1 Bilgiye Erişim Merkezi`ne Yeni Gelen Yayınlar Cihangir, Mehmet
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1 Bilgiye Erişim Merkezi`ne Yeni Gelen Yayınlar Cihangir, Mehmet
222333 M M A R T P A Z A R T E S MA AR RT TP PA AZ ZA AR RT TE ES Sİİİ S S A Y SA YIII::: 555111999 AY Bilgiye Erişim Merkezi’ne Yeni Gelen Yayınlar Cihangir, Mehmet. – Türkiye’de banka birleşmeleri ve birleşen bankaların verimlilik ve etkinliğinin ölçülmesi üzerine karşılaştırmalı-uygulamalı bir inceleme (Doktora Tezi). – Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, 2004. İ İ S M M M O B g y e E r ş m M e r k e z İS SM MM MM MO O B Biiilllg giiiy ye e E Er riiiş şiiim m M Me er rk ke ez ziii 1 Resmi Gazete YÜRÜTME VE İDARE BÖLÜMÜ CUMHURBAŞKANLIĞINA VEKÂLET ETME İŞLEMİ — Cumhurbaşkanlığına, Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Başkanı Köksal TOPTAN'ın Vekalet Etmesine Dair Tezkere BAKANLIKLARA VEKÂLET ETME İŞLEMİ — Devlet Bakanı Kürşad TÜZMEN’e, Devlet Bakanı Mehmet AYDIN’ın Vekâlet Etmesine Dair Tezkere — İçişleri Bakanlığına, Milli Savunma Bakanı M. Vecdi GÖNÜL’ün Vekâlet Etmesine Dair Tezkere YÖNETMELİKLER — Tarım ve Köyişleri Bakanlığı Döner Sermaye İşletmeleri Uygulama Yönetmeliğinde Değişiklik Yapılmasına Dair Yönetmelik — İstanbul Teknik Üniversitesi Lisansüstü Eğitim ve Öğretim Yönetmeliğinde Değişiklik Yapılmasına Dair Yönetmelik — İstanbul Teknik Üniversitesi Yaz Öğretimi Yönetmeliğinde Değişiklik Yapılmasına Dair Yönetmelik ANA STATÜ — Türkiye Motosiklet Federasyonu Ana Statüsünde Değişiklik Yapılmasına Dair Ana Statü Yabancı Kitap Ve Süreli Yayınlar Journal of Accounting and Public Policy Volume 26, Issue 6, Pages 637-750 (November-December 2007) Information sharing among firms and cyber attacks Pages 639-688 Kjell Hausken Abstract As the Sarbanes-Oxley Act strengthens internal controls, and the government encourages information sharing, accounting gains significance through secure representation, storage, and transfer of information, and by laying the foundation for assessing costs and benefits. Information sharing and security investment for two firms are inverse U shaped in the aggregate attack, and interlinked through the interdependence and the firm’s unit cost of security investment. Both increase in the interdependence (e.g. US telecommunications industry). With given security investment, social welfare is inverse U shaped in information sharing. Individual optimization implies free riding. A social planner is introduced controlling information sharing, security investment, or both, in simultaneous and two period games. Two period games where the social planner moves first are realistic when the social planner is highly respected. For the simultaneous game, a social planner controlling information sharing (security investment) imposes unreasonably high sharing (security investment). İ İ S M M M O B g y e E r ş m M e r k e z İS SM MM MM MO O B Biiilllg giiiy ye e E Er riiiş şiiim m M Me er rk ke ez ziii 2 Firms free ride in the variable they control. The social planner imposes more moderate levels in the two period games. A social planner controlling both information sharing and security investment in a two period game where the social planner moves first is the most beneficial control scenario when the firms’ defense efficiencies are high. If these are sufficiently high, the attack is deterred altogether. Article Outline 1. Introduction 2. The model 3. Analyzing the model: each firm and the agent optimize individually 4. Exogenously given information sharing 5. Exogenously given security investment 6. Social planner controls information sharing 6.1. Two period game 6.2. Simultaneous game 7. Social planner controls security investment: simultaneous game 8. Social planner controls both information sharing and security investment 8.1. Simultaneous game 8.2. Two period game 9. Which games and control scenarios do the agent and social planner prefer 10. Conclusion Acknowledgements Appendix 1. Individual firm and agent optimization, cf. Section 3 Appendix 2. A social planner controls information sharing in a two period game, cf. Section 6.1 Appendix 3. A social planner controls information sharing in a simultaneous game, cf. Section 6.2 Appendix 4. Social planner controls security investment: Simultaneous game, cf. Section 7 Appendix 5. Social planner controls both information sharing and security investment: simultaneous game, cf. Section 8.1 Appendix 6. Social planner controls both information sharing and security investment: two period game, cf. Section 8.2 İ İ S M M M O B g y e E r ş m M e r k e z İS SM MM MM MO O B Biiilllg giiiy ye e E Er riiiş şiiim m M Me er rk ke ez ziii 3 References Determinants of the variability in corporate effective tax rates and tax reform: Evidence from Australia Pages 689-704 Grant Richardson, Roman Lanis Abstract This study examines the determinants of the variability in corporate effective tax rates in Australia spanning the Ralph Review of Business Taxation reform. Our results indicate that corporate effective tax rates are associated with several major firm-specific characteristics, including firm size, capital structure (leverage) and asset mix (capital intensity, inventory intensity and R&D intensity). While the