, “Doğmakta Olan Bir Burjuvazinin Öncüsü: Genç Türklerin Sosyal ve Ekonomik Politikası,” in İttihatçılıktan 3 4 5 6 7 8 Kemalizme (İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 2002), 25-60. Kudret Emiroğlu, Anadolu’da Devrim Günleri: II. Meşrutiyet’in İlanı (Ankara: İmge Kitabevi, 1999). Aykut Kansu, 1908 Devrimi, trans. Ayda Erbal (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2001). Halil İnalcık, Tanzimat ve Bulgar Meselesi (Doktora Tezinin 50. Yılı) (İstanbul: Eren Yayınları, 1992). Fikret Adanır, Makedonya Sorunu (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 1996). Tahsin Uzer, Makedonya Eşkiyalık Tarihi ve Son Osmanlı Yönetimi (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1979), 30-31. Bu süreç ve jandarma reformunun ayrıntıları için bkz. Nadir Özbek, “Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nda İç Güvenlik, Siyaset ve Devlet, 1876-1909,” Türklük Araştırmaları Dergisi, 16 (2004): 5995. Makedonya’daki siyasi gelişmeler ve söz konusu ayaklanmalar için bkz. Fikret Adanır, Makedonya Sorunu (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 1996), Gül Tokay, Makedonya Sorunu: cılığıyla hakkını arayabildiğine işaret etmektedir. Ancak bu tekil örneğin geneli yansıttığını düşünmek hayli zor görünmektedir.21 Bu yazıda, Osmanlı Rumeli’sinde İkinci Abdülhamid döneminde vergi tahsilatına ilişkin kısa bir değerlendirme yapılmıştır. Vergi tahsilatı, 19. yüzyıl zarfında bireyle devletin karşı karşıya geldiği en önemli anlardan birisini oluşturmaktadır. İdarenin meşruiyeti ve ahalinin rejime güveninin tesis edildiği en önemli momentlerden birisini bu ilişki oluşturmaktadır. Osmanlı idarecileri bütün çabalarına rağmen bu ilişkiyi sağlıklı bir zeminde kuramamışlardır. Vergi tahsili işlemleri bütün çabalara rağmen zaptiye ve jandarma birlikleri aracılığıyla gerçekleştirilmiş ve bu durum ahalinin baskı ve şiddete maruz kalmasına yol açmıştır. Ayrıca her ne kadar son derece sınırlı kalmış da olsa vergi tahsildarlık teşkilatının zaptiyeden ayrıştırılıp sivil bir kurum haline getirilmesi tek başına bir çözüm olamamış, maliyenin ne pahasına olursa olsun ahaliden zamanında ve devletin ihtiyaçları ölçüsünde vergi toplama eğilimi geniş halk yığınlarının rejimden uzaklaşmasını ve muhalif siyasi hareketlerin etki alanına girmesini kolaylaştırmıştır. Rumeli’de bu dinamik İttihad ve Terakki’nin Abdülhamid rejimine karşı yürüttüğü siyasal muhalefet için kuşkusuz verimli bir sosyal zemin hazırlamıştır. nadir özbek boğaziçi üniversitesi atatürk enstitüsü 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 Jön Türk İhtilalinin Kökenleri (1903-1908) (İstanbul: AFA Yayınları, 1995). BOA, DH.TMIK.S, 4/41, 1314.07.08 (13 Aralık 1896). BOA, DH.TMIK.S, 19/87, 1316.02.28 (18 Temmuz 1898). BOA, DH.TMIK.S, 33/23, 1318.09.04 (26 Aralık 1900). BOA, DH.TMIK.S, 60/39, 1323.09.04 (2 Kasım 1905). BOA, DH.TMIK.S, 19/87, 1316.02.28 (18 Temmuz 1898). BOA, DH.TMIK.S, 26/54, 1317.04.21 (29 Ağustos 1899). BOA, DH.TMIK.S, 33/104, 1318.12.05 (26 Mart 1901). BOA, DH.TMIK.S, 8/59, 1314.11.17 (19 Nisan 1897). BOA, DH.TMIK.S, 19/87, 1316.02.28 (18 Temmuz 1898). BOA, DH.TMIK.S, 35/42, 1319.06.22 (6 Ekim 1901). BOA, DH.TMIK.S, 19/87, 1316.02.28 (18 Temmuz 1898). BOA, Ibid. BOA, DH.TMIK.S, 47/1, 1321.05.04 (29 Temmuz 1903).