September 2004 Mark Dutz* The World Bank Melek Us
Transkript
September 2004 Mark Dutz* The World Bank Melek Us
TURKEY’S FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT CHALLENGES: COMPETITION, THE RULE OF LAW, AND EU ACCESSION Mark Dutz* The World Bank Melek Us** SETBIR Kamil Yılmaz Koç University September 2003 Revised: September 2004 * At the time of the writing of the paper, Mark Dutz was GTZ Advisor to the Undersecretariat of Treasury. ** Melek Us is the General Secretary of the Association of Dairy, Beef and Food Manufacturers and Producers (SETBIR) of Turkey. At the time of the writing of the paper, she was the Director General of Foreign Investment at the Undersecretariat of Treasury 1. Introduction After following inward-oriented development strategies for fifty years, Turkey switched to outward-oriented policies in 1980. The policy of further opening up the economy was pursued with the aim of eventually integrating into the EU. The Helsinki European Council summit held on December 10-11, 1999 produced a breakthrough in EU-Turkey relations by officially recognising Turkey as a candidate state on equal footing with other candidate states. With accession, Turkey would be part of the European single market. Joining the EU will require Turkey to adopt and implement the whole body of EU legislation and standards – the acquis communautaire – and also participate eventually in the European Monetary Union (EMU). Over the last four years, Turkey has been undergoing a series of serious social, economic and institutional transformations with the clear political objective of EU membership. The definitive prospect of EU membership should make Turkey very attractive for FDI, given among other strengths its highly skilled and adaptable labour force, large domestic market, and geographical proximity both to Europe and to the Middle East, Northern Africa and Central Asia markets. The recent bout of both export- and domestic market-oriented investments in the automobile industry are a clear indication of Turkey’s attractiveness for FDI flows. However, over the last decade Turkey lost ground to Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) in attracting foreign investments, especially those from Europe. While the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland combined (jointly with a smaller population than Turkey) have received 71 billion U.S. dollars in FDI flows between 1995 and 2000, Turkey has received only 5.1 billion dollars over the same period, almost 14 times less. And it appears from other countries’ experiences that unless there is a major paradigm-shift in a country’s or its competitors’ FDI policies, there is likely to be very little change in FDI inflows. The approach taken in this paper will be to explore how Turkey may be different from most CEECs, and what this implies for appropriate FDI policy in light of EU accession prospects. The paper begins by outlining the benefits of FDI based on an overview of economic concepts together with an assessment of the Turkish experience. FDI inflows are not considered as an end-goal but an instrument to create a globally competitive economy. Through FDIstimulated productivity increases, Turkey seeks to be positioned at the higher value-added end of the fast-changing worldwide division of labour. In its analysis of obstacles to foreign investment, the paper will emphasise competition-related and legal/judicial barriers. Having analysed the benefits from and impediments to FDI, the paper will review what has been done to improve the policy and regulatory framework, and analyse what Turkey still must do to meet EU requirements and fully benefit from FDI. In summary, Turkey should benefit significantly from EU accession in terms of a step-change in sizeable FDI inflows, largely because the accession process would help Turkey overcome its rule of law and competition-related constraints to foreign direct investment. More rapid and consistent implementation of rules and regulations that ensure a level playing field for all companies would be assisted by the EU accession process, and in turn would enable Turkey to take full advantage of investment-related benefits. 2. The benefits of FDI 2.1 The role of FDI in economic growth Being a capital-scarce country, Turkey can benefit substantially from injections of foreign capital through their role in the expansion of productive capacity and the creation of new jobs. However, the type of capital inflows matters. Unlike portfolio investments and loans to the private sector, FDI inflows involve direct equity ownership plus significant ownership control, and therefore are more stable. They do not easily flee in a domestic market downturn. 1 Unlike loans, FDI inflows ensure that business risks are borne by foreign investors. FDI differs from other forms of capital flows in other crucial aspects. FDI does not only entail the transfer of financial resources and the creation of new jobs. It is a bundle that involves the transfer of fixed assets, technology, know-how and international market access. FDI connects the country to international best practices, helps upgrade the management and workforce, and establishes stronger ties between domestic and international markets. As it entails the transfer of technology and know-how, FDI is expected to have both a direct and an indirect impact on the economic growth of a country. Because FDI involves significant ownership control as well as the transfer of technology, its impact on economic growth will take place through increased productivity, human capital accumulation, R&D activity, and technological and productivity spillovers. In addition, its impact on economic growth can be greater if the types of FDI that the country receives stimulate, in other words crowd-in, domestic investment activity. There are several studies that establish a link between FDI and economic growth. Using data on FDI flows from industrial countries to 69 developing countries over the 1970-89 period and using a cross-country regression framework, Borensztein et. al. (1998) show that FDI flows has a positive impact on economic growth. They also show that the impact of foreign investment exceeds the impact of domestic investment on growth. Not all countries benefit from FDI however. According to Borensztein et. al. (1998), countries need to have a minimum stock of human capital in order for the growth effects of FDI to be realised. Zhang (1999) shows that FDI inflows helped stimulate economic growth in several East-Asian countries. Gruben and McLeod (1998) show that in a sample of 18 countries, FDI had a significant impact on economic growth, especially in Latin American countries. 2.2 The role of FDI in raising productivity and stimulating spillovers One of the important contributions of FDI companies is to enhance the transfer and diffusion of technology to the host country. As a multinational corporation undertakes investment in a country, it brings its production technology, its access to global production and distribution networks, its know-how and experience to that sector. Being generally larger corporations, FDI companies have access to large and low-cost investment funds that could be used to finance investment in more advanced technology than available and accessible in the host country. Obviously, the direct technology transfer effect may not be realised in all FDI projects. If the FDI is an export-oriented investment, the impact on technology diffusion will generally be more significant than a domestic-market oriented investment. The impact of FDI on technology diffusion was rather limited in the import-substitution era, as the main incentive for a foreign company to undertake investment was the heavily-protected domestic market. In such an environment, foreign companies prefer to transfer old and outdated technology to their factories in developing countries, creating little technology diffusion. Today, however, FDI decisions cannot focus only on the domestic market. Following the push for more liberal trade relations throughout the world, FDI companies do face competition in domestic markets of the host country through imports. Consequently, FDI decisions, especially in the manufacturing sector, often are made with the serious consideration of international competitiveness of the affiliate firm. The affiliate firm must have the technological capability and the resulting efficiency which renders it flexible enough to target export markets as well as the domestic market. Consequently, one would expect to observe higher productivity in FDI companies compared to domestic enterprises. The impact of FDI on the host country economy is not just limited to the direct channels of technology transfer and diffusion. The presence of multinationals may affect local 2 companies through several channels. The first type of these effects takes place through intensified domestic market competition. As the FDI companies become major players in the domestic market, this will force local companies to adopt newer and more advanced technologies and use existing resources of the firm more efficiently in order to survive. (See Blomström and Kokko, 1998.) This channel is similar to the effect of import liberalisation, even though the impact on local companies may be more significant than imports. The technology transfer may take embodied (machinery and equipment imports) and/or disembodied (know-how, knowledge, licenses) forms. The transfer of embodied technology is not difficult to be organised by the local enterprises. What is more difficult is the transfer of disembodied technology, which requires absorption capacity of the local enterprises. However, the workers and engineers employed by FDI companies will gain experience and accumulate knowledge through their tenure there. In the medium-to-long-run, these employees will have the opportunity to transfer this experience and knowledge to local enterprises. Other channels through which the presence of FDI companies affects the local companies mostly take the form of spillovers. Productivity spillovers from FDI take place when the entry or presence of multinational corporations increases productivity of domestic firms in a host country and the multinationals do not fully internalise the value of these benefits. Spillovers may take place when local firms improve their efficiency by copying technologies of foreign affiliates operating in the local market either based on observation or by hiring workers trained by the affiliates. Besides horizontal spillovers to other firms in the same sector, the presence of FDI companies may also affect local firms in other sectors of economy. These vertical spillover effects can be through backward (purchases of inputs from local suppliers) and forward linkages (supply of outputs to local downstream purchasers). In line with findings for other countries, in Turkey FDI companies have higher labour productivity relative to local enterprises.1 In 1991, the average labour productivity in FDI companies was 35% higher than average labour productivity in all manufacturing plants. Over time, the productivity gap between FDI companies and the sector average was closed slightly to 30% by 1996. Average labour productivity in foreign-owned plants increased from 4.1 to 4.7 million TLs in 1990 prices (from $1611 to $1803). Average labour productivity in all plants, on the other hand, increased from 3.1 to 3.6 million TLs (from $1189 to $1550). These numbers are clear indication of the fact that the labour productivity gap between foreign and domesticowned plants is significant and does not vanish over time. These annual average values support the case for significant labour productivity differences between FDI and local enterprises, but the possibility cannot be ruled out that these differences stem from plant characteristics other than foreign ownership. Based on regression results using various measures of foreign participation, Yılmaz and Ozler (2004) show that plants with foreign partners have higher total factor productivity even after other plant characteristics and sector and time effects are accounted for.2 Finally, Yılmaz and Ozler (2004) show that in sectors with a greater FDI involvement, domestic plants tend to have higher TFP productivity compared to others where FDI involvement is low. All else being equal, as the foreign-ownership weighted sectoral output shares of foreign-affiliated plants increases by 1 percentage point, the total factor productivity of local plants in the same sector increases by 0.82 1 This analysis is based on plant level data collected by the Turkish State Institute of Statistics through annual manufacturing surveys However, the data have limitations. They cover only a small portion of the FDI companies that are active in the Turkish economy, reflecting only a subset of manufacturing-related FDI. While the records of the Undersecretariat of the Treasury indicate 581 FDI companies to be active in the Turkish manufacturing sector in 1991 increasing to 922 by 1996, the SIS manufacturing survey includes only 210 plants increasing to 273 plants by 1996 as partially or fully-owned by foreigners. 2 Variables used to control for other characteristics that could affect productivity include firm size as measured by employment, imported license use, percent share of the output exported, imported machinery and equipment use, whether the firm is incorporated or not, sub-contracted input use and subcontracted output sale, measures of agglomeration at the provincial level, and the share of skilled production workers. 3 percentage points. However, horizontal spillovers from all foreign-owned plants are not similar. As the output share of FDI companies with less than 50% foreign participation increases by 1 percentage point, TFP in local firms increases on average by 0.72 percent, while the spillover effect from plants with foreign share ownership greater than or equal to 50% but less than full foreign ownership jumps to 1.1 percentage points. Finally, fully foreign-owned plants tend to generate external benefits that would increase the productivity of local plants in the same sector by 0.4 percent. 3. The current state of FDI FDI can have strong, positive effects for national economies. In the previous section, we showed that FDI in the Turkish manufacturing sector also had both direct and indirect productivity enhancing benefits. The evidence is based on plant-level studies and can be viewed as the most reliable available. However, this finding and the results discussed only establish that FDI is desirable for Turkey. The next step in the analysis consists in characterising the level and other features of FDI in Turkey relative to comparator countries, and exploring why it is so low in spite of being highly desirable for the country. 