Ralph Review tax reform had a significant impact on many of these associations, corporate effective tax rates continue to be associated with firm size, capital structure and asset mix after the tax reform. Article Outline 1. Introduction 2. Determinants of ETRs and hypotheses 2.1. ETRs and firm size 2.2. ETRs and firms’ financing and investment decisions 2.3. ETRs and tax reform 3. Research design 3.1. Sample and data 3.2. Dependent variable 3.3. Independent variables 3.3.1. Firm-specific variables 3.3.2. Control variables 3.3.3. Tax reform variables 3.4. Regression model 4. Results and analyses 4.1. Descriptive statistics İ İ S M M M O B g y e E r ş m M e r k e z İS SM MM MM MO O B Biiilllg giiiy ye e E Er riiiş şiiim m M Me er rk ke ez ziii 4 4.2. Regression results 4.3. Robustness checks 5. Conclusions Acknowledgements References Auditor specialization, perceived audit quality, and audit fees in the local government audit market Pages 705-732 Suzanne Lowensohn, Laurence E. Johnson, Randal J. Elder, Stephen P. Davies Abstract Prior governmental research implies a positive relation between auditor specialization and audit quality, but the effect of specialization on audit fees is mixed. However, no single governmental study investigates the effect of auditor specialization on both audit quality and audit fees. Also, prior studies focus on either large- or small audit firms and often employ indirect proxies for audit quality. We study the effects of auditor specialization on perceived audit quality and audit fees. Our data represent both Big 5 and smaller audit firms and include three market-based measures of specialization. We survey 241 Florida local government finance directors and find that specialization is positively associated with perceived audit quality but not with audit fees. We also find that Big 5 auditors, often used as a proxy for higher audit quality in prior research, are not uniformly associated with increased perceived audit quality but consistently charge higher audit fees. Our results confirm a relation between measures of audit firm specialization and audit quality and raise questions regarding audit firm size and audit quality in the municipal sector. Our findings suggest that engaging specialized auditors may be good policy for many local governments. Article Outline 1. Introduction 2. Literature review and theoretical considerations 2.1. The audit environment of interest 2.2. Operationalizing audit quality 2.3. Auditor specialization and audit quality İ İ S M M M O B g y e E r ş m M e r k e z İS SM MM MM MO O B Biiilllg giiiy ye e E Er riiiş şiiim m M Me er rk ke ez ziii 5 2.4. Auditor specialization and audit fees 2.5. Audit firm size and audit quality 3. Model development 3.1. The dependent variable 3.2. Research variables 4. Control variables 4.1. The audit fee model 4.2. Relation between audit quality and audit fees 5. Research method 6. Data collection 6.1. Data analysis 7. Results and discussion 7.1. Analysis of audit fees 7.2. Additional analysis of audit firm size and specialization 7.3. Discussion of findings 7.4. Conclusion Appendix. Local government audit survey Please complete this survey regarding the audit of your government’s financial statements for the fiscal year ending (FYE) 9-30-02 References US oil companies’ earnings management in response to hurricanes Katrina and Rita Pages 733-748 Donal Byard, Mahmud Hossain, Santanu Mitra Abstract This study examines earnings management by US-based oil companies in the period immediately after the impact of hurricanes Katrina and Rita. We show that large petroleum refining firms – but not the smaller crude oil and natural gas production companies – recorded significant abnormal income-decreasing accruals in the fiscal quarter immediately after the impact of hurricanes Katrina and Rita (Q4 of 2005). In addition, we show that these results are driven by abnormal current accruals. Prior studies show that some firms respond to periods of heightened political scrutiny by İ İ S M M M O B g y e E r ş m M e r k e z İS SM MM MM MO O B Biiilllg giiiy ye e E Er riiiş şiiim m M Me er rk ke ez ziii 6 recording abnormal income-decreasing accruals (e.g. [Cahan, S., 1992. The effect of antitrust investigation on discretionary accruals: a refined test of the political cost hypothesis. The Accounting Review 67 (1), 77–96; Han, J., Wang, S., 1998. Political costs and earnings management of oil companies during the 1990 Persian Gulf Crisis. The Accounting Review 73 (1), 103–118]). Our results add to this stream of research by examining a political cost-increasing event that occurred after the passage of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act (SOX) of 2002. The results suggest that in the post-SOX period managers continue to engage in income-decreasing earnings management during periods of heightened political cost sensitivity, at least in the case of large petroleum refining firms. Article Outline 1. Introduction 2. Background 3. Sample selection and research method 3.1. Sample selection 3.2. Research method 4. Results 5. Concluding comments Acknowledgements References İ İ S M M M O B g y e E r ş m M e r k e z İS SM MM MM MO O B Biiilllg giiiy ye e E Er riiiş şiiim m M Me er rk ke ez ziii 7