hypermasculinity
Transkript
hypermasculinity
AİBÜ Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Dergisi, 2014, Cilt:14, Yıl:14, Sayı:2, 14: 233-262 RELATIONS BETWEEN TURKEY AND IRAN AFTER THE ARAB SPRING: THE EXTENT OF A PRAGMATIC RAPPROCHEMENT Burak KÜNTAY* ARAP BAHARI SONRASI TÜRKİYE İRAN İLİŞKİLERİ: PRAGMATİK UZLAŞMANIN BOYUTU Abstract This article is attempting to find an answer to the questions of “How are Turkish and Iranian relations affected by the recent happenings in the Middle East and what is the possible extent of pragmatic rapprochement?” It is believed that both countries’ contradicting ways of understanding the reasons and the outcomes of the Arab Spring together with several regional issues have put Turkey and Iran into a competitive atmosphere. However, due to the interdependence between Turkey and Iran together with the regional balances, a severed relationship between these particular countries is not expected. But although there is a considerable enhancement in Turkish-Iranian relations since 2002 encouraged both by the current Turkish government and regional as well as international atmosphere, it is not free from any tensions and therefore it would be miscalculating to claim that both countries have formed matured cooperation that is very strong. Keywords: Turkish Foreign Policy, Turkish Iranian Relations, Arab Spring, Interdependence, Foreign Policy Analysis Öz Bu makale Ortadoğu’da yaşanan son gelişmelerin Türkiye-İran ilişkileri üzerine nasıl etkilediği ve bu iki ülke arasındaki pragmatik yakınlaşmanın muhtemel kapsamının ne denli olacağı sorularına yanıt aramaya çalışmaktadır. Her iki ülkenin Arap Baharı’nın nedenleri ve sonuçlarına yönelik farklı yaklaşımlara sahip olmasıyla beraber diğer bölgesel meseleler Türkiye ve İran’ı rekabetçi bir ortama sürüklemiştir. Bunlara rağmen, iki ülkenin arasındaki karşılıklı bağımlılık ve bölgesel dengeler değerlendirildiğinde bu ülkeler arasındaki ilişkilerin tamamen kopması beklenmemektedir. Yine de tüm bunlara rağmen, 2002 sonrası Assist. Prof., Bahçeşehir University Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences, Department of Political Science and International Relations; burakkuntay@bahcesehir.edu.tr * 233 AIBU Journal of Social Sciences, 2014, Vol:14, Year:14, Issue:2, 14: 233-262 mevcut Türk Hükümetiyle beraber bölgesel ve uluslararası ortamın teşvikleri sayesinde iki ülke arasındaki ilişkiler kayda değer bir şekilde gelişmiş olsa da bu ilişkiler devam eden ve ileride olabilecek gerginliklerden de asla muaf tutulamaz. Bu nedenle, Türkiye ve İran’ın tam anlamıyla olgun ve güçlü bir işbirliğine gireceğini değerlendirmek çok da doğru bir tahmin olmaz. Anahtar Kelimeler: Türk Dış Politikası, Türkiye-İran İlişkileri, Arap Baharı, Karşılıklı Bağımlılık, Dış Politika Analizi 1. Introduction With the emergence of so-called “Arab Spring”, the Middle East has entered into a new era of significant transformation process. These political movements have impact on the countries located in the region and on Turkey as well. Turkey’s Justice and Development Party1 (AKP henceforth) government established very close relations with the Middle Eastern countries irrespective of their regime types since 2002. However, as the uprisings have broken out Turkish policy makers began to emphasize the need for the promotion of democracy in the region and supported the protesters. Iran, on the contrary, has also welcomed the uprisings, except the one in Syria, but with a more colored ideology. Both countries’ contradicting ways of understanding the reasons and the outcomes of the Arab Spring together with several regional issues have put Turkey and Iran into a competitive atmosphere. This article is aimed at finding out the effect of the Arab Spring on the relations of Turkey and Iran and whether their pragmatic rapprochement can be durable. In accordance with this given aim, the article is going to begin with TurkishIranian relations since 2002 and Turkey’s perception of the Arab Spring. The next section is going to mention how Iran views the events that have taken place since late 2010. Afterwards, the article is going to touch upon several disputes between these two countries that have emerged after the Arab Spring accordingly or not and try to express their effects on Turkish-Iranian relations. The following section is going to refer to the extent of Turkish-Iranian dependence. Consequently, the article would try to reach a conclusion about these countries’ relations in the near future under given political and economic data. Thus, with these sections the article would give detailed interpretation of Turkish and Iranian course of relations from 2002 until the recent happenings in the region and would clarify the extent of their rapprochement. 1 Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AKP) in Turkish. 234 AİBÜ Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Dergisi, 2014, Cilt:14, Yıl:14, Sayı:2, 14: 233-262 2. Turkish-Iranian Relations Since 2002 and Turkey’s Attitude towards the Arab Spring With the rise to power of AKP in 2002, Turkey’s perception of the Middle East together with its national identity as a Western and secular state have been altered with AKP’s civilizational, cultural and Islamic approach. Professor Ahmet Davutoğlu’s impact on the government and his various foreign policy understandings, namely, rhythmic diplomacy, multi-dimensional foreign policy, zero problems with neighbors, order instituting actor, and proactive foreign policy (Davutoğlu 2012:4) have also been significant. Turkey has become gradually and relatively active player in the region under the AKP government since 2002. Turkey redefined its geographical security environment over the last decade by deepening its engagement with the Middle Eastern countries (Öniş 2012:45). Turkey has established closer ties with Syria, Iran, and Iraq, assumed a leadership position in the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), attended Arab League conferences as permanent observatory state since 2006, and contributed to UN forces in Lebanon. She has also mediated in the Syrian - Israeli conflict as well as the nuclear standoff with Iran (Taşpınar 2012:127). Therefore, these issues have occupied foreign affairs of Turkey for a long time. AKP’s predecessors have actually, to varying degrees, emphasized cultural and historical ties with the Middle East (Altunışık 2009:178) but what AKP government has been doing is somewhat more than emphasizing, as it tried to develop a vision that located Turkey to the Islamic civilization and brought out Eastern and Islamic identity of it (Dal 2012:250). The other motivating factor that has led AKP to deal with the region is the “belief that Turkey, as the inheritor of the Ottoman Empire, holds a particular responsibility for the nature of international relations in this region” (Oğuzlu 2008:13). AKP strongly believed that the history and culture together with economic interdependence would consolidate relations with the Middle Eastern countries and bring each party closer. Besides AKP’s increasing