3.1 FDI in Turkey relative to Eastern European comparators The most striking feature of foreign investment flows to Turkey is their low level relative to comparator emerging market economies in the CEECs (Table 1). In terms of population in 2000, Turkey is larger than Poland, Czech Republic and Hungary combined. In terms of GDP in 2000, Turkey’s economy is four times as large as that of Czech Republic or Hungary, and one quarter larger than Poland. And in terms of gross fixed capital formation, that is, the total value of producers’ acquisitions of fixed assets, Turkey’s investments during 2000 are 3 to 4 times larger than Czech Republic and Hungary, and roughly a sixth larger than Poland. However, as highlighted in Table 1, in terms of average annual inflows of FDI during the 1990s, the level that Turkey has been attracting, at USD 800 million, is roughly one-fifth of FDI inflows to Poland, at 4.1 billion, and also significantly lower than Czech Republic and Hungary, each attracting roughly 2.1 billion per annum. A second striking feature in comparing Turkey with Poland, Hungary and Czech Republic is that there has been no closing of the FDI gap throughout the 1990s. To the contrary, with the formal announcement at the December 1997 European Council summit in Luxembourg of the opening of EU accession negotiations with Poland, Hungary and Czech Republic on 31 March 1998, these countries appear to have benefited from a virtuous cycle. The enhanced likelihood of EU accession and further FDI flows improved credit ratings and in turn attracted more FDI, thereby increasing the difference between these countries and Turkey. As is clear from Table 1 and Figure 1, average annual FDI inflows increased in the 1997-2000 period more than 3-fold in Poland, from USD 2.1 to almost 7 billion, and more than 4-fold in Czech Republic, from USD 0.9 to over 4 billion, while in Turkey they remained completely unchanged relative to gross fixed capital formation. It is remarkable that the Turkish announcement of its EU Customs Union in 1996 had no discernable effect on aggregate FDI flows. It should be taken into account that when FDI inflows across countries are compared, the FDI definition used by Turkey is much narrower than that of some countries and international institutions, leading to systematic undervaluation of FDI inflows to Turkey. As will be seen below, Turkey adopted the OECD definition for FDI in 2001, followed by its inclusion in the new FDI law of 2003.3 Table 2 compares the elements included in Turkey’s definition of FDI (both in the 1954 and 2003 laws) to other OECD countries, highlighting the omission of preferred stocks traded in the stock exchange, long-term loans, other marketable securities & bonds and financial derivatives from the previous definition (short-term loans, 3 See, for instance, OECD (1996) and OECD (2003). 4 commercial/retail loans and leasing are still not included in the new law). In addition, even though the law may allow certain flows to be included, local statistical data collection and recording practices may preclude their inclusion in the official statistics. Capital in kind is one such example, where statistics are generally not calculated and therefore not included. Even though the precise figures are not available, for some big projects Turkey’s previous narrower definition and statistical processing can underestimate FDI inflows by significant orders of magnitude. As an example, Turkey has traditionally not recorded long-term credits from foreign partners as FDI, including such flows only if the foreign partners’ receivables are added to the company’s capital; otherwise it is not recorded as an increase in FDI but rather as an increase in external debt. However, for the first time in 2001, due to a particularly large intra-company long-term foreign credit and in response to internal discussions on the matter, it was decided to classify it as an FDI flow in conformity with international norms. Therefore, the USD 1.4 billion credit provided by the mobile phone arm of Telecom Italia, the foreign partner of the GSM IşTim Telekomunikasyon Hizmetleri A.Ş. company, has been included in 2001 inflows. In terms of type of investment, most of the growth of FDI companies world-wide over the decade of the 1990s has been via cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&As), in particular the acquisitions by foreign investors of privatised state-owned enterprises, rather than green-field investments: less than 3% of the total number of global cross-border M&As during the 1990s are officially classified as mergers, with the rest being different types of acquisitions. In terms of ownership, roughly two-thirds of cross-border M&As were full acquisitions and the remaining one-third were minority acquisitions (10-49% control). In terms of value, 70% of cross-border M&As are functionally classified as horizontal, between firms in the same industry.4 Figure 2 highlights how this global trend also was critical in driving FDI especially in Poland, but also in the Czech Republic and Hungary, in contrast to a significantly lesser influence in Turkey. Figure 3 presents suggestive evidence of the importance of privatisations in fuelling M&A-related FDI inflows, highlighting the relatively much more important role of privatisations in the CEECs throughout the 1990s in contrast to Turkey. However, while a significant share of FDI in transition economies may have been generated by the privatisation process, it is important to stress that the privatisation process in Poland has involved a sizeable amount of stock market flotation, where privatisation-related capital inflows would be reported as portfolio inflows rather than FDI, while the Czech Republic has actively promoted privatisation to local investors, which was usually debt financed and thus linked either to domestic or foreign credit rather than FDI. In terms of industrial sub-sector allocation, a majority of FDI inflows to Turkey has been directed to the tertiary sector. Table 3 illustrates that over 57% of total FDI stocks in Turkey by end-2000 were dedicated to services, including 3 of the top 5 sub-sectors – transport & communications, banking and other financial services, and trade & repairs, a similar pattern as Poland. The other major recipients of FDI inflows to Turkey have been in the manufacturing sector, namely the automotive & auto parts sub-sector, and the petroleum, chemicals, rubber & plastic products sub-sector. The sub-sectoral pattern in the smaller countries, the Czech Republic and Hungary, which do not benefit from as large a domestic internal market, is even more concentrated in the tertiary sector, with all 5 top sub-sectors dedicated to the production of services rather than manufacturing goods. Table 4 reports the identity of the largest FDI companies by world-wide sales in each of the 4 economies, highlighting the important role of the automotive & auto parts sub-sector and petroleum, chemicals & rubber sector in Turkey, with 9 of the top 20 Turkish FDI companies in these 2 sub-sectors, followed by the electronics & electrical machinery sub-sector. The absence of service sector companies in the Turkish list is explained by the investment-to-sales profile typical in these sub-sectors, where there usually is a lag between the large, lumpy up-front investments required and the subsequent stream of sales revenues generated by the installed infrastructure service networks. In terms of country of origin, a striking feature of FDI stocks is the significantly greater 4 For a detailed description of this trend world-wide, see UNCTAD (2000). 5 concentration of investment from EU countries to the officially-recognised EU accession countries than to Turkey. Table 5 highlights that, in contrast to Poland, Hungary and Czech Republic, which have received 79, 80 and 84% of their FDI flows respectively from EU countries, Turkey had received a significantly lower 68.7% from EU countries. Turkey, in contrast, has received significantly more FDI inflows from Japan, Saudi Arabia, as well as offshore locations such as Panama and the Dutch Antilles. Interestingly, in spite of important investments from the US in the top 20 Turkish FDI companies (motor vehicles, rubber and glass), the relative share of US investment is not significantly different in Turkey than in the CEECs. 3.2 Determinants of FDI The investment climate can be defined as the policy, institutional and behavioural environment, present and expected, that influences the perceived returns and risks associated with investment in terms of both quantity and productivity of investment flows.5 Investment climate depends on a wide array of factors that can be grouped under three broad headings: macroeconomic and trade policies, infrastructure, and governance and institutions. These factors help explain both the strong potential attractiveness of Turkey as a global location for FDI and the shortcomings that have led Turkey to fall so far below its potential in this area. a. Macro policies, infrastructure and the automotive sector Macroeconomic and trade policies. Since the 1980s, Turkey went through significant changes in its economic relations with the outside world. Following the January 24, 1980 decision, the government put great emphasis on export orientation. This first step was followed by gradual import liberalisation that started in 1984 and finally culminated in the Customs Union with the EU in 1996. However, despite the gradual removal of trade barriers and increased export-orientation, Turkey was unable to attract large FDI inflows. One of the main culprits behind this failure was the uncertain macroeconomic environment. With its heavy dose of patronage relations and rent-seeking activities, domestic politics never allowed the creation of a stable macroeconomic environment. Fiscal imbalances continued throughout the 1990s, to be transformed into rather stark debt dynamics by the end of the decade (Table 6). Public sector borrowing requirements increased from 5% of GNP in 1995 to as high as 15.5% in 1999 and 2001. Chronic budget deficits and the rapidly increasing public debt lie at the root of the high and chronic inflation problem that Turkey suffered over the last 25 years. The average consumer price inflation rate throughout the last 25 years was 63%. Throughout the last two decades annual inflation has never seen values lower than 30%. Through the second half of 1990s and early 2000s, the real interest rate was quite high. With the exception of 1997 and 2000, ex-post real interest rates on bonds and t-bills were above 20%, reaching as high as 36%. In addition to high real interest rates that inhibit domestic and foreign investment, the exchange rate devaluation risk created an extra burden on foreign investors who are willing to invest in the country with a long-term perspective. As a result of the uncertainties stemming from domestic politics, the macroeconomic environment and the ensuing high real interest rates, the country followed a very erratic growth performance. Following the capital account liberalisation in 1989, Turkey was able to attract foreign capital to be used to finance public sector borrowing requirements and generate growth rates of around 5%. Thanks to the availability of external funds, successive governments were ‘unable’ to bring budget deficits and hence inflation under control. As the country’s inability to cope with its economic woes became evident towards the end of the 1990s, external funds dried up and growth rates declined sharply. The 2001 economic crisis was the final blow that underlined the need for a new economic policy framework in Turkey. 5 For this definition, see Stern (2002). 6 Throughout the last two decades, Turkey had put many decisions that could help foreign investors cope with high inflation on hold. One of the critical measures has been an inflation accounting framework. In a country that lived with an average of 60% inflation, an inflation accounting framework has not been implemented until now. Infrastructure-related factors. The quantity and quality of Turkey’s broadly-defined infrastructure, including geographical and demographical endowments, and physical and financial infrastructure help position Turkey as a potentially powerful magnet for FDI inflows. Turkey enjoys a very special location at the crossroads between East and West, overlapping Europe and Asia geographically and culturally. The proximity to the Balkans and the rest of high-income Europe as well as to growing emerging markets in Russia, Caucasia and Central Asia, and expanding markets of the Middle East and North Africa offer the potential of over 1 billion consumers. As highlighted in Tables 7a and 7b, Turkey’s demographical endowments present both strengths and weaknesses to foreign investors when compared with Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic. Turkey’s huge and growing domestic market reflects favourably with the comparator CEECs. Turkey is projected to continue to constitute one of the largest populations in the Middle East and Eastern Europe. The domestic market is predominantly urban, with at least 17 major cities having a population in excess of 1 million, led by Istanbul, Ankara and Izmir. The population is much younger than European countries, with over 60% of the population below the age of 35. On the negative side, the purchasing power of the average citizen is still significantly lower than the CEECs, with GDP per capita 30% less than Poland’s, and less than half that of Hungary and the Czech Republic. On the other hand, Turkey’s improving consumption patterns and purchasing power, with a growing middle class, are important positive features of the domestic market. With Turkey’s population growth rate having fallen from over 3% to under 2.5%, it is on the verge of entering a ‘golden demographic period’ similar to what East Asia experienced in the 1980s, where the productive working population is largest relative to children and retirees, providing a critical ingredient for rapid income growth. Only a few emerging markets in the world have the potential of attracting investment both for export as well as for their domestic market. Turkey is in such a privileged position to create a ‘virtuous investment cycle’, with a more competitive domestic business environment further strengthening the country as a platform for exports, and exports in turn stimulating firms to upgrade and better serve the domestic market. In addition to geography and demography, another area where Turkey compares favourably with its comparator CEECs is its highly skilled, flexible and business-oriented labour force. As reported in Table 7a, Turkey’s workforce is considered to be significantly more flexible, adaptable and entrepreneurial than its comparators.6 On the other hand, the levels of actual employment, of adult literacy, secondary school enrolment and female labour force participation are low relative to the CEECs, indicating the strong positive role still to be played by more widespread and improved nation-wide education services. While Turkey scores comparatively well in terms of availability of competent senior managers, training of employees is less of a priority in Turkish companies on average than in the CEECs. Regarding traditional basic infrastructure measures, Turkey is characterised again by areas of strength and weakness (Tables 7a and 7b). In communications and transport, Turkey stands out for its relatively low Internet costs –the costs of Turkey’s Internet access for a basket of 20 hours at peak time is the lowest of all countries included in the 2002 report—and is perceived as providing adequate communications standards. Turkey also is rated highly for both 6 Many of these measures are based on surveys, which in this context are arguably the most appropriate measures, as they reflect the perceptions of actual investors. In 2002, 3,532 executives responded to the World Competitiveness survey, reflecting widespread business knowledge about each country and crosscountry international experience. 7 air transport quality and internal distribution infrastructure. On the other hand, Turkey lags behind in terms of its energy infrastructure. Though it has recently passed new electricity and natural gas framework laws designed to spur significant market-driven improvements in line with Turkey’s underlying endowments, it will take some time for effective implementation to yield expected results. Turkey also lags the CEECs in the areas of computerisation and technological cooperation. Finally, in the area of finance, Turkey stands out with respect to the breadth of its private sector-relevant finance skills and access to credit cards. But Turkey performs less well in areas critical for starting new indigenous businesses not connected to existing industrial groups, with venture capital for business development not so easily available and credit not flowing very easily from banks to businesses. The automotive industry. A natural implication of Turkey’s large domestic market is the presence of FDI directed largely towards the internal market. However, the automotive industry is a good example of how an initially protected home market can be transformed into a competitive and increasingly export-oriented industry through FDI inflows, largely the availability, cost and quality of Turkey’s labour force. During the debate on the Customs Union, the automotive industry was expected to be the worst affected from lowering protection on EU imports. However, that prediction was proven wrong. Over the last couple of years, the automotive industry has become the second largest exporter. By the mid-1990s, there were four FDI companies that had more than 20 years of experience in the Turkish automotive industry (Fiat, Ford, Mercedes and Renault).7 In the mid1990s with the increasing prospects of a Customs Union agreement with the EU, Japanese and Korean companies (Honda, Hyundai, Isuzu and Toyota) started investing in Turkey in jointventures with Turkish industrialists.8 Perhaps because of the uncertain business environment in Turkey, these companies did not make substantial investments initially and built plants with small production capacity. Once the Customs Union with the EU went into effect in 1996, the domestic market became gradually opened to tough competition from EU. Actually, in the first couple of years of the Customs Union, the sector struggled with wild fluctuations in domestic demand as well as competition from imports. However, there was a lot at stake. There was already a substantial production capacity coupled with a competitive parts and accessories industry. In addition, domestic business establishments with years of experience in the automotive industry and low-cost but good quality labour induced FDI companies in the automotive sector to increase their investments in Turkey and build new capacity to produce motor vehicles for the European market. None of the aforementioned companies decided to close shop in Turkey. Only Opel decided to close its small plant near Izmir that used to undertake the assembly of some of its car models. In the meantime, the auto parts industry has also been attracting foreign investors. Most of the world leaders of the sector have joint ventures with Turkish partners. Some of them are big suppliers like Robert Bosch, Valeo, Delphi Packard and Mannesmann Sachs. Altogether, between 1992 and 2000, the automotive industry realised a total of $3.4 billion worth of investment. Of this amount, $750 million was used for capacity development, $976 million for new model development, $497 million for modernisation, $300 million for localisation and $195 million for quality improvement. Moreover, due to new investment projects towards the production of new models, in the 2000-2002 period this investment amount increased further by 7 Though there were other producers active in the domestic market, the listed four had the largest market presence in the automotive industry at the time. 8 Of these four, Honda and Toyota became the sole owners of their production units once they decided to target their production towards the European rather than the domestic market. This fact can be taken as an example of the difficulty that foreign investors face while entering the domestic market without an insider on board. This argument is strengthened by the fact that the other two MNCs retained their local partners given that they continued to target the local market. Anadolu Isuzu focuses on light trucks and midi buses and mainly targets the local market. Hyundai Assan also sells half of its production on the local market. 8 close to $1 billion. The success of the automotive industry in attracting FDI flows, despite the continuing constraints arising from macro and governance/institutions factors (see below) is largely driven by the relevance of all the positive aspects of trade and infrastructure for this industry. That is why automobile-related MNCs decided to invest in Turkey. If other obstacles were not present, the Turkish auto industry would have likely attracted FDI inflows in multiples of current levels. b. Governance and institutions: Case studies Bottlenecks related to insufficient respect for the rule of law and weak competition in local markets, reinforced by uneven application of bureaucratic red-tape and of competition rules to all economic actors in the market, are profoundly damaging to any country’s investment climate. In these critical areas requiring improved governance and more effective institutions, Turkey unfortunately compares unfavourably to the comparator CEECs, as reflected by the perceptions of global investors and experts that have compiled these rankings. According to the Heritage Foundation economic freedom index 2003, Turkey ranks 105th (with a score of 3.3), in contrast to Poland, 45th (2.7), and Czech Republic and Hungary, both tied at 32nd (2.4). According to PricewaterhouseCoopers’ opacity index 2001, Turkey ranks 74th, compared with Czech Republic at 71, Poland at 64 and Hungary at 50. And according to Transparency International’s corruption perception index 2002 , Turkey ranks 64th (with a score of 3.2), in contrast to Czech Republic, 52nd (3.7), Poland, 45th (4.0), and Hungary, 33rd (4.9). To help illustrate what may be the key underlying factors accounting for Turkey’s poor performance according to these widely-cited indices, three case studies reflecting recent experiences of actual foreign investors are presented. The case studies have been selected as representative of the primary sector (Normandy’s experience in gold mining), the secondary manufacturing sector (Cargill’s experience in agro-processing), and tertiary services (Iş-Tim’s experience in the mobile telecoms market). Figure 4 provides a summary of main facts. A discussion of common elements across the case studies follows. (1) The Eurogold investment. Due to its complex geology, Turkey possesses a diverse and rich array of minerals. Turkey is a major world producer of boron minerals (possessing twothirds of the world’s borate reserves), marble, copper and chrome ores, feldspar, magnesite and others. Total mineral industry revenues (primary and secondary mineral production including cement, glass, refined petroleum products, steel and certain inorganic chemicals) are estimated to account for roughly 10% of GDP. The mining sector is still overwhelmingly controlled by state-owned companies, though a number of public companies have been placed under the privatisation process. To-date, the peak points with respect to value of FDI approvals in the sector have occurred after the enactment of the Mining Law 3213 in 1985, with the following major investments: in 1990 in the Omya calcite mine, a joint venture involving the Swiss company of the same name; in 1991 in the Ovacik gold deposit by Eurogold; and in 1995 in an Eskişehir magnesite mine by Magnesit A.Ş., a subsidiary of the Dutch-based Societe d’Interests Magnesians. Normandy Madencilik A.Ş. (formerly Eurogold, but subsequently purchased by Australia-based Normandy Mining Limited) was registered in 1989 as a 100% FDI company and found total reported gold reserves of 24,000 tons (and another 24,000 tons of silver) near the village of Ovacik, Bergama, in Izmir province. According to the initial application, the mine was to be operated for 8 years, if no more reserves would be discovered in the interim. The ore would be mined by both open pit and underground mining methods, followed by cyanide leaching. Gold and silver doré metal were to be produced as the final products. In response to a request by the company in August 1991, the Ministry of Environment issued a letter of no objection in October 1994 indicating no health and environmental drawbacks and allowing the mining and processing facility to operate. The company also secured the required permit for mining activities from the Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources, and related permits, 9 licenses and investment certificates from relevant government entities. The amount of total investment was USD 100 million. As part of its application in 1991, Normandy prepared an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) report. Following the enactment of a formal EIA regulation in 1993, Normandy committed to meet the new discharge limits even though it was exempt from the EIA as the mining rights were granted before the regulation took effect. Accordingly, the waste material from the facility would be stored in a water retention-type tailings dam lined with clay and geo-membrane liners, with no discharge to the environment. The judicial problems facing Normandy started with a court case initiated by local inhabitants of Ovacik and some NGOs in 1994, based on a suit to annul the original Ministry of Environment decision authorising the project. Long-lasting and repeated legal procedures followed. In 1997, after a long judicial process and just as construction of the facility had been completed and the mine was ready to operate, Turkey’s highest relevant court, the Council of State (Danıştay) overturned the initial government authorisation and ordered the mine and processing plant to be sealed by 1999. The ruling stated that the facility’s proposed use of cyanide posed risks for health and environment, and thereby violated Article 17 of the Constitution granting all citizens the right to live in a healthy and balanced environment. Danıştay’s decision that the technical method for mining was hazardous for human health has been criticised by some lawyers on the grounds that setting rules on such a technical issue and prohibiting the use of a technical method is not under the responsibility of Danıştay, but rather resides with the related Ministries or government institutions. In response to this ruling, Normandy took additional safety measures in 1998 and reapplied for a new administrative permission to the Ministry of Environment, adding a cyanide destruction system for the effluents from the facility, a sealed tailings pond and a zero discharge system for wastewater. With these measures, the Ovacik facility in terms of environmental protection was considered one of the better examples in the world.9 The Ministry of Environment, in turn, consulted with the Prime Ministry. The Prime Ministry appointed a team of scientists under the governance of the Turkish Scientific and Technical Research Institute (TUBITAK) to evaluate the process. Based on a positive report from TUBITAK, the company was allowed to operate the facility for a one-year trial period, and began operations in June 2001. Normandy has been operating the facility since then, and publicising the results of periodic independent environmental monitoring showing results well below national and international limits. Project opponents have continued to challenge government decisions in various Administrative Courts in Izmir, with at least 10 separate court cases filed since August 2000 involving local plaintiffs and as defendants the Prime Ministry, Ministry of Environment, Ministry of Health and Ministry of Forestry. In late February 2002, an Administrative Court in Izmir ruled that the trial permit was violating the public good, and issued an injunction against the facility, ordering it to close on April 2, 2002. However, the government passed a special permit for Normandy to continue operations. Based on Normandy’s involvement, the Turkish mining sector has benefited in terms of improvement of environmental standards in the mining sector, application of state-of-art technology in gold mining and processing, and improvement of local technical training. Since start of operations in June 2001, the facility has provided direct employment for 250 persons plus indirect employment of an additional 1200 persons including through the formation of new businesses in supporting industries. The acquisition of Normandy Mining Limited by US-based Newmont Mining Corporation has been completed in February 2002. The case highlights problems for investors arising from insufficient clarity and respect for the rule of law. In this instance, Normandy followed established rules and procedures. An initial government authorisation (by the Ministry of Environment) based on Normandy having adhered to the prescribed rules did not protect the company from successive legal challenges. Following an initial order for plant closure, subsequent authorisations based on the company observing newly-prescribed rules (the new EIA regulation) by the Ministry of Environment, the 9 See, for instance, Arol (2002). 10 Prime Ministry and TUBITAK again were overturned, and the plant was ordered to be closed for a second time. In the end, the legal problems still have not been solved permanently and there still is not a technical standard issued by the government regarding the permitted methods for gold mining and specifically for cyanide leaching. It is indeed striking how this area of critical concern to potential investors has been left insufficiently defined in the existing laws and regulations. This in turn discourages Normandy and other existing and new entrant companies from making investments. (2) The Cargill starch-based sugar investment. Turkey’s sugar production can be divided into traditional beet sugar (sucrose, or ordinary table sugar) processed from crushed sugar beets, and starch-based sugar (glucose and fructose), a lower cost alternative processed from maize. While fructose can be used as a substitute to sucrose (it is sweeter and metabolised more slowly, hence often used in food products designed for people with diabetes), glucose is not a substitute – though both are used as important sweetener inputs into food processing industries. The more traditional beet sugar is produced by 29 companies, with state-owned production capacity accounting for 80% of the total. Starch-based sugar, on the other hand, is produced by 5 private companies, of which 3 are MNCs. In 2001, Turkey produced 2,000 thousand tons of beet sugar, over 5.5 times more than the privately-produced 360 thousand tons of starch-based sugar (235 of fructose, 125 of glucose). The sugar industry is characterised by substantial excess capacity, with total production capacity of 2,250 thousand tons of beet sugar and 930 thousand tons of starch-based sugar. However, given un-competitively high local production costs of beet sugar, even current levels of beet sugar production are only feasible with extremely high nominal rates of protection of 78.5% and effective rates of protection of 1500%. The excess capacity of starch-based sugar, on the other hand, is not market-based but is artificially created by the new Sugar Law (No. 4634) announced in April 2001, which imposed a quota limiting starch-based sugar production to 10% of total beet sugar production—in response to pressure from beet sugar farmers and processors. U.S.