role in foreign policy making, there are other factors that we should also mention for greater concern of the region in Turkish foreign policy. Economic factors, especially Turkey’s export-led growth policy advanced with Iran’s huge market potential and economic capacity led Turkey to spread its economic power and needs as a “trading state” (Kirişçi 2009:29-56). Rising energy demand of Turkey also required better relations with the states in the region, particularly with 235 AIBU Journal of Social Sciences, 2014, Vol:14, Year:14, Issue:2, 14: 233-262 Iran. Moreover, the regional developments in the Middle East, like US invasion in Iraq in 2003 in the name of Bush Doctrine, and Turkish parliament’s decision in March 1, 2003 have worsened Turkish-US relations and also increased anxiety in Turkey concerning its vital interests. Hence, Turkey not only with Iran but also with Syria increased its diplomatic and economic relations in order to “soft balance” the USA (Ayman 2012:566-567). Iran believed that it was surrounded and contained with US troops stationed in Iraq and Afghanistan. Turkey, on the other hand, felt that it was sidelined and realized that there was an increasing cooperation between the Iraqi Kurds and the USA leading the way for a Kurdish state (Ibid.). Rising terrorism also have an effect in Turco-Iranian rapprochement. Iranian former President Ahmadinejad stated that “We have to have coordination between the governments of Turkey, Iran and Iraq” (Today’s Zaman 2008). Hence, fighting cooperatively against “cousin” terrorist groups, namely PKK and PJAK became another factor that has increased strategic relations between Turkey and Iran. The deadlock in Turkey-EU relations in 2006 (Dal 2012:250) resulted with the EU Council’s decision on suspension of eight chapters and economic crisis that the world, particularly Europe was facing have also provided an encouraging atmosphere for improvement in the relations with the Middle Eastern countries and Iran in particular. Moreover, Turkey decided to further its relations with Iran that is following a nuclear program, as Turkey is highly worried about full-fledged war in its southern borders. Turkey, for a long time, believes that an isolated and marginalized Iran would not help to peace and stability in the region (Ayman 2012:577-578). Furthermore, Turkey also believes that there is no need to negotiate on military means to prevent Iran, as diplomatic means are not fully exhausted (Ibid.). Turkish Prime Minister Erdoğan declared: “We are against the possession of nuclear weapons in our region. We always give advice to Iran about this issue, and they tell us that they are not working on nuclear weapons. But those who ask Iran not to produce nuclear weapons should themselves give up their nuclear weapons first” (Zıbak 2018). Hence, Turkey always supported the rights of NPT signatory Iran for its pursuits to develop its nuclear program to reach peaceful ends. Israel was not mentioned directly by Erdoğan but it is clear that he criticizes the West, particularly the USA for supporting a non-contracting state, namely 236 AİBÜ Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Dergisi, 2014, Cilt:14, Yıl:14, Sayı:2, 14: 233-262 Israel that is believed to have nuclear weapons. Turkey and Brazil voted against to the UN Security Council’s sanctions on Iran and both countries also offered a uranium swap deal to Iran in 2010, which indicated a very concrete support for Iran. The increase of the weight of the Middle East in Turkish foreign policy and changing self-perception of Turkey caused Turkey to act like Iran in some respects (Ayman 2012:570). Most clear example of this might be Turkey’s worsened almost severed relations with Israel and Turkey’s high degree of support to Palestinians (Ibid.) and its closer engagement with Hamas. Israel’s attack on Turkish flagged Mavi Marmara, which was going to Gaza, has also caused enhanced relations between Turkey and Iran. These policies and factors coincided with AKP’s steadily increase in foreign policy making process, as it prioritized Turkey’s relations with the Middle Eastern and North African countries and “…thus catalyzed a significant revision of Turkish foreign policy toward its Middle Eastern neighbors generally and a new era in Turkish-Iranian relations in particular” (Habibi 2012:2). Thus, in recent years, Turkey and regional countries, particularly Iran have moved markedly closer on trade, diplomacy and strategic affairs. Since the Islamic revolution in Iran, Turkish and Iranian relations followed a rugged path, and they were indicated as uneasy neighbors having totally different ideologies. Each country represented explicitly divergent principles, while Turkey is having a secular democracy, being a NATO member and an ally of Israel, in contrast, Iran having a theocratic autocracy, believing the United States to be the world’s “Great Satan” and openly calls for the destruction of Israel (McCurdy 2008:88). But each country, downgrading all those ideological differences among their regime types and not intervening into their domestic issues, they began to come closer and realized that they were in need of one another. Iran’s perception in Turkey and Turkey’s perception in Iran gradually changed and lead to better economic and political relations and eliminated competitive and confrontational expressions made by two parties to a great extent (Keneş 2012:198). The Arab Spring, however, caused reorientation in Turkish foreign policy towards the region, as Turkish policy makers had to decide which party, i.e. well established relations with the authoritarian leaders or the protesters, to support. People who protested against their governments were perceived as people fighting for more freedom, equality and 237 AIBU Journal of Social Sciences, 2014, Vol:14, Year:14, Issue:2, 14: 233-262 democracy by Turkish policy makers. Davutoğlu stated that “Turkey’s value-based approach and emphasis on democracy and popular legitimacy have underpinned its policy toward the uprisings in the Middle East” (Davutoğlu 2012:8). It is understood from Davutoğlu’s statement that Turkey is going to support the people seeking for democracy regarding value-based approach, democracy and popular legitimacy, but Turkey before the beginning of the uprisings formed very close relations with former leaders of those countries facing with political transition today. Those leaders or the governments, who were highly criticized for oppressing and for not listening to their people by Turkish leaders, were one of the closest friends of Turkish leaders. AKP’s initial close relations with the authoritarian leaders were not really for the sake of democracy or its promotion. Rather it was for the above mentioned reasons, namely, “mutual gain through economic interdependence and close political ties based on cultural affinity and Muslim brotherhood” (Öniş 2012:46). Hence, this dilemma indicates us the fact that the uprisings were clearly surprising for Turkish policy makers, who have been living in a spring with their counterparts in the Middle East and North Africa. 