-based but Dutch-registered Cargill Inc. began starch-based sugar production in Turkey in 1990, having obtained required investment certificates (10 separate certificates between 1990 and 1997) for a wet corn milling (starch) processing plant in Pendik, Istanbul with a capacity of 220 thousand tons. Based on the success of that plant, Cargill obtained an additional investment certificate for a USD 90 million investment in a second facility at Orhangazi, in Bursa province in January 1998, again with a capacity of 220 thousand tons. As with the first facility, this plant was constructed in full compliance with the provisions of all the relevant legislation in force, and the plant has held all consents, permits, licenses and authorisations (with a special condition within the foreign investment certificate recognising the High Planning Board decision transferring the former agricultural area land into industrial area land). Significantly, 800 families and 4000 people in the region were making their living out of the Orhangazi facility based on production activities between 1998 and 2002, with 70% of the maize processed in the facility in 2002 purchased from domestic growers. In response to intense lobbying from the more expensive beet sugar producers, the Orhangazi facility has since 2001 faced 2 separate but related problems. First, there are 4 pending court cases commenced in 2001 challenging the initial government granting of construction, discharge and emission permits. The plaintiffs, supported by the Bar Association of the city of Bursa, various professional chambers of Bursa and a number of national MPs from Bursa commenced these actions against the Prime Ministry, the Governorship of Bursa, and the Ministry of Public Works and Housing. Although a case commenced at the 6th Administrative Chamber of the Council of State was initially unanimously ruled in favour of Cargill and the government, it was subsequently appealed by the plaintiffs. Eventually the initial decision was overruled, with the plaintiffs then seeking that the initially-granted discharge and emission permits be cancelled. It was also separately ruled that the High Planning Board initially gave inappropriate permission for facility construction on ‘first priority agricultural land’, a permission that is claimed to be in contradiction with the Constitution. It was therefore ruled that the Orhangazi facility must be torn down. At the moment, the company is operating on a special permission by the government, but a permanent legal solution is still required for the 11 company to plan for future activities. The second problem is related to the unpredictable introduction of quotas on starchbased sugar production in 2001, following the initial government policy of creating substantial additional capacity by promoting starch-based production to substitute for higher-cost beet sugar. Although the initial quota for the period 2002-03 was restricted to 234 thousand tons, it was increased by a subsequent Council of Ministers’ decision by 50%. However, the government’s decision to increase the production quota has been ineffective so far as it has not been implemented by the responsible independent regulatory board (the newly-instituted Sugar Board). This case highlights similar problems for investors as with the Eurogold investment, again arising from insufficient clarity and respect for the rule of law. Cargill also followed established rules and procedures. An initial government authorisation granted in 1998 (supported by a High Planning Board decision) based on Cargill having followed the prescribed rules again did not protect the company from successive legal challenges, nor did subsequent support by the government (Prime Ministry, Ministry of Public Works and Housing, Governorship of Bursa) protect the company from plaintiffs eager to find legal loopholes to force plant closure. Again, the legal problems still have not been solved permanently. In addition, this case highlights the negative impact on investments arising from the lack of a level playing field for all firms. In effect, unpredictable and uneven changes in rules with the introduction of highly-restrictive quotas on some market players and not on others, together with the biased and anti-competitive decision of the Sugar Board in favour of entrenched local incumbents, have a negative effect on investments not only by efficient companies in the sugar industry but by efficient companies in all sectors. (3) The Iş-Tim mobile telecom investment. The move to liberalise the Turkish telecommunication industry’s state-run monopoly began in 1994, with legislation to corporatise (as a state economic enterprise) the sole fixed line operator, Turk Telekom, removing telecom services from direct government involvement. Also in 1994, the mobile telecoms market was opened to limited competition with two private operators, Turkcell and Telsim starting business under revenue-sharing agreements with Turk Telekom. These duopoly providers were granted 25-year licenses in 1998, though this initial assignment of spectrum was not competitively determined. In January 2000, new legislation (Law 4502) established an independent authority, the Telecommunications Authority, while Turk Telekom was granted independence in business operations together with a decision to end its monopoly in fixed voice telephony by 31 December 2003. The third mobile license was allocated on the basis of a competitive tender in April 2000, with the condition that the minimum bid for a fourth license be equal to that paid by the third operator. Iş-Tim, a consortium of domestic Iş Bankasi and the mobile phone arm of Telecom Italia (TIM) operating under the Aria brand, won the third tender with an unexpectedly high bid price of USD 2.525 billion, suspected to have been an attempt to prevent a fourth operator from entering.10 The tender offer for a fourth license failed, and the fifth licence was granted to Turk Telekom (through a newly-created subsidiary Aycell) at the same price as IşTim. Iş-Tim entered the market in March 2001, and Aycell in December 2001. By end-2001, the mobile penetration rate reached 28.7 per 100 inhabitants, surpassing that in the fixedtelephony market. By end-2002, Turkcell had a market share of 64.3%, Telsim 30.2%, Iş-Tim 4.7% and Aycell 0.8%. Unlike the other two cases which involved 100% FDI companies, IşTim is a joint-venture investment with TIM owning 49% and where the domestic partner is one of the largest banks and holding companies in Turkey. The main problem facing Iş-Tim since its entry into the Turkish market arose from its inability to conclude mutually-acceptable roaming agreements with the incumbent competitors, Turkcell and Telsim. Following failure of the parties to resolve the tariff dispute among themselves, the Telecom Authority was requested to intervene by Iş-Tim in March 2001. The 10 It is known that as part of the final communications prior to the bid, Iş-Tim received a verbal promise from the Ministry of Tranport regarding roaming privileges. 12 regulator determined terms, conditions and tariffs for roaming in October 2001, but Turkcell and Telsim obtained preliminary injunction decisions in November 2001 with the aim of suspending implementation of these terms and conditions, and applied to international arbitration. Subsequently, the Telecom Authority adopted ‘Regulation on the Procedures and Merits concerning the Execution of National Roaming Agreements’ in March 2002, but Turkcell and Telsim again obtained preliminary injunction decisions and applied to international arbitration for the second time. Iş-Tim raised an objection against both injunction decisions as the third party suffering from the decision, but its objections were rejected. Iş-Tim sent a letter as a last warning to the Telecom Authority in February 2003, and filed a lawsuit against the Authority with the Paris-based International Chamber of Commerce’s International Court of Arbitration on March 31, 2003 seeking nearly USD 3 billion in damages as a result of the negative response to its letter (the full value of the paid license fee plus VAT because Turkey did not make available the roaming rights it had purportedly promised). However on May 13, following a negotiation involving Italian Prime Minister Berlusconi and Turkish Prime Minister Erdoğan, Iş-Tim announced a merger plan with Aycell (TIM and Turk Telekom each to hold 40% of the merged provider with Iş-Bank holding the remaining 20%). With the announcement of the merger plan, Iş-Tim withdrew its lawsuit as the merger is expected to furnish Iş-Tim with national roaming capacity, given Aycell’s sizeable network of base stations. The Turkish government accepted the merger of the two companies to prevent any further damage to the already poor reputation of Turkey for foreign investors. The merger was completed in February 2004. The new company is called TT-Tim and is operating under the Avea brand, with a market share of 16%. In the meantime, on June 9, 2003, Turkey’s Competition Board fined Turkcell USD 15.4 million and Telsim USD 6.1 million (1% of the companies’ net sales in 2001) for refusing to allow Iş-Tim access to their networks. The Competition Board ruled that Turkcell and Telsim have been deliberately stifling competition in the mobile services market. The Competition Board also urged the Telecom Authority to provide the requisite remedy by better regulating the market in order to end competition rule violations of this kind. The request for arbitration arose out of the right for national roaming for national operators, and the presumption by Iş-Tim that this right was not adequately ensured by the Telecom Authority. The right of Iş-Tim to benefit from national roaming is contained in Article 6 of Law 4502, which requires mobile operators ‘to satisfy reasonable, economically proportionate and technically feasible roaming requests of other operators working in the same field’, and requires the regulator ‘to issue regulations setting out the principles of implementation of this provision and the details to which standard reference tariffs, interconnection and roaming agreements are subject’. National roaming rights are also presumed to arise out of Article 35 of the concession agreement between Iş-Tim and the Telecom Authority, which requires the regulator ‘to provide a necessary, sufficient and fair competitive environment since Iş-Tim entered the market’, though it also specifies that ‘the coverage area of the (new) companies should cover 50% of the population of the country in 3 years and 90% in 5 years by investments exclusively made by the operators themselves without any national roaming support’. The presumed shortcoming of the Telecom Authority is that it has been late in coming up with own regulations regarding roaming, that standard interconnection tariffs based on the Long Run Incremental Cost accounting methodology have not been established yet, and that no requirement is in place ensuring that regulatory decisions remain in force while court proceedings are undertaken. The Iş-Tim case, as with the Cargill case, highlights the negative impact on investments arising from the lack of a level playing field for all firms. While the relevant regulatory body in the sugar industry took an anti-competitive decision in favour of entrenched local incumbent enterprises, the anti-competitive impact in this instance arose from the lack of the ability of the Telecom Authority to impose a pro-competitive decision regarding roaming rights with Turkcell and Telsim in a timely manner. The origins of the problem in this case are related to the tooslow evolution of rules and regulations in the telecommunications sector and the lack of authority of the regulatory body, driven no doubt at least in part by a natural learning process on the part of the Authority. 13 Common governance and institutions-related constraints. One of the common features of the three cases examined is the lack of credible industrial policy framework statements that could otherwise provide investors with confidence of the expected rules of the game in each industry. There is no such available document for any industry. Even the changes made in the legislative framework for telecommunications in May 2001 that gave more power to the Telecom Authority were made without a clearly-articulated policy framework. They hardly form the basis for providing confidence to investors about the government’s long-term vision for the industry and for the economy as a whole. To help give credibility to such policy framework statements, related legislation including implementing decrees in line with the policy statements are essential, as is subsequent consistent implementation of such legislation. The case studies highlight two distinct but related classes of constraints accounting for Turkey’s poor performance in attracting FDI: legal and judicial constraints related to insufficient clarity and respect for the rule of law, and competition constraints related to the absence of a level playing field where all firms compete on an equal basis. Lack of clarity refers to insufficiently defined, missing, incoherent and changing rules. Lack of respect for the rule of law refers to the practice of decision-making based not on ex-ante defined rules but on opportunistic motives irrespective of the prevailing rules. It refers to both a reluctance to apply rules when they should be applied as well as allowing loopholes and ambiguities to persist in the legal framework. The lack of respect for the rule of law creates an environment where multiple appeals are common and where successive appeals attempt to over-rule the previous court’s or public authority’s ruling. The ineffectiveness of many of the recently-established regulatory boards intensifies the adverse effects of this constraint on foreign investors. In such an environment, it is only natural for investors to lack confidence that established rights will be respected by the courts. In each of the presented cases, the government as rule-maker has not been able to solve the underlying problems in a timely manner. In those instances where the government has strived to help the investor, its attempts have been met with judicial challenges. These judicial challenges, when circumvented by government as in the Eurogold and Cargill cases, were done so without addressing the underlying legal bottlenecks. This fundamental problem of unaddressed underlying legal ambiguities appears to be one of the most critical problems. It raises the question of whether lack of clarity