3. Iran’s Attitude towards the Arab Spring Unprecedented uprisings in several Arab countries caused shockwaves in the region and in Iran particularly. The narrative illustrated by Iran towards the uprisings in the region was, supportive to some extent, but with a specific emphasis on ideology. Hence, uprisings in the region were perceived as “Islamic Awakening” aimed at overthrowing Western oriented, secular dictatorships, sharing similar traits with the 1979 Islamic revolution in Iran (Uygur 2012:11). Iran’s supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei alleged that “What I firmly announce is that a new movement, with the grace of God, has started in the region... This widespread awakening of nations, which is directed towards Islamic goals, will definitely become victorious” (Davari 2011). According to CBN News Sr. Reporter George Thomas, Iranian former President Mahmud Ahmadinejad, like Khamenei believed that the uprisings were inspired by the Iranian brand of Islam and on the day when Hosni Mubarak was ousted he stated that “The final move has begun...a great awakening is unfolding. One can witness the hand of Imam in managing it” (Thomas 2011). Major General Yahya Rahim Safavi has also stated in line with other two leaders; “The revolution of the people of Tunisia and Egypt is modeled after Iran's Islamic Revolution” (Molavi 2011). Iranian media, on the other hand, have also followed the same track and qualified the 238 AİBÜ Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Dergisi, 2014, Cilt:14, Yıl:14, Sayı:2, 14: 233-262 uprisings as Islamic awakening. As Ali Parchami, visiting research fellow at the University of Reading, cited from the Kayhan newspaper of Iran; “the popular stirrings … – represent a wave of ‘Islamic awakening’ which is long overdue and now represents an unstoppable force. Its headlines refer not only to the uprising of the Arab masses but also to the impending ‘Islamic Revolution’” (Parchami 2012:37). According to these declarations of Iranian leaders and the mass media, we can come to a conclusion that commonalities and correlations were tried to be found between the uprisings and the raison d’être of the Iranian state and it was believed by the Iranian leaders that at last, “the wave of the Islamic awakening resonated through the Islamic world as an export of the Islamic Republic of Iran” (Rafati 2012). This way of explaining the uprisings does not cover all the reasons of the happenings, and does not really mesh with the reality so we can claim that it is a little more than a partial explanation. Despite Iran’s claims that the Arab Spring was in line with her Islamic revolution, recent developments seem to indicate the otherwise that should be the result of Iran’s inability to adjust its foreign policy to sudden changes. Newly established governments in Tunisia and Egypt detached from Iranian model of government (Uygur 2012:12), or in other words, Iranian theocracy. Although the former President of Egypt Mohammed Morsi, both as the President of Egypt and the former Head of non-aligned Movement, paid a visit to Tehran, the effect of a long lasting discredit among Tehran and Cairo was still explicit. A member of the Foreign Relations Unit from the Muslim Brotherhood’s political wing stated: “We believe that Iran has very bad practices in international relations whether with the Gulf countries or with the Syrian revolution, and we have a permanent problem with the Shia issue - they're trying to spread this all over the region… We're not willing to stress this relationship or fortify it or build new links. We're trying to have normal relations, very slow in pace and very alert because we don't trust their foreign relations at all” (Knell 2012) The coup in Egypt left Iran in serious fears, as Iranian officials were afraid of the crisis in Egypt to spread around. Ayatollah Ali Khamenei warned on 9th of August that the political crisis in Egypt could spark a civil war (Hashem 2013). He said that “We are worried about what is happening in Egypt,” he said, adding, “Speculation about an impending civil war is gaining momentum on a daily basis; this would be a disaster 239 AIBU Journal of Social Sciences, 2014, Vol:14, Year:14, Issue:2, 14: 233-262 with dire consequences” (Ibid.). In general, Iran does not want Egypt to be influenced by Western states. We should keep in mind that both Tunisia and Egypt are predominantly Sunni Muslim countries, so this fact can be one of the reasons that Iran had hard time in reaching to those states. In realistic terms, Iranian leaders might not have thought that all of a sudden, Islamists would seize the power and follow an Iranian like government model rather they might have thought, or at least hope for the uprisings to lead to “an outcome along the lines of the Iraqi model: a fragile state with flawed, albeit democratic institutions, which provides Islamist parties – and their Iranian patron – ample opportunity to influence and shape the character of the government” (Parchami 2012:39). Taking the above mentioned argument and Iranian perception of the Western powers into consideration it would be righteous for us to claim that Iran would definitely criticize any foreign interference. Bahrain, for example, is another country that demonstrations inspired by the Arab Spring were taking place. Bahrain is mainly a Shiite country ruled by a Sunni Muslim family (Richter 2011) with state of emergency laws (Mohammed 2012). Like in other instances demonstrations held in the Pearl Square were initially aimed at “political and constitutional reform, which was to pave the way for greater popular participation in governance, equal access to socio-economic opportunities and development, action against corruption, and termination of the alleged practice of political naturalization” (BICI 2011). Hence we can claim that protests were not directed to the King of Bahrain initially. But the turmoil was escalated after the death of several protesters and it resulted in an increase in criticisms against the monarchy. The Monarchy in Bahrain requested military help from the member states of Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)2. As a result, protests have been suppressed by the help of Saudi and UAE-led GCC forces. Iran, severely criticized Arab forces intervention into Bahrain and suppressing the protesters. Several Iranian officials, mainly military officials, even threatened Bahrain and Saudi Arabia (BİLGESAM 2011:11-12). Another instance that frustrated Iran is Libya, as former leader Qaddafi was forced out of power by the help of NATO operation. Hence, in general Iran does not want any foreign, mainly Western intervention into the region. 