in the underlying rule of law is intentional, in order to give public decision-makers the required degrees of freedom to grant special treatment and exemptions whenever politically convenient. Unfortunately, the substantial cost of such unpredictability in the rule of law in terms of foregone current and future investments amplifies the impact of the distortions caused by government allocations based on personal connections rather than market allocations based on underlying efficiency-related rules. Competition-related constraints lead state-owned, local, joint-venture and fully foreignowned companies not to compete on an equal footing. In both the Cargill and Iş-Tim cases, the failure of the relevant regulatory body rapidly to enforce a pro-competitive order has sent negative signals for future investments by existing or new potentially efficient enterprises. It is of course natural for entrenched local incumbents, whether in primary, secondary or tertiary sectors, to seek to maintain market power and prevent new investors from challenging their local dominance. However, it is the role of properly-enforced competition policies, both through the independent regulatory bodies and through the Competition Board, to ensure that incumbent companies only do so by lowering their costs and offering improved products, rather than by seeking to dull the competitive market process, either on their own or through alliances with organs of government. This analysis of governance and institutions-related constraints in Turkey is consistent with a broader analysis of politics and democracy in Turkey as populist patronage, allowing the 14 people greater access to the resources of the state through the help of political parties.11 In a cultural environment where interpersonal trust is low, regional solidarity ties, blood relations, clientelistic networks, favouritism and nepotism have deeply influenced and moulded the political culture.12 For patronage to work, authorities must distribute favours to their clientele, which is hard to do if allocation of contracts and contract monitoring, recruitment, promotion, tariff decisions and the expansion of new entrants occur purely on meritocratic grounds and through transparent procedures as required by EU standards. Only when rules and laws are applied evenly for all market participants (and not directly modified for politically influential firms) will non-market based favouritism be overcome, and more substantial investments driven by underlying efficiencies be forthcoming. 4. FDI-related policies and institutions and EU accession Turkey scores better than its competitors along many dimensions. A huge and growing domestic market, a skilled and cost effective labour, strong local companies, and access to other expanding markets are all strengths of Turkey. Furthermore, Turkey has a liberal legal framework for FDI since 1954 and a convertible currency for almost 15 years, far earlier than its competitors. However, relatively low levels of FDI inflows over the past years show that Turkey has not been able to translate these competitiveness-related strengths into a sufficientlylarge number of concrete FDI projects. In comparison to other candidate countries, Turkey’s EU candidacy has not positively affected the inflow of FDI, and figures show that even the Customs Union has had a negligible effect. 13 The policies Turkey must follow to foster its future competitiveness include all the traditional components needed to attract more FDI, such as further harmonisation of trade and industrial policies and the adoption of related legislation and administrative procedures. However, these components are necessary but not sufficient conditions for a more competitive economy and will not automatically result in increased inflows of FDI. All candidate countries also have applied the acquis but each country also has country-specific rules, policies and institutions to seek FDI. In addition to meeting EU requirements in a broad range of traditional harmonisation-related areas, Turkey must make efforts to improve its legal/judicial and competition-related environment in order to ensure predictable respect for the rule of law and a level playing field for all firms, not only on paper but also in terms of implementation. 4.1 EU requirements Turkey’s EU candidacy status and obligations as a member of the Customs Union do not directly impose EU requirements on FDI policy. Until the 2003 Accession Partnership (AP), there was no explicit clause on FDI policy neither in accession partnership nor in regular reports, even though limits on foreign ownership for certain sectors were criticised in the context of freer movement of capital. However, FDI as well as domestic investments are very much related to the overall business environment, and policy decisions regarding taxes and state aids, intellectual property rights, sectoral licences, customs and standards. Furthermore, broader competition policy areas have a direct impact on how a country performs with respect to attracting FDI. Thus, the previous AP documents and the National Programme of Turkey had a long list of legislation to be amended, which in turn could positively affect the investment 11 See, for instance, Kalaycıoğlu (2001). Among 44 countries included in the World Values Survey of 1989-90, Turkey ranks the lowest with less than 10% of its population believing that most fellow human beings are trustworthy. See Kalaycıoğlu, op. cit. 13 The CU agreement does not provide as strong a signal as the prospects of a full EU membership because it entails only market integration, without ensuring the deeper political, social and legal transformations that would bring greater comfort to investors. 12 15 climate. The 2003 Accession Partnership for Turkey has for the first time clauses related to FDI policy. The two requirements explicitly stated in the AP document, both as short-term priorities, are that Turkey should “facilitate and promote the inflow of FDI” (in the Economic Criteria section) and “remove all restrictions affecting FDI (originating from the EU) in all sectors in Turkey” (in the Free Movement of Capital section).14 Regarding broader EU requirements for FDI, the 2002 Regular Report contains criticism of the limitations on foreign ownership in some sectors, of the authorisation system for investment and of the obligation to provide USD 50,000 to establish a company or open a branch in Turkey.15 Regarding the restrictions on foreign ownership in certain sectors such as civil aviation, maritime transport, port enterprises, radio and television broadcasting, telecommunication, and mining and energy, the government argues that most of the other candidate countries still have similar restrictions and that Turkey should not remove them until a more definite road map for EU accession is agreed upon. However, it is also argued that these restrictions should be removed not only for compliance with the EU acquis, but to develop a more competitive investment environment for Turkey. 4.2 Reform efforts to-date Turkey has adopted an ambitious structural reform program in 2001 to lay the foundation for sustainable growth, driven by private investments and supported by a smaller but more effective government. The main private sector development-related pillars of the government’s economic programme include: an improved investment climate; a smaller, more transparent and effective public sector; a sound and competitive financial system; accelerated privatisation; and a more efficient business infrastructure, with a particular focus on communications and energy. The ongoing reform efforts are closely linked to Turkey’s objective to accede to the EU. The government realises that Turkey has fallen behind many other developing countries with respect to effective liberalisation, enforcement practice as well as with respect to legal and judicial reforms. Pushing on with the ongoing reforms is crucial to the country’s economic future. Currently Turkey is implementing a major fiscal adjustment program to increase the effectiveness of the public sector while reducing its size. Fiscal and public sector reforms are imperative to ensure a sustainable domestic public debt profile, which is itself critical for establishing macroeconomic stability with low inflation. These actions are critical to allow lower interest rates, facilitate long-term investment planning and more robust private sector growth. To complement these reforms and ensure their sustainability, Turkey also is undertaking fundamental reforms of expenditure and taxation systems. The new Banks Act in 1999 established the Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency (BDDK) as an independent authority to regulate and supervise the banking sector. The BDDK has implemented a comprehensive banking restructuring program to promote more efficient financial intermediation for the enterprise sector. To strengthen the scope for private sector investment in telecoms, an amending Law in 2000 created the Telecommunications Authority, and independent regulatory body responsible for licensing, tariffs, spectrum allocation and other supervisory activities. Similarly, to strengthen the scope for private sector investment in energy, separate electricity and natural gas Laws in 2001 established the independent Energy Market Regulatory Authority. Amendments to Turkey’s Constitution were made in August 1999 establishing the legal basis for privatisation, and allowing public services to be performed under private law. Importantly, the amendments also allow international arbitration of disputes. A new public procurement law also has been enacted in 2002. While all these policy 14 15 Council Decision on Accession Partnership with Turkey, 2003 (COM 2003) Regular Report on Turkey’s Accession, 2002 (COM 2002, 700 final) 16 announcements are desirable and in the right direction, the government needs to ensure careful and consistent implementation without undue hesitation not to adversely affect business expectations. In order to address the feedback received from international investors about the difficulties in Turkey’s investment climate, the government in 2001 launched a reform process to improve administrative procedures under the title ‘Reform Program for Improving the Investment Climate’. The idea behind this initiative was that administrative barriers can make the difference between being an attractive location for investment and one that is not competitive, since complex and time-consuming administrative procedures appear to be among the most important disincentives to investment, and can discourage investors despite other attractive features that a country might have to offer. Taking into account the findings and recommendations of a diagnostic study and the project on administrative barriers to investment conducted jointly by the government and the Foreign Investment Advisory Service, a joint facility of the International Finance Corporation and the World Bank, the Government enacted a “Decree on Improving the Investment Climate in Turkey” on December 11, 2001 as part of a national strategy to increase the overall level of income and productivity and to raise the level of competitiveness of firms operating in Turkey.16 The challenge facing the government was how to implement this reform vision in a manner that would streamline administrative procedures while incorporating private sector feedback on the measures to be taken. Within this framework, a three-phase strategy was designed and started to be implemented to facilitate the reform process. First, a clear vision and a consistent direction for the reform were embodied in the December 2001 ministerial decree in order to demonstrate political commitment and consensus behind the reform scheme. The decree established a coordinating body comprised of senior public and private sector decisionmakers, the Coordination Council for the Improvement of the Investment Climate (YOIKK), with the mandate to identify and remove regulatory and administrative barriers to private investment. Second, a clear and precise action plan defining the priorities, the timing and responsibilities was formulated. Last but not least, YOIKK has been scheduled to hold regular monthly meetings in order to monitor progress made, with quarterly reports submitted to the Council of Ministers. As shown in Figure 5, key areas of reform have been identified and grouped under nine technical committees to deal with the following constraints: - Company registration: time consuming, unnecessary and duplicative transactions - Employment: problems related to short-term work visas, employment of special groups, and high social contributions by employers. - Sectoral licences: licensing procedures are unnecessarily complicated in a number of industries, primarily due to overlapping authorities, highly centralised approval procedures, and with little involvement by the private sector. - Location: access to public lands and site development by the private sector is very timeconsuming and has some restrictions. - Taxes and incentives: corporate income tax rate is comparatively high, and the system is complex. Incentives should be aligned to the EU state aids regime and the process should be simplified and automatic where possible. - Customs and standards: despite major reform initiatives, customs procedures still cause some delays due to significant documentation requirements, lengthy testing procedures, delayed VAT reimbursement and discretionary decision-making with incidences of corruption, 16 See FIAS (2001). 