2 GCC consists of Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. Ibid., p.132 240 AİBÜ Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Dergisi, 2014, Cilt:14, Yıl:14, Sayı:2, 14: 233-262 Although Iran has supported the protesters in above mentioned countries, it followed a totally different policy in Syria. Close relations with Iran and Syria dates back to 1979, when Ayatollah Khomeini and Hafez alAssad formed an alliance called “marriage of convenience” that greatly affected the balance of power in the region (Cafiero 2012). Syria is the only Arab country that has very close relations with Iran and Assad regime and Iran also have belief in similar faith so that Iran never wants Syrian regime to be vested in the hands of any group of people who would follow policies against Iran. 4. Regional Confrontation or Silent Confrontation between Turkey and Iran The Arab Spring has a significant effect on the region in general, “as well as forcing a reconsideration of Turkish and Iranian policies towards Arab nations, the events of the Arab Spring have also affected how Turkey and Iran view each other” (Iskander 2012). These countries were actually on the same side, as they both supported revolutionary movements in Tunisia and Egypt. But while Iran was supporting the protesters, as they were believed to be acting for “Islamic Awakening”, Turkey, on the other hand, perceived them as freedom and democracy fighters. Hence, there was a huge ideological difference in the perception of the basic reasons of the uprisings in the region. Although Iran claims that the Arab Spring was equivalent to her own revolution, recent developments seem to indicate the otherwise. Newly elected governments and the people living in the Middle East are, seemingly, praising the “Turkish model” not the “Iranian theocracy” according to recent surveys made by several organizations (Akgün and Gündoğar 2012). Turkish model is used to define a state which is moderately Islamic but secular in general and enjoys the earnings of democracy and free market economy, whereas the Iranian theocracy by definition refers to the opposite. There has been a long standing debate whether Islam and democracy can work properly in a predominantly Moslem society. Turkey’s relevance to the issue of modernization in the Middle East and the Islamic world is not entirely new (Altunışık 2008:41). After the end of the Cold War, during the period of political reforms and transitions, Turkey was shown by many Western circles as an example for newly founded, Muslim populated states. The Economist even named Turkey as the “Star of Islam” (Kirişçi 2012:34). Although the Arab Spring “encompasses a variety of distinct social movements in various countries … common 241 AIBU Journal of Social Sciences, 2014, Vol:14, Year:14, Issue:2, 14: 233-262 history, culture, language, and complaints unite the Arab Spring movement” (stevens 2012). This debate over Turkish Model resurfaced after the uprisings but, unlike in the past, this time the debate is occurring against a backdrop of successful uprisings in Egypt and Tunisia that have raised the genuine prospects of actual reform. This time Turkey is being shown as a model by the very people who are involved in efforts to bring about reform and transformation to the Arab world (Kirişçi 2011:34-35) Hence, not the Westerners or foreigners this time the people protesting for more freedom, equality, democracy and respect to human rights have desired to establish a Turkey-like model in their changing countries. As a result, there is a popular opinion that Turkey and Turkish model could best serve for a better future in transforming societies. TESEV’s recent survey on the perception of Turkey in the Middle East indicates that Turkey is perceived as a model country and people who support Turkish model favor it mainly because of its economic advantages and its democratic and secular traits (Akgün and Gündoğar 2012). Another poll that was made in 2011 by the Arab American Institute Foundation indicates that Turkey is more sympathized than Iran and perception of Iran in the Arab world is in a decreasing trend. Graph1 (Zogby 2011): There has been a dramatic decrease in Iran’s favorable ratings since 2006. 242 AİBÜ Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Dergisi, 2014, Cilt:14, Yıl:14, Sayı:2, 14: 233-262 Graph 2 (Ibid.): This graph shows the answer given to the question of “Please tell us if your opinion of each of the following is favorable or unfavorable?” In every county except Lebanon, Iran has a net unfavorable rating with highest negatives in Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and UAE. Iran’s favorable rating in Lebanon is driven by strong support from that country’s Shiite community (CIA World Factbook), with mixed Sunni and Christian attitudes towards Iran. Iran’s contribution to peace in the region is also lower than Turkey’s ratings (Zogby 2011). All of these data increase Iran’s concerns about Turkey’s increasing popularity in the region. Turkish Prime Minister Erdoğan is perceived as a leader who speaks for the Arab street and his visits to Egypt, Tunisia and Libya were highly welcomed. His speech in Egypt about secularism3 has sounded differently but positively in general in the region except Iran. Iran’s prominent figure in religious affairs and politics, Ayatollah Hasimi Sahrudi blamed Turkey on fostering “liberal Islam” for the sake of a better position in the period of transition (Ayman 2012:580). Turkish government seems to wish for a significant role in the region and tries to become the leading power in the newly established order. In this regard, in a Parliamentary meeting on the issues on Syria Turkey’s Minister of Foreign Affairs Davutoğlu asserted: “We will manage the wave of change in the Middle East. Just as the ideal we have in our minds about Turkey, we have an ideal of a new Middle East. We will be the leader and the spokesperson of a new peaceful order, no matter what they say” (Davutoğlu 2012). Hence, Turkey’s eagerness to be a leader in the region coincided with its increasing popularity has discounted Iran naturally. 3 “…don’t be afraid of secularism. I hope that Egypt will be a secular state” 243 AIBU Journal of Social Sciences, 2014, Vol:14, Year:14, Issue:2, 14: 233-262 4.1. Dispute over the NATO Operation in Libya Despite opposite thoughts of the reasons and the aims of the uprisings, Turkey and Iran were actually in the same side, as they both supported revolutionary movements in Tunisia and Egypt. However, Turkey’s participation in NATO operation on Libya against Qaddafi and Iran’s support for Shiite regime in Syria and Turkey’s support for rebels tinted their opposing policies. Turkey, in the case of Libya, due to significant economic interests, remained cautious about providing support for the protesters and reluctant to give its approval to the NATO intervention (Öniş 2012:51). Prime Minster Erdoğan even claimed that the NATO intervention “would be absurd, unthinkable and useless” (Head 2011). Davutoğlu was also in line with Erdoğan, as in his article titled “Principles of Turkish Foreign Policy and Regional Political Structuring” stated that “we expressed our opposition to foreign intervention because this region’s future has to be decided by its people” (Davutoğlu 2012:8). Both leaders were mostly afraid of facing an “Iraq-like scenario” (Taşpınar 2012:135) again that would probably cause trouble. Increasing turmoil in Libya, French government’s rising role in this particular case and the fear of both losing the support of the Arab street and prestige in the international arena, Turkey decided to take generally a passive part in NATO intervention into Libya. On March 24, 2011 Turkish Parliament approved Turkish participation in NATO intervention. The Turkish Navy participated with five ships and one submarine in the NATO-led naval blockade to enforce the arms embargo (Head 2011). Iran, on the other hand, believed that the intervention was another example of imperialism and warned Arabs not to be fallen into the hands of the Western powers. Ayatollah Ali Khamenei declared: “Muslim nations in Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, Yemen or other countries need vigilance today. They should not allow enemies confiscate the victories they’ve achieved…They should not forget that those who have come to the scene in Libya [NATO] today and consider themselves owners of the uprising are the same people who used to sit and drink with those who once suppressed the Libyan nation” (Dareini 2011). Although Iran supported the protesters, its stance against NATO operation in Libya was highly condemning. 244 AİBÜ Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Dergisi, 2014, Cilt:14, Yıl:14, Sayı:2, 14: 233-262 4.2. Syrian Deadlock Syria marks the most serious source of discord in Turkish-Iranian relations. Ankara’s determined criticism of Syrian President Bashar alAssad, as well as its explicit support for the Syrian opposition and Syrian immigrants4, has angered Iranian leaders. Syria is definitely Iran’s closest ally in the region and Assad’s defeat would probably cause trouble to Iran’s regional ambitions and also leave Tehran ever more isolated (Larrabee 2012). It is also often argued that, any change in Syrian regime would dismantle the so called “Shiite crescent”. Iran’s efforts to ensure the continuation of the Assad regime can be viewed as an indicator of its goal of having Shiite regimes in the region stay in power. Syria’s geographical position is also very significant for Iran, as it is close to Israel and it acts as a channel to Hezbollah and Hamas. Thus, “the collapse of the Shiite regime in Syria would mean the end of Iran’s ability to exert influence in Lebanon and Jordan through Syria” (Kaya 2012:6). Turkey, initially tried to convince Assad to make several social, economic and political reforms and provide peaceful transition. But Turkish policy makers were not successful to persuade Assad’s government to resolve the crisis in Syria in peaceful means and proAssad groups began to resort unpleasant confrontation to repress the protesters. Davutoğlu stated: “Our efforts to find a diplomatic solution, carried out in coordination with the regional actors and the international community, have fallen on deaf ears in Damascus. The regime’s indiscriminate killings have reached such massive proportions that they constitute crimes against humanity” (Davutoğlu 2011:6). Thus, Ankara blames Damascus of killing innocent people and not taking any step to find a proper solution for the problem. Erdoğan also appeared to be insulted personally by the fact that Assad had effectively lied to him about the reforms, “much as he had been personally angered by Ehud Olmert’s hiding the December 2008 Gaza war from him in a meeting, just days before Israel launched that operation” (Taşpınar 2012:137). Hence, tension between Ankara and Damascus is very high nowadays. Iranian General Yahya Rahim Safavi blamed Turkey of being acting in line with the West and pro-Westerners located in the region. He officially Deputy Prime Minister of Turkey Beşir Atalay claimed that there are 105.000 Syrian immigrants in Turkey. http://www.aa.com.tr/tr/politika/94370--suriyeli-gocmen-sayisi-105-bin 4 245 AIBU Journal of Social Sciences, 2014, Vol:14, Year:14, Issue:2, 14: 233-262 stated that “The Americans, Israelis, and some European and Persian Gulf nations, in particular Qatar and Saudi Arabia, have delegated to Turkey the task of achieving their goal to weaken or topple Bashar alAssad’s government or make it surrender” (Agence France-Presse 2012). Iranian former Revolutionary Guards commander have also claimed that Turkey was working cooperatively with the Zionists to confront Iran and its allies. He declared that “Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Turkey are acting in the interests of the US and the Zionists to weaken the resistance axis comprising Iran, Syria and Hezbollah” (Ibid.). Turkish Prime Minister Erdoğan, on the other hand, in an interview with the Turkish media had stated that he had talked with Iranian former President Ahmadinejad and told him that “the Assad administration is getting spoiled with your encouragement” (CNNTurk 2012). Tensions increased at the end of June, after Syria downed a Turkish fighter jet. In response, Erdoğan bluntly warned Damascus to keep troops away from the Turkish-Syrian border and requested a special meeting with its NATO allies to discuss a common approach (Larrabee 2012). Iran would definitely oppose severely to a similar scenario that was played in Libya. After the election of Hassan Rouhani as the new President of Iran began to outmaneuver its assertive policy on the Syrian issue but still any Western led intervention would not be welcomed by Iran. So there is still highly conflicting approaches to the Syrian turmoil between Turkey and Iran. 4.3. NATO Radar System Stationed in Malatya/Kürecik In September 2011 Turkey agreed to host one of the early-warning radars of NATO’s early warning missile defense system in its southeast, 700km west of the Iranian border (Associated Press 2011). Tehran perceives this system as a US led intrigue aimed at protecting Israel against a possible counterattack by Iran, in the event that Israel targets Iran’s nuclear facilities. Iran has threatened to make the radar in Turkey its first target in the event of an attack (Kaya 2012). Turkish policy makers claim that the radar system is not positioned with any particular country in mind and have expressed their opposition to identifying Iran explicitly as a potential attacker (Ibid.). Turkey has also intensely opposed sharing any intelligence gained from the radar with Israel. Turkish President Abdullah Gül, concerning the above mentioned issue, admitted: “This is definitely not the case. Israel is not a NATO member, thus it cannot benefit from NATO capabilities, especially when Turkey is [involved]. Every move within 246 AİBÜ Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Dergisi, 2014, Cilt:14, Yıl:14, Sayı:2, 14: 233-262 NATO comes via unanimity. These accusations are black propaganda from the Israelis” (Hürriyet Daily News 2012). Turkish President also stated that the radar system is not deployed against Iran rather it is a precaution against any missiles. In his own words: “We are a country that helped stop communism in the region and this radar system is a precaution against missiles, as part of NATO defenses. Thus, it is