17 - Intellectual property rights: protection of patents, trademarks, and copyrights is insufficient, mainly because of remaining gaps in the existing legislation, weak implementation and enforcement of laws, and cumbersome procedures, - Investment promotion: There is no one single entity that effectively conducts a targeted investment promotion and policy advocacy - FDI legislation: Legislation on FDI at the time of the formation of YOIKK was based on the 1954 law. The first YOIKK meeting was held in March 2002, and set targets and timelines for these technical committees. One core dimension of the reform process has been private sector involvement in all efforts through disseminating the information and sharing the results obtained over time. This emphasis is in line with the government’s conviction that joint evaluation of the needs and identification of appropriate solutions is of utmost importance for the success of the reform initiative. The reports of the technical committees have been quite positive. The government already has taken several steps in compliance with the recommendations of the committees. Even though there was an election and change in government, the reform program has proved to be effective and various legislative changes have been made and draft laws prepared. Following the November 2002 elections, the new government has amended the Council of Minister’s Decree to include another technical committee on small and medium enterprises. To increase the influence of YOIKK, the government decided to head YOIKK by a minister. Enacted laws as a direct result of the YOIKK process to-date include: a new up-to-date FDI law (that serves as a declaration to foreign investors of their rights and that will enable a shift from an ex-ante control-based “investment permission system” to a “promotion and facilitation approach” with minimal ex-post monitoring to continuously improve the investor climate, in conformity with international best practices); a law that redesigns the company registration process (by diminishing the prior 19 required steps to 3 and reducing turnaround from two and a half months to one day); a law on employment of foreign personnel; and a law on the investment allowance system (which enables a shift to an automatic state aids system in line with EU requirements). Among the drafted laws which have been sent either to the Prime Ministry or to the Parliament are: a law on the duties and responsibities of the Patent Institute (which will enable the Institute to deal with intelllectual property rights issue in a more professional way); and a law on the establishment of an investment promotion agency. Although there have been some investment promotion initiatives underway by several public and private institutions, Turkey at present does not have an agency with a strong and clear mandate, set-up and budget to carry out effective investment promotion, including functions such as investor servicing, investment generation and policy advocacy, and governed jointly by public and private sectors. The draft new law submitted to the parliament incorporates these issues. YOIKK efforts also have borne fruitful results in several other areas such as recruitment of expatriates, sectoral licencing, customs, and intellectual and industrial property rights. With respect to customs reform, the Undersecretariat of Customs has been implementing an ambitious reform program to improve its administrative efficiency and effectiveness. The customs automated system has been rolled-out to 99% of all customs offices and further enhanced to assist customs in controlling movement of goods. Important steps taken include modernising customs laws, regulations and procedures in line with those of EU legislation, and simplifying and harmonising forms, procedures and control techniques in line with those internationally recommended by the World Customs Organisation. Necessary legislation to strengthen the capacity and infrastructure of the Turkish Patent Institute has been submitted to parliament. The intent is to ensure effective implementation of the regulations on protection of intellectual and industrial property rights. 18 Finally, land acquisition and site development for investment is a critical issue for both local and foreign investors. A very useful discussion forum involving public and private sector representatives has led to the creation of a priority list of problems and measures to be taken in this field. The technical committee working on this issue will begin by formulating solutions to the most urgent problems. 4.3 Outstanding priorities While current efforts have largely focused on the introduction of new laws in pre-identified areas to spur administrative reforms, predictable implementation of existing and new legislation is far more important. And regarding competition-related reforms, it is vital for all investors— existing producers as well as new entrants, whether local, joint venture or wholly foreignowned—to face a level playing field in the way that laws, regulations and administrative procedures are implemented. Certain critical problems still exist for investors in these areas, as highlighted by the case studies. a. Legal and judicial reforms The improvements on the legislation front, many of which were achieved in the last few years, were necessary but not sufficient to create an attractive legal framework for foreign investors. Improvements in FDI legislation in the narrow sense fall in this category of necessary but not sufficient changes required to generate sustainable increases in FDI inflows. One of the critical outstanding impediments to investment is that implementation of the laws in both the executive and judicial branches of the government is fraught with problems for investors. The most important but also likely the most difficult reforms needed in this arena are basic changes in the legal and judicial systems, and in the way that administrative procedures more generally are implemented. The way that the legal and judicial systems work is a critical determinant of FDI – especially high-value FDI destined for export markets which can go anywhere and which need a reliable and hassle-free environment. Lengthy and non transparent procedures combined with unpredictable outcomes, in both the executive branch of the government and in the courts, are among the main problems in this area. Incomplete reforms and poor implementation of laws and regulations are the overarching issues. Adopted laws are often not implemented on time. All this contributes to the general perception of an unpredictable legal framework. Not only are the administrative procedures time-consuming, but also enforcement procedures for commercial cases at the courts take much longer than many other countries. The high workload of judges is the major reason for these delays. Cases in Turkey take often longer than a year. In a survey carried out by FIAS, another point frequently raised by investors is the lack of confidence in the impartiality and quality of the commercial courts.17 Even if the legal issue appears clear, foreign investors routinely state that the judgments are still much more unpredictable than they would be in their home country. Foreign companies and bigger companies are very visible and laws may be applied more strictly to them than to domestic and smaller companies. While the laws themselves respect the principle of equal treatment stipulated in the 1954 Law on Foreign Capital and the new Foreign Direct Investment Law, implementation often has been different. The government is taking steps to reform the judicial system and enhance its predictability as a component of its EU Accession Program. The commitments made in this area as well as the short- to medium-term plans are reflected in the National Program. These targets will require some years to achieve. However, these reforms should also help to improve the perception of Turkey in foreign investors’ eyes. One desirable step would be for Turkey to institute a comprehensive legal and judicial review to identify and address important items in existing private sector-related laws that are in contradiction with each other or that are not 17 FIAS, op.cit. 19 sufficiently clearly defined. Furthermore, a specific institution should be entrusted with improved oversight responsibilities to reduce the likelihood of such re-occurrences in the future. Such a review should also include in its terms of reference the removal of detailed sectoral issues—such as those related to allocation of land, first priority agricultural land, privatisation and arbitration—from the Constitution and their introduction instead in appropriate laws. Two related recommendations that could be acted on immediately are to refrain from allowing so much time to pass between the adoption of laws and of implementing legislation, and to seek maximum input from private sector participants, both local and foreign, at the legal preparation phase. Best practice would be to draft implementing regulations parallel to the law or at least to have a detailed draft on how the implementation will look like at the time the law is adopted. Seeking significant input from business associations before laws and regulations are adopted will result in adequate legislation based also on the concerns of the private sector. This procedure, common practice in most OECD countries, increases the knowledge base on which legislation is drafted. b. Competition-related reforms The general aim of creating a more competitive environment has been dealt with as part of the process of meeting basic EU accession requirements. Turkey’s competition law was developed while Turkey was negotiating its Customs Union with the EU, and was adopted in 1994, taking the EU treaty as its substantive basis. The Competition Board (RK) has been actively applying Turkey’s competition law since the end of 1997. However, in addition to competition law implementation, industrial policy, company law, the free movement of goods, capital and service provision, taxation, sectoral policies, regional policies and SME policy are all related to competition. Progress in all of these areas to comply with the EU acquis will help Turkey to have a better competitive environment. In the area of competition law enforcement, a couple of outstanding issues still remain that are crucial for effective private sector development. In particular, the current legislation does not allow the RK to apply competition rules to all public undertakings, including those with special or exclusive rights and to other entities of public administration. It is in Turkey’s interest to change this and include the equivalent of EC Treaty Article 86 (ex Article 90 of the Treaty of Rome). As privatisation progresses and public participation withdraws, care should be given to better align the specific sectoral laws to the Competition Act in order to ensure the efficient enforcement of competition rules. Therefore, it is essential that enhanced powers to act during the privatisation process and in the regulated infrastructure sectors be granted to the RK. In this respect, closer coordination between the RK and special sectoral regulatory authorities should be secured. While sectoral regulatory authorities should focus more on ex-ante regulation, the RK should concentrate on ex-post regulation. Following such a ‘specialisation’ the current state of competition between these two types of institutions will diminish. Instead, a stable ground for cooperation and coordination will be laid. This need for improved coordination is evident in the Cargill case where quotas imposed by the Sugar Board have adversely affected private sector parties by inhibiting competition, and also in the Iş-Tim case where earlier coordination would have helped address the situation sooner. A recent study carried out by experts from RK on legislation not compatible with competition supports the view that the government is not consistent in its application of competition policy principles.18 The study lists various laws and regulations from different sectors that contradict the enacted competition law, with almost all these sectors being dominated by public enterprises. While such inconsistencies could be understandable for legislation that dates back to the time when government applied an import-substitution strategy and the public sector was the driving force of the economy, there is no economic rationale for such contradictions in legislation adopted after the Competition Act was approved. In particular, 18 Ekdi, Öztürk, Ünlü, Ünlüsoy and Çınaroğlu, 2002. 20 such contradictions are most glaring in the case of regulatory bodies. As discussed in the Cargill case, the Sugar Board should not have the unilateral authority to impose anti-competitive quotas. More generally, there should be enhanced competition policy oversight to ensure that the decisions of regulatory boards are not in contradiction with competition principles. A strong case can be made for the desirability of strengthening the traditional competition advocacy responsibilities of the RK, including granting the RK: the power to introduce or amend new laws to promote competition; the power to modify existing laws that are anti-competitive in their impact; the oversight responsibility to ensure that relevant institutions do not perform an anti-competitive role; and the power to review whether decisions of all regulatory institutions are in the public interest, with the mandate to submit their reports to parliament and other appropriate public oversight entities. A second key area of competition policy with an unfinished agenda concerns state aids. Turkey has been criticised by the EU for not aligning its state aids system to that of the EU, even though this has been a commitment of Turkey under the Customs Union. Progress has been made in this area, but legislative changes and an independent monitoring authority have not yet been established. Moreover, the current attempts to align the state aids rules only cover the aids given to the private sector whereas public sector incentives also should be covered to ensure a competitive environment. The broader EU requirements shed light on other issues that Turkey should focus on regarding a more competitive environment. These include alignment with the acquis on intellectual and industrial property rights (company law), and removing limitations for foreign ownership in certain sectors (free movement of capital). c. The benefits of full EU accession Turkey’s eventual EU membership is very crucial for FDI inflows. Irrespective of numerous characteristics that render it an attractive place for foreign investment, Turkey cannot attract as much FDI as its CEEC competitors unless the government takes further steps towards full EU membership. Actually, Turkey would not have to wait very long to start reaping the benefits of an eventual EU accession. With the opening of EU accession negotiations, Turkey is already likely to attract larger sums of FDI. There are many reasons to expect such a development to take place. The opening of EU negotiations would act as a strong signal that Turkey will become a full member of the EU in the future. Assuming that the government will continue on the current path of structural reforms with a clear focus on the sustainability of public debt, the signalling effect of the opening of accession negotiations will be strong. Such a decision will assure foreign investors that the Turkish economy will be set on a stable growth path for the foreseeable future. Equally important, the opening of EU accession negotiations would provide all investors enhanced trust that the legal and judicial environment will improve across all relevant areas of the common acquis, and that implementation of all required secondary legislation also will improve – as the accession process in Turkey’s case requires not only progress in enacting laws but progress in implementation. For Turkey, the benefit of stability, together with institutional reforms that will improve application of the rule of law and enhance competition, will be to convince foreign investors to channel more funds to Turkey for domestic as well as export market-oriented projects. Especially with its domestic market potential, Turkey will be very attractive for FDI in non-traded sectors. As the average size of investments in these sectors is in general larger, attracting significant FDI inflows immediately after the opening of negotiations is likely. The attractiveness of Turkey for foreign investors will continue to increase as the accession negotiations proceed. At each step, Turkey will move closer to becoming a full member, closing the gap between CEECs and Turkey in terms of attracting FDI. Turkey will undertake more steps towards the harmonisation with the EU framework. At one step, even 21 before becoming a full member, Turkey will be in a position to accept the authority of EU agencies in the resolution of problems that may arise between foreign investors and the Turkish