not of an offensive quality. It is not against countries, it is against missiles” (Ibid.). NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen have also denied reports that the intelligence obtained from the radar system stationed in Turkey has been shared with Israel and affirmed: “We do stress that data within this missile defense system are not shared with a third country. Data are shared within our alliance, among allies, it is a defensive system to protect the populations of NATO allies” (Press TV of Iran 2012), Although Turkish President and many other Turkish officials, as well as NATO Secretary-General made similar statements saying that the radar system is not against the threat of Iran, there is a popular belief that NATO missile defenses will be oriented toward defending member countries first and foremost from the threat posed by Iran’s expanding strategic arsenal (Berman 2012). Iranian officials have severely criticized Turkey’s plans to host the NATO missile shield. General Yahya Rahim Safevi, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s military advisor, threatened Turkey with adverse consequences unless it abandons its policies regarding NATO’s missile shield and Syria (Milliyet 2011). Similarly, Iranian Brigadier General Hacizade said: “We have prepared ourselves. If there is an attack on Iran, our first target will be the missile shield systems in Turkey, and then we’ll turn to other targets…The missile shield to be placed in Turkey is there not because NATO wants it to be, but because the US wants to protect Israel. They are trying to deceive the entire international community, starting with the Turks, into thinking that NATO wants to do this. In today’s world, the Zionist regime (Israel) conducts its acts with the US, and the US conducts its acts as NATO. However, we believe that the Turks are knowledgeable enough to prevent such a conspiracy. The Muslim Turkish people will destroy this system when it’s time” (Fars News Agency 2011). 247 AIBU Journal of Social Sciences, 2014, Vol:14, Year:14, Issue:2, 14: 233-262 Vice-Chairman of the Iranian Parliament’s National Security and Foreign Policy Commission Hossein Ebrahimi have also echoed same response saying that Iran would retaliate by striking the radar site in Turkey, should Iran be attacked (Ibid.). Despite harsh criticisms from both Iranian religious leaders and high ranked military officials any declarations from the government officials in the similar tone of the formers were not made (Uygur 2012: 22). This could be an indication of Iran’s cautious steps to give a message of its close monitoring the situation but not willing to further infringe Turkish-Iranian relations. 4.4. Sectarian Fragmentation and the Dispute over the Future of Iraq There is also a growing concern for a sectarian fragmentation in the region, where Shiites and Sunnis are at the opposite camps. Iran is predominantly a Shiite country and a leader of a so called “Shiite Crescent”. Recent developments in the region pave the way for Iran to utilize its Shiite identity as a foreign policy tool and it generates a greater geopolitical area for Iran to maneuver. But Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei “denounced ‘Shiite crescent’ issue as a propaganda effort to intimidate Sunni nations and government of empowerment of Shiites” (Office of Supreme Leader Sayyid Ali Khamenei 2006). Turkey, on the other hand, is mainly dominated by Sunni Muslims but also has significant amount of Alevis, who are closer to Shiite way of Islam. Although Turkey tried to stay out of such conflict, it seems that Turkey is already one of the major actors in this particular conflict, especially when its Syrian and Iraqi policies are considered. Thus, two countries seem to be in a complete disagreement over the future of Iraq. Since the end of 2011, Iraq has emerged as an important front line between Turkey and Iran. The withdrawal of US combat forces has left a power vacuum there that both countries would like to exploit. Iran viewed Iraq as its natural sphere of influence and followed mainly a sectarian strategy, which required influencing the country via the Shiite population. As in Syria, Iran would like to see Iraq dominated by Shiites, such that it could control the regime there. According to Huffington Post’s citation from Professor Mehrzad Boroujerdi, “…Iran is a significant political force in Iraq… They are actively and aggressively trying to keep al-Maliki in power. The fear is that the downfall of al-Maliki, coupled with the uncertainties about Assad’s fate in Syria, could leave the 248 AİBÜ Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Dergisi, 2014, Cilt:14, Yıl:14, Sayı:2, 14: 233-262 Iranians suddenly looking at unfriendly faces” (Abdul-Zahra and Murphy 2012). Turkey, on the other hand, has advocated Iraq’s integrity and a democratic, representative and pluralistic structure based on the equal participation of all religious and ethnic groups in Iraq (Kaya 2011). Turkey, more importantly, hosts Iraqi vice-President Tariq al-Hashimi, who has been sentenced to death in absentia. Al-Hashimi is one of the most influential and senior Sunni Muslim in a mostly Shiite Iraqi government. He is accused of organizing terror attacks against Iraqi officials and security forces (BBC 2012). Turkish Premier Erdoğan has said that Turkey will host al-Hashemi “as long as he wants” and “accused Iraqi Premier Maliki’s government of corruption, discrimination, and of fuelling sectarianism” (Ibid.). Increasing tension between Turkey and the central Iraqi government lead Turkey to follow its policies with Iraq through Northern Iraq. In general, it is believed that a sectarian fragmentation in the region would lead to further conflicts and even a full-fledged war. 4.5. Disputes over Energy Issues and Sanctions Tensions over energy are also mounting implicitly. Despite the signing of a road map for expanded cooperation in early 2011, Turkey and Iran’s energy relationship has been fraught with complications (Berman 2012). Turkey tries to balance its relations with the West and East but it is not a very easy course of action and it needs a very precautious foreign policy. EU decided to stop buying crude oil from Iran in July 2012 and Iran immediately declared that the European countries were adversary and decided to stop selling its crude oil to those countries (Ayman 2012:587). Turkey imports more than 30 percent of its daily consumption from Iran and has so far given no indication that it will comply with a planned European Union import embargo on Iranian crude. However, there are now signs that Turkey is seeking to lessen its current, deep dependence on Iranian oil and gas. Taner Yıldız, Turkish Minister of Energy and Natural Resources, has declared that the amount of natural gas in producing electricity is around 50 percent, so with the new investments and resolutions we will try to restrain the role of natural gas in producing electricity (Enerji Enstitüsü 2012). Turkish refiner TUPRAŞ, for instance, is said to be in conversation with Saudi Arabian suppliers as part of a concerted move to lessen Ankara's dependence on Iranian oil deliveries and to diversify sources of energy supply (Ayman 2012). Recent data 249 AIBU Journal of Social Sciences, 2014, Vol:14, Year:14, Issue:2, 14: 233-262 indicates that Turkey’s crude oil imports from Iran fell by more than 30 percent to 75,281 barrels per day in October from September as volumes of oil from other suppliers including Iraq and Saudi Arabia increased (Coşkun 2012). But it is not the case in natural gas imports. Minister Yıldız, said that Ankara tried to convince Washington not to impose sanctions on its natural gas imports from Iran and continued by claiming that “We said to them, if you tell us not to buy gas from Iran, that would be a sanction on Turkey and not on Iran. They agreed not to include natural gas agreements in the sanctions” (Ibid.). Iran is very significant energy supplier, so it is not easy to decrease Turkey’s dependence on Iran, due to economic, technological and geographical reasons. 5. Interdependence between Turkey and Iran Turkish-Iranian relations have been very close since 2002. Besides increased weight of the Middle East in Turkish foreign policy one of the main driving factors behind increased Turkish-Iranian relations is basically economic issues. There is a considerable increase in bilateral commerce between these two countries. Bilateral trade has gradually increased from around $1.3 billion in 2002 to $4.3 billion in 2005 and $ 16 billion in 2011 (Sinkaya 2012:141). Graph 3: This graph shows Turkey’s trade with Iran (TÜİK 2012) The graph above indicates that Turkey’s trade with Iran is in an increasing tendency. Decrease in trade in 2009 was because of global economic crisis around the world. Hence, as a result of the effects of the global economic crisis, Iranian exports dropped sharply in 2009 by almost 60%, whereas Turkish exports remained stagnant in comparison to the corresponding figures of the previous year. According to data of 2012 (until November) export and import levels have reached almost to the same level and especially export level of that year has increased 250 AİBÜ Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Dergisi, 2014, Cilt:14, Yıl:14, Sayı:2, 14: 233-262 noticeably. This might be the result of both Turkish businessman eagerness to export more goods to Iran and imposition of sanctions on shipping to and from Iran. Turkish exports to Iran are mainly machinery, motor vehicles, iron and steel products, boilers, electric devices, tobacco products (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2012). Turkish entrepreneurs are very interested in investing in Iran, so Iran has become an increasingly important export destination for Turkey. As an example “Iran imported 145 million dollar worth of cars in the first seven months of 2008, a 167 percent increase on the previous year’s figure” (McCurdy 2008:92). Moreover, Iran’s car manufacturing giant Iran Khodro Company and Turkey’s Hema Endustri are set to sign a deal worth 262 million $ to build two automotive factories (Grove 2010). Another remarkable investment is GÜBRETAŞ’s, a Turkish state owned fertilizer company, bought Iran’s giant in chemical sector, namely, Razi Petrochemical Company in February 2008, by paying 681 million $ to Iranian privatization administration (McCurdy 2008:92, Sinkaya 2012:142). Moreover, many Turkish construction companies have numerous projects ranging from hotels to housing complexes (Sinkaya 2012:142). Besides all of these, Turkey is highly dependent on Iranian energy exports. In 2011, Turkey imported 51% of its crude oil and 21% of its natural gas from Iran (Babalı 2012:3). Recently, Turkey imports around 220.000 barrels of crude oil per day (Khajhepour 2012:21) from Iran, and daily import of natural gas from Iran has reached up to 31,5 million m3 (Enerji Enstitüsü 2012). Hence, Iran is one of the most significant energy suppliers of Turkey. Additionally, Iran is rather significant for Turkey’s aim of becoming an energy hub and transit country. “Hence, through friendly relations and energy cooperation with Iran, Turkey hopes to become the energy corridor between the Caspian Sea region, the Middle East and Europe” (Głogowska 2012). Despite severe opposition from the United States in July 2007 former ministers in both countries signed an agreement concerning transportation of both Iranian and Turkmen natural gas to the European market via Turkey and Iran respectively (Kaya 2012:17). They also agreed to the development of South Pars field by Turkish State Petroleum Corporation (McCurdy 2008:90). However, due to further opposition from the United States and Europe’s decreasing interest in resource diversification together with their reluctance in cooperating with Iran led Turkey to cancel its investment to the above mentioned project in 2009 (Kaya 2012:18). It was believed that with the 251 AIBU Journal of Social Sciences, 2014, Vol:14, Year:14, Issue:2, 14: 233-262 realization of the project Turkey would have become a significant country for the EU and for whole Europe as well as a regional power. It is believed that Iran, on the other hand, is also highly in need of Turkey as an ally. Turkey is an opening gate for Iran’s strictly closed and internationally isolated economy, where Turkey has significant economic potential and access to wider region (Uygur 2012:25). Turkey, as an economic partner and neighbor, combines some of the key characteristics that Iranian stakeholders are favoring: “it is a Muslim country; it is one of Iran’s strategic neighbors; and, its economy can offer Iran technological and financial assistance in Iran’s projects” (Khajhepour 2012: 19). According to the data of Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey, in the last ten years, direct investments in Turkey from Iran exceeded 110 million $ (Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs). The driving force behind rising investments to Turkey is that the Iranian companies want to become stronger as a regional entity and want to learn from the experiences of various successful Turkish companies. More importantly, as Iran is facing with sanctions, Iranian companies are investing in and began to operate from Turkey (Sinkaya 2012:142) so that they “can continue their international business with less risk emanating from international sanctions” (Khajhepour 2012: 21). Moreover, place of Turkey in Iranian economy is in an increasing trend due also to both increasing energy and non-energy exports (Habibi 2012:4) to Turkey and Turkey’s indispensable geographic position. With the imposition of international sanctions Turkey plays an important role as a transition route, as most of the western exports to Iran are transited by land via Turkey (Khajhepour 2012: 21). Graph 4 (Habibi 2012:4): This graph shows Iran’s Trade with Turkey in million $ 252 AİBÜ Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Dergisi, 2014, Cilt:14, Yıl:14, Sayı:2, 14: 233-262 Many international companies, which are willing to invest in Iran, are using Turkish Banks for major transactions (Khajhepour 2012: 21). Even Iranian Central Bank also has accounts in Turkey to manage several international transactions (Ibid.). Thus, Turkey has a vital role as it constitutes the financial nucleus of Iranian economy. 