government. This step will further ease some of the reservations that foreign investors may still have vis-à-vis Turkey. After all, EU rules and regulations and the ways they are implemented are well-known and predictable to foreign investors. It is at this stage that one of the most important benefits from EU accession will be realised by Turkey, as rule of law and competition-related constraints will be eased even further, with concomitant increases in private investment flows for the benefit of enhanced growth and development in Turkey. d. The role of pro-active investment promotion policies In each of the anticipated stages in the accession process, as Turkey moves from its current status as a country seeking the opening of accession negotiations to the desired endstatus as a full EU member country, a critical question is what the most appropriate set of investment promotion policies, best adapted to the evolving Turkish reality, should be. In addition to focusing on those elements of the investment climate most critical to moving from one stage to the next in the accession process, including improved implementation of existing laws and institutional reforms to improve application of the rule of law and to enhance competition, what else should Turkey be doing on the policy side? This brings us to the question of the desirability of more targeted FDI policies. Both developed and developing country experiences show the potential benefits of specific policies to stimulate investment, and of the establishment of an investment promotion agency (IPA) that will be engaged in activities such as investment generation, policy advocacy, investor servicing and image building. According to UNCTAD, there are more than 160 national and over 250 sub-national IPAs worldwide.19 A recent empirical study on the effectiveness of IPAs in 58 countries shows that FDI inflows are positively correlated with investment promotion activities, and that the quality of the investment climate and the level of development have a significant effect on IPA performance.20 This finding suggests that countries are well advised to focus on basic improvements in the investment climate first, and consider introducing an IPA at a minimum concurrently with serious efforts to improve the investment climate. Moreover, political visibility and participation of the private sector appear to be two critical elements that contribute to the success of an IPA. Worldwide experience shows that IPAs are more effective when they are autonomous from the government (though subject to policy oversight by the public sector), and when they are a product of genuine joint effort of private and public sectors.21 At the moment, Turkey does not have an IPA. The government has been carrying out promotion activities on a negligible budget. The promotion activities mainly consist of publications, limited advertisement, and participation in seminars and trade-investment fairs. Compared with many other countries, it is difficult to claim that Turkey has a coherent promotion policy. Nor is it possible to claim that the budget allocated to promotion is sufficient. Under the YOIKK reform program, the Technical Promotion Committee has tackled this problem and decided to establish a promotion agency. Besides the already mentioned study that was carried out as a joint effort of the World Bank and related Turkish institutions, and a draft law has been prepared. Care has been taken to design an agency that could perform all the key recommended IPA functions. The new FDI law recommends that the governance of the IPA be carried out jointly by public and private sectors, with the majority vote in private hands. It is also proposed that the agency have an autonomous structure and an independent budget. The law has already been sent to the Prime Ministry, and is expected to be enacted as of 2004. 19 See UNCTAD (2000). See Morisset (2003). 21 The key functions that a well-designed IPA should perform are summarised in an annex. 20 22 Aside from the public sector’s oversight role in establishing an appropriate institutional framework, governments also have a key role to play in articulating an overall investment policy, and specific FDI policy actions. Governments ideally should first decide on an overall investment and FDI policy, and then use incentives where appropriate as tools to achieve the stated objectives. The use of incentives will differ by country, but there are general rules specified by WTO that each country should obey. For Turkey, there are additional rules stemming from the Customs Union agreement with the EU. As part of cross-national efforts at abolishing barriers to investment, bilateral or international agreements are signed between countries to protect mutual investments, with clauses ranging from admission and establishment to standards of treatment and dispute settlement mechanisms. Attracting more FDI per se should not necessarily be the main target of a country’s FDI policy. As important are the questions of how the country can benefit more from any level of FDI, and how to prevent any potential negative effects of FDI. FDI policies ideally should provide incentives for investors to act in ways that will contribute most to the development process of the country. For this, countries can try to build local capabilities, using local suppliers and upgrading local skills, technological capabilities and infrastructure.22 Typically, policy makers attempt to understand the potentialities and the attractiveness of the country, and then try to design a policy accordingly. The sectoral and regional capabilities of the country, the needs of specific investors, be they market-seeking or resource seeking, the development level of specific sectors relative to global trends all should be taken into consideration. Even developed countries apply specific policies to attract FDI, and Germany’s provision of special incentives for attracting ICT (information-communication technologies) investments is an example of this. Despite the general shift of attitudes in favour of FDI, significant concerns remain about potential negative effects. So, countries should be careful in eliminating the possible negative effects that FDI can have and design their policy accordingly. Crowding-out of local firms and products, transfers of polluting activities or technologies, concessions given to investors in special zones that allow them to skirt labour and environmental regulations are examples of these negative effects. 23 Given the benefits that could accrue to Turkey from significantly higher levels of FDI, there is indeed more that Turkey could and should do on the policy side – subject to WTO and EU Customs Union constraints. Turkey indeed has negotiated investment agreements with 79 countries and signed 66 of these agreements, and also has signed “double taxation” agreements” with 49 countries. Turkey has taken active part in the WTO negotiations for an international investment agreement, and has participated in FDI-related issues in platforms such as UNCTAD, OECD, WTO, and the EU Commission. However, comparing Turkey’s potential with actual levels of FDI inflows suggests that policies implemented to-date need further strengthening. In addition to enhanced legal/judicial implementation and more effective competition across markets, Turkey would benefit from a coherent overall investment and FDI policy, with a clear articulation of how specific policies and more activist promotion are intended to achieve stated objectives. 5. Conclusion This paper examines the main FDI challenges currently facing Turkey. The setting of the analysis is that FDI can in principle be highly beneficial for a country’s growth and development prospects. In a first section, we reviewed this claim in the Turkish context based on existing studies. The available evidence suggests that FDI is indeed highly productive for the Turkish economy as a whole, based on the significant direct and indirect benefits on productivity in the manufacturing sector. 22 23 See UNCTAD (2003). Op.cit, p.88 23 Despite its beneficial effects, however, recorded FDI inflows to Turkey have extremely been low compared to the CEECs. The main FDI challenges facing Turkey, therefore, are why FDI inflows have remained so low and how to increase the inflows to desirable levels. An initial question addressed is to what extent recorded inflows fully reflect actual inflows. The paper provides preliminary evidence that understatements may be significant in some years, though changes in the new 2003 FDI Law coupled with improved statistical recording should help alleviate discrepancies from international common practice. The paper examines the determinants of low FDI inflows in greater detail. We argue that one of the major culprits behind the laggard performance in FDI inflows is the country’s long-running fiscal problems and the ensuing macroeconomic uncertainty. Turkey’s current efforts at implementing a major fiscal adjustment, if sustained, should help achieve lower inflation and macroeconomic stability. The introduction of inflation accounting will no doubt be a welcome interim measure for local and foreign investors alike. Besides macroeconomic uncertainty, specific infrastructure-related weaknesses also continue to diminish Turkey’s attractiveness to investors. Although Turkey benefits from its skilled, adaptable and entrepreneurial workforce, and communications and transport do not appear to be major problem areas, Turkey lags behind in terms of its energy infrastructure, its level of computerisation, and the availability of credit for the private sector. Turkey’s recently passed new electricity and natural gas framework laws, to the extent that they are effectively implemented, should spur significant improvements in line with Turkey’s underlying endowments in the energy area. The successful implementation of the adjustment program will ensure that more funds will be channelled to private sector rather than the funding of the huge public sector deficit, at low real interest rates. Perhaps the most important contribution of the paper is its examination of outstanding rule of law and competition-related impediments to investment through detailed case studies. Based on three cases from the primary, secondary manufacturing and tertiary services sectors, we argue that the main unaddressed obstacles to increased FDI in Turkey are governance and institutions-related problems related to rule of law and competition. The most important legal and judicial constraints relate to insufficient clarity and insufficient respect for the rule of law. In each of the analysed cases, the government as rule-maker has failed to address underlying legal ambiguities in a timely fashion, raising the question of whether lack of clarity in the underlying rule of law is intentional, in order to give public decision-makers the required degrees of freedom to grant special treatment and exemptions whenever politically convenient. Unfortunately for the country as a whole, the resulting unpredictability has resulted in substantial foregone current and future investments. Competition constraints, in turn, are related to the absence of a level playing field where all companies compete on an equal basis. In two of the cases examined, the failure of the relevant regulatory body to enforce a pro-competition ruling rapidly also has sent negative signals for future investments. In terms of future policy priorities, we argue that predictable and uniform implementation of existing and new legislation is of utmost importance. In the legal and judicial area, the focus of reforms should be to remove legal ambiguities, by addressing all private sector laws and implementing regulations that are in contradiction with each other or not sufficiently clearly defined. In the competition area, it is in Turkey’s interest to empower the Competition Board to apply competition rules to all public undertakings, aligning its competition law to EC Treaty Article 86 and its state aids system to that of the EU. Improved coordination between competition and other independent regulatory boards should yield more rapid pro-competition outcomes. The EU accession process should itself provide significant benefits to Turkey with respect to FDI inflows by helping rule of law and competition constraints to be eased further. The expected EU decision to start negotiations towards full membership of Turkey will be crucial in finally convincing larger numbers of foreign investors to invest in Turkey. Finally, in addition to aligning Turkey’s investment climate more closely with that of the EU, Turkey also should follow a more pro-active approach by implementing more specific FDI policies and 24 active promotion. 25 References Arol, Ali Ihsan, 2002, “Current Status of FDI and Environmental Issues in Mining in Turkey,” OECD Global Forum on FDI and the Environment, February. Blomström, Magnus and Ari Kokko, 1998, “Multinational Corporations and Spillovers,” Journal of Economic Surveys, 12(2): 1-31. Borensztein, Eduardo, Jose De Gregorio and Jong-Wha Lee, 1998, “How Does Foreign Direct Investment Affect Economic Growth”, Journal of International Economics, Vol. 45, 1998, pp. 115-135. Commission of the European Communities, 2003, Council Decision on Accession Partnership with Turkey (COM 2003) Commission of the European Communities, 2002, Regular Report on Turkey’s Accession (COM 2002, 700 final) Ekdi, Barış, Ebru Öztürk, H.Hüseyin Ünlü, Kürşat Ünlüsoy and Serpil Çınaroğlu, 2002, “Rekabet Kuralları İle Uyumlu Olmayan Mevzuat Listesi”, Rekabet Dergisi, Issue 9, March. FIAS, 2001, Turkey: A Diagnostic study of the FDI Environment, February. Gruben, William C., and Darryl McLeod, 1998, “Capital flows, savings, and growth in the 1990s”, The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Vol. 38, No. 3, Fall. Kalaycıoğlu, Ersin, 2001, “Turkish Democracy: Patronage versus Governance”, Turkish Studies, Vol. 2, No 1 (Spring), pp 54-70. Morisset, Jacques, 2003 “Does a Country Need a Promotion Agency to Attract Foreign Direct Investment?” World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3028, April 2003. OECD, 2003, Foreign Direct Investment Statistics: How Countries Measure FDI, Paris. _____, 1996, OECD Benchmark definition of FDI, 3rd Edition, Paris Özatay, Fatih, ve Guven Sak, 2002, “The 2000-2001 Financial Crisis in Turkey”, mimeo, The Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey and Ankara University. Stern, Nicholas, 2002, “Dynamic Development: Innovation and Inclusion,” Munich Lectures in Economics, Ludwig Maximilian University, Munich, November 19. UNCTAD, 2003, World Investment Report: FDI Policies for Development: National and International Perspectives, New York: The United Nations. ________, 2001, “The World of Investment Promotion at a Glance: A Survey of Investment Promotion Practices”, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, United Nations Advisory Studies number 17, UNCTAD/ITE/IPC/3. ________, 2000, World Investment Report: Cross-border Mergers and Acquisitions and Development, New York: The United Nations. Wells, Louis T. Jr. and Alvin G. Wint, 2001, “Marketing a Country: Promotion as a Tool for Attracting Foreign Investment,” Foreign Investment Advisory Service (FIAS) Occasional Paper; 13. 