6. Conclusion: Projections about the Future of Turkish-Iranian Relations There is a considerable enhancement in Turkish-Iranian relations since 2002 encouraged both by Turkish government preferences and regional as well as international atmosphere, but it is not free from any tensions and therefore it would be miscalculating to claim that both countries have formed matured cooperation that is very strong. Especially open-ended turmoil in Syria, sectarian disputes in the region, missiles deployed in Turkey and possible deployment of Russian S-300 missiles in Syria (BBC News 2013), normalization of Turkish Israeli relations (to some extent) and many other factors affects the relations of Turkey and Iran. It is believed that despite all of those disputes mentioned above any severed relations and any armed conflicts between these given states are detrimental and not likely to occur. Recent visits of both states’ Ministers of Foreign Affairs indicate us the fact that the relations between these two significant states of the region will continue in the near future. Turkey and Iran have never been close allies in the past and seemingly, never will be in the near future but because of their regional, especially economic, interdependence they will continue to have relations at least in low scale. Otherwise, it would be disastrous not only for these countries but also for the wider region and for the World perhaps. Turkey does not want a marginalized and isolated Iran that constitutes one of the most significant energy suppliers to Turkey, in its southern border, whereas Iran does not want to lose its significant economic partner and supporter in international arena. Moreover, it is believed that Turkey’s relations with Iran is also important for the United States and Israel as well, as neither the United States nor Israel has direct channels of communication with Iran. Hence, Israel’s normalized relations with Turkey and their cooperation is very important especially for the United States. What this process to conceive is still a huge mystery but Turkey’s role as a communicator between parties before a possible military operation seems very significant for all parties. 253 AIBU Journal of Social Sciences, 2014, Vol:14, Year:14, Issue:2, 14: 233-262 We should also touch upon to Israel’s apology. After Israel’s apology, probably the first concrete steps towards normalization are going to be taken by cooperating with Turkey and even including Turkey into the process of energy deals in the Mediterranean. It is believed that the United States is going to follow up the process, already US Secretary of State John Kerry paid frequent visits to Turkey to negotiate this process of normalization. Turkey, on the other hand, accepted the apology of Israel and seems to espouse Obama’s mediation. However, only one out of three requests of Turkey has been realized by Israel that is the apology, remaining ones (compensation and lifting of the embargo) are yet to be realized. So we cannot talk about total normalization, even Ambassadors are not appointed to the capitals of each country. Above mentioned disputes cause tensions among Turkey and Iran but not as much as the one in Syria. It is believed that Iran is aware of the fact that Turkey is a NATO member country for a long time and an ally of the United States (despite several volatilities). As a result, it might have been surprising if Turkey had not taken part in NATO operation in Libya, not allowed NATO radar system to be stationed in Malatya and taken a closer stand in Iraqi dispute to the United States. Government of Iran, most probably due to economic relations with Turkey, did not take significantly critical stance towards Turkey yet and whether they will carry the burden of all economic and political problems if they lose Turkey as a friend is rather debatable. Hence, apart from others, turmoil in Syria seems to mark the most concrete dispute among Turkey and Iran. So it would be righteous to claim that not the Arab Spring, in general, but the crisis in Syria, mainly, caused so many problems for their relations. However, for Iran there are growing messages coming both from domestic and international circles to soften its stance against uprisings in Syria. It is believed that, this way or another, the Assad regime is likely to fall apart, as Syrian National Coalition (SNC hereafter) for revolutionary and opposition forces is gaining recognition from most of the countries, like the United States, Gulf states, the EU member states (Aljazeera 2012) and from Turkey as well. Moreover, Russia and China now assert criticism to the killings of civilians and look for a resolution of the crisis. Iran’s opposing circles have criticized Iranian policies in Syrian issue saying that the resources and energy allocated to Syria should be used for Iran’s future and its people (Kaya 2012:19). Reformists in Iran believe that Iran should have taken a more calculated stand towards the crisis in Syria by pressuring Assad to pull the army back from streets and carry out substantial reforms (Ataie 2012). Former Deputy Foreign Minister, 254 AİBÜ Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Dergisi, 2014, Cilt:14, Yıl:14, Sayı:2, 14: 233-262 Mohammad Sadr, “blamed Ahmadinejad’s government for failing to use Iran’s regional capacity to coordinate with Turkey and international bodies to reach a regional solution for Syria” (Ibid.). But throughout the research, criticisms to Turkey and international entities came mostly from the religious leaders and military officers of Iran not generally from Ahmedinejad and his cabinet. Ahmadinejad, in an interview with CNN condemned the use of violence by both parties in Syria and repeated Iran’s recognition of the Syrian opposition and he stated that “We must all say enough of this violence, right now,” he also add and said that “he is working to organize a group to bring the two sides together” (CNN Wire Staff 2012). Corresponding remarks have been uttered by the Iranian former Foreign Minister, Akbar Salehi, who described the protestors’ demands as legitimate (Ataie 2012). After the general elections held in Iran, the newly elected President of Iran seems to keep expectations at lower scale in regard to Iran providing military aid to Syrian regime if Western forces attack him (Mostaghim and Williams 2013). In light of all of these, it is believed that, high-level negotiations, agreements on economic issues and a room for dialogue among these states are likely to continue in the coming months and all of the statements made regarding high-politics would remain in rhetorical level. But it would be surprising if their relations will turn out to be a “strategic ally” level, as their relations are not immune from the pressures coming from major powers. 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