26 Yılmaz, Kamil, Cevdet Akçay and Emre Alper, 2002, “Enflasyon ve Büyüme Dinamikleri: Gelişmekte Olan Ülke Deneyimleri Işığında Türkiye Analizi,” (Inflation and Growth Dynamics: An Analysis of Turkey in the light of Developing Country Experiences), TUSIAD (Turkish Industrialists' and Businessmen's Association) Publication, December. Yılmaz, Kamil and Şule Özler, 2004, “Foreign Direct Investment and Productivity Spillovers: Identifying Linkages through Product-based Measures,” mimeo. Zhang, Kevin H., 1999, “FDI and Economic Growth: Evidence from 10 East Asian Economies”, Economia Internationale, November. 27 ANNEX: Functions of an Investment Promotion Agency (IPA) The groupings of the different functions of an IPA can differ for developed and developing countries or from one country to another. The four-fold grouping proposed by Wells and Wint (2001) used for the studies carried out for the Turkish IPA, are described below. Image building is the function of creating the perception of a country as an attractive site for international investment. Activities commonly associated with image building include focused advertising, public relations events, and the generation of favourable news stories by cultivating journalists. Investor servicing and facilitation refers to the range of services provided in a host country that can assist an investor in analysing investment decisions, establishing a business, and maintaining it in good standing. Activities in this area include information provision, “onestop shop” services aimed at expediting approval processes, and various forms of assistance in obtaining access to sites and utilities. Investment generation entails targeting specific sectors and companies with a view to creating investment leads. Activities include identification of potential sectors and investors, direct mailing, telephone campaigns, investor forums and seminars, and individual presentations to targeted investors. Investment generation activities can be done both at home and overseas. Policy advocacy consists of the activities through which the agency supports initiatives to improve the quality of the investment climate and identifies the views of the private sector on each relevant topic. Activities include surveys of the private sector, participation in task forces, policy and legal proposals, and lobbying. The emphasis of the IPA facility should depend on the purpose of the FDI policy: how much promotion is needed depends on the kind of FDI to be attracted and the basic attractions of the host country. A large and dynamic economy needs to promote itself less than a small one. The bulk of massive inflows of FDI to China were not the result of active FDI promotion. And promotion can only go so far. If the economic base is weak and unstable, no amount of persuasion can attract large and sustained FDI flows (UNCTAD, 2003). Of the main investment promotion functions that all countries consider, image building and investor servicing & facilitation are typically the ones best left entirely to the separate public-private IPA. 28 Table 1. FDI summary data: Turkey vs comparators Czech Turkey Poland Republic Hungary 199,267 157,598 51,433 46,604 44,542 39,212 14,550 11,269 Population (2000, millions) 67.4 38.7 10.3 10.0 FDI inflows, 1991-1996 (USD mn, annual avg.) 751 2,119 939 2,205 FDI inflows, 1997-2000 (USD mn, annual avg.) 878 6,971 4,072 1,957 FDI inflows, 2001 (USD mn) 3,266 5,713 4,924 2,440 FDI inflows/GFCF, 1991-1996 (annual avg.) 1.9% 10.7% 6.4% 26.8% FDI inflows/GFCF, 1997-2000 (annual avg.) 1.9% 18.1% 26.5% 17.9% 12.4% 15.0% 30.6% 20.1% FDI stocks, 1996 (USD mn) 5,825 11,463 8,785 14,193 FDI stocks/GDP, 1996 3.2% 8.8% 15.2% 31.4% FDI stocks, 2000 (USD mn) 9,335 34,227 21,644 19,804 FDI stocks/GDP, 2000 4.7% 21.7% 42.1% 42.5% 12,601 42,433 26,764 23,562 FDI stocks/GDP, 2001 8.5% 24.1% 47.1% 45.4% Exports of affiliates of foreign TNCs 1 2000 (USD mn) 3,684 12,267 10,876 2 19,558 26.5% 32.7% 2 61.1% 11,107 2 22,820 71,385 4 26,645 GDP (2000, USD millions) GFCF (2000, USD millions) FDI inflows/GFCF, 2001 FDI stocks, 2001 (USD mn) 7.2% TNC Exports/Total Exports, 2000 Imports of affiliates of foreign TNCs, 2000 No of affiliates of foreign TNCs, 2000 12,628 23,554 5,334 3 35,840 Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics CD-ROM; UNCTAD, World Investment Database (WID) Country Profiles, 2003; UNCTAD, World Investment Report, selected years. v 1. An affiliate is an incorporated or unincorporated enterprise in which an investor, who is resident in another economy, owns a stake that permits a lasting interest in the management of that enterprise (an equity stake of 10% for an incorporated enterprise or its equivalent for an unincorporated enterprise). 2. For Czech Republic foreign trade, 1999. 3. For Poland number of affiliates, 1998. Includes all firms with foreign capital. 4. For Czech Republic number of affiliates, 1999. The number includes joint ventures. Out of this number, 53,775 are fully-owned foreign affiliates. 29 Table 2. FDI Definition in OECD Countries Preferred Preferred Stocks Other Kinds of Indirectly- Capital Long Short Bonds & Reinvested Financial Commerce / StocksTraded in Not Traded in Non Preferred owned FDI in Term Term Leasing Marketable Earnings Derivatives Retail Loans Stock Exchange Stock Exchange Stocks Enterprises Kind Loans Loans Securities Australia Austria Belgium Canada Czech Re. Denmark Finland France Germany Greece Hungary Iceland Ireland Japan Korea Luxembourg Mexico Netherlands New Zealand Norway Poland Portugal Spain Sweden Switzerland Turkey (6224) Turkey (4875) England USA Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes No NA No Yes No No Yes No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes NA Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes NA Yes Yes NA Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes NA No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Source: OECD, 2002 and 2003. NA: Not Available; * Excluding State Bonds 30 Yes No No Yes No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes NA No Yes Yes NA No Yes No No Yes Yes NA Yes No No No Yes No Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes No No Yes NA No No No No Yes Yes NA Yes Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes(*) No Yes Yes No No NA NA No No No No NA Yes NA NA No No No No NA No Yes NA No No No Yes No Yes No Yes Table 3. FDI stocks by industrial sector, 2000 (Share, %) Sector / Industry PRIMARY SECTOR Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing Mining, quarrying and petroleum SECONDARY SECTOR Food, beverages and tobacco Textiles, leather and clothing Wood, paper, publishing and printing Petroleum, chemicals, rubber and plastic products Non-metallic mineral products Basic metal and metal products Machinery and equipment Electrical machinery and apparatus Motor vehicles and other transport equipment Precision Instruments Other manufacturing Unspecified secondary TERTIARY SECTOR Electricity, gas and water Construction Trade and repairs Hotels and restaurants Transport, storage and communication Finance Real estate and business activities Education Health and social services Other services TOTAL TURKEY 1.5 0.8 0.7 41.3 7.3 1.9 0.3 9.5 2.6 2.6 0.2 3.7 12.1 0.4 0.7 0.0 57.3 0.8 8.1 4.4 17.0 16.6 0.0 7.5 2.8 100 Poland 0.9 0.5 0.4 38.6 8.4 0.7 4.4 6.5 2.0 1.3 1.2 6.4 7.8 60.5 1.2 6.6 16.7 0.5 8.0 20.0 7.0 0.5 100 Source: UNCTAD, World Investment Database (WID) Country Profiles, 2003; Turkey GDFI database. 31 Czech Rep. 2.0 0.2 1.9 38.1 4.8 1.3 3.1 6.5 5.9 3.6 1.7 3.3 6.5 0.7 0.6 0.0 59.8 6.6 1.5 15.0 0.3 11.2 14.7 9.2 1.2 100 Hungary 1.5 1.1 0.4 36.8 8.9 1.6 1.9 6.8 2.3 2.2 1.9 7.2 3.6 0.4 61.7 9.4 1.2 12.4 1.8 7.7 11.3 15.7 0.0 0.1 1.9 100 Table 4. Largest Affiliates of Foreign TNCs (Sales in million USD) Company Home Country Industry 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 Turkey – 2001 Tofaş Türk Otomobil Fabrikası A.Ş. Oyak Renault Otomobil Fabrikaları A.Ş. Vestel Elektronik San. ve Tic. A.Ş. Ipragaz A.Ş. Sasa Dupont Sabancı Polyester Sanayi A.Ş. Mercedes Benz Türk A.Ş. Philsa PhilipMorris Sabancı Sigara-TütünA.Ş. Bosch Sanayi ve Ticaret A.Ş. Siemens Sanayi ve Ticaret A.Ş. Paşabahçe Cam Sanayi Ford Otomotiv Sanayi A.Ş. Goodyear Lastikleri T.A.Ş. Trakya Cam Sanayii A.Ş. Profilo Telra Elektronik Sanayi ve Tic. A.Ş. BSH Profilo Elektrikli Gereçler Sanayii A.Ş. Alcatel Teletaş Telekomünikasyon End. Türk Pirelli Lastikleri A.Ş. Korsa Sabancı Dupont End. İplik San. A.Ş. JTI Tütün Ürünleri Sanayi A.Ş. İzmir Demir Çelik Sanayi A.Ş. TOTAL Poland – 1999 Fiat Auto Poland SA Makro Cash and Cary Poland Centrum Daewoo Sp ZOO Volkswagen Poznan Sp ZOO Reemtsma Polska SA Thompson Polkolor Sp ZOO Real Sp ZOO General Motors Poland Sp ZOO Procter and Gamble Polska Sp ZOO Geant Polska Sp ZOO Unilever Polska SA International Paper Kwidzyn SA Renault Polska Sp ZOO Kulczyk Tradex Sp ZOO Auchan Polska Sp ZOO Electrocieplownie Warszawkie SA Frantschah Swiecie SA Philips Lighting Poland SA Jeronimo Martins Dystrybucja Sp ZOO British American Tobacco Polska SA TOTAL 32 Italy France Netherlands France Netherlands Germany Netherlands Germany Germany Saudi Arabia United States United States United States France Germany Neth. /Belgium İtaly Netherlands Japan Saudi Arabia Motor Vehicles Motor Vehicles Electronics Petroleum Prod. Chemicals Motor Vehicles Tobacco Autoparts Electrical Mach. Glass Motor Vehicles Rubber Glass Electronics Electrical Mach. Electronics Rubber Textiles Tobacco Iron -Steel Italy Germany Rep. Of Korea Germany Germany France Germany U.S.A. U.S.A. France Netherlands U.S.A. France U.K. France Sweden Germany Netherlands Portugal U. K. Motor Vehicles Distributive Trade Motor Vehicles Motor Vehicles Tobacco Electrical Equip. Distributive Trade Motor Vehicles Distributive Trade Distributive Trade Distributive Trade Paper Poducts Motor Vehicles Distributive Trade Distributive Trade Electricity Paper Poducts Electrical Equip. Distributive Trade Tobacco Sales 875.5 748.4 690.2 375.5 333.3 284.9 264.6 245.7 231.3 223.0 212.9 193.5 192.0 189.0 185.0 176.7 173.7 173.2 168.6 161.0 6098.0 1,844.1 1,544.8 916.6 661.5 595.7 439.3 423.7 411.3 400.0 387.9 383.6 360.7 360.7 304.8 297.5 293.0 289.9 289.4 262.0 282.9 10,749.4 Table 4. (Cont’d) Largest Affiliates of Foreign TNCs (Sales in million USD) Company Home Economy Industry 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 Czech Republic – 1999 Skoda Automobilovi AS Makro Cr Spol SRO Rewe Spol. SRO Tabak AS Philip Morris Jihomoravska Energetica Tesco Stores Cr AS IPS AS Delvita AS Penny Market SRO Severoceska Energetica Jilius Meinl AS Siemens Automobilovl Technika SRO Stavby Silnic A Zeleznic AS Plzensky Prazdroj AS Autopal SRO Glaverbel Czech AS Robert Bosch Spol. SRO Nestle Cokoladovny AS Siemens Elektromotory SRO TOTAL Hungary – 2000 Audi Hungaria Motor Kft. Philips Magyarorszag Kft. IBM Storage Products Kft. Matav Rt. Panrusgaz Magyar-Orosz Gazipari Rt. Flextronics International Kft. Metro Holding Kft. GE Hungary Rt. Opel Magyarorszag Jarmugyarto Kft. Kromberg Es Schubert Kabeleket Vogel and Noot Mezogepgyar Kft. Westel 900 Mobil Rt. Budapesti Elektromos Muvek Rt. Elmu Rt. Tesco Global Rt. Suziki Rt. Hungarotabak Tobaccoland Rt. Shell Hungary Rt. Alcoa Kofem Kft. BorsodChem TOTAL Sales Germany Germany Germany U.S.A. U.S.A. Germany U. K. Finland Netherlands Germany Germany Austria Germany France Netherlands U.S.A. Belgium/Japan Germany Switzerland Germany Motor Vehicles Distributive Trade Mach.& Equip. Tobacco Tobacco Energy Distributive Trade Construction Distributive Trade Distributive Trade Energy Distributive Trade Motor Vehicles Construction Beverages Motor Vehicles Non-metal mineral Motor Vehicles Food Mach. & Equip. 3,292.5 736.2 509.2 416.2 402.5 382.2 335.0 327.6 318.6 294.8 285.0 218.4 208.6 207.9 203.9 201.3 196.3 162.6 148.7 147.5 8,995.0 Germany Netherlands U.S.A. Germany Russia U.S.A. Germany U.S.A. U.S.A. Austria Austria U.S.A. Germany Germany U. K. Japan Austria Netherlands/U.K U.S.A. Austria Motor Vehicles Electronics Electronics Telecom. Distributive Trade Electronics Distributive Trade Electronics Motor Vehicles Basic Metals Basic Metals Telecom. Electricity Electricity Distributive Trade Motor Vehicles Trade Distributive Trade Basic Metals Chemical 3,190.6 2,266.3 2,239.7 1,565.3 1,027.6 868.1 715.1 658.1 629.5 628.0 584.4 541.9 483.6 483.6 447.6 446.4 442.3 420.5 395.1 393.5 18,427,2 Source: Source: UNCTAD, World Investment Database (WID) Country Profiles, 2003; Turkey GDFI database. 33 Table 5. FDI stocks by country of origin, 2000 Country of Origin Austria Belgium and Luxembourg Denmark Finland France Germany Ireland Italy Netherlands Spain Sweden United Kingdom European Union – Total Japan South Korea Switzerland USA Other OECD Countries – Total OECD – Total Other East European Countries Israel Saudi Arabia Panama Dutch Antilles Other Countries Total TURKEY 0.5 3.4 0.5 0.1 7.3 14.1 0.2 2.0 31.4 2.2 1.0 6.0 68.7 4.4 0.7 5.4 8.7 19.2 87.9 0.4 0.1 1.1 3.7 1.2 5.4 Poland 3.2 2.5 2.5 0.6 12.2 18.9 1.2 4.3 24.6 1.9 3.5 3.3 78.8 0.4 1.3 2.5 9.5 13.7 92.5 4.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.8 Czech Rep. 11.1 5.4 1.2 0.6 4.3 25.5 0.0 0.8 30.1 0.2 1.4 3.5 84.0 0.5 0.0 4.0 6.5 11.0 95.1 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.5 Hungary 12.2 5.3 0.5 1.6 6.5 25.8 0.7 2.7 22.5 0.4 0.9 1.1 80.2 2.1 1.0 2.1 8.2 13.4 93.6 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.0 100 100 100 100 Source: UNCTAD, World Investment Database (WID) Country Profiles, 2003; Turkey GDFI database. 34 Table 6. Macroeconomic Indicators 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 Percent of GNP Public Sector Borrowing Requirement Primary Surplus Interest Expenditures (Consol. Budget) Public Sector Debt Stock Domestic External Percent per annum Interest Rate on Bonds and T-bills (average) Inflation (CPI, annual average) Ex-post Real Interest rate (CPI-based) GNP Growth Rate 124.2 132.2 107.4 115.5 104.6 38.2 99.6 89.0 80.2 85.7 84.6 64.9 54.9 54.4 24.4 25.0 12.4 30.7 32.1 -10.5 36.0 8.0 7.1 8.3 3.9 -6.1 6.3 -8.5 Real Exchange Rate (CPI based index) Real Exchange Rate (WPI based index) Average maturity of Borrowings (days) 100 102.7 109.4 118.5 123.1 136.5 112.5 100 101.2 107 110.1 107.4 114.3 98.3 188.0 186.6 393.5 235.1 502.3 426.8 146.3 5.0 2.1 7.4 37.6 14.6 23.0 8.6 1.3 10.0 40.3 18.5 21.8 7.7 0.0 7.7 40.5 20.2 20.3 9.4 2.1 11.5 41.3 21.7 19.6 15.6 -1.9 13.7 51.8 29.3 22.5 12.5 3.8 16.3 53.4 29.0 24.4 15.5 6.5 22.2 97.8 66.3 31.5 Source: Yılmaz, Akçay and Alper (2002) and Özatay and Sak (2002). Table 7a. Infrastructure-related factors -- Strengths: Turkey vs comparators Turkey Demography and business values Population - market size (millions) Labour force growth (% change) Ave. no. of working hours per year Flexibility & adaptability of people (survey) Entrepreneurship (survey) Availability of competent senior managers (survey) Physical and financial infrastructure Internet costs for 20 hours (USD) Adequacy of communications (survey) Quality of air transport (survey) Adequacy of distribution infrastructure (survey) No. of credit cards issued (per capita) Availability of finance skills (survey) Poland Czech. Republic Hungary 67.8 2.46 2074 7.53 7.03 6.5 38.7 -0.33 1870 4.77 4.12 5.21 10.3 -0.04 1976 5.83 6.44 4.92 10.1 -0.47 1988 6.74 6.74 6.37 11.4 6.66 7.44 6.06 0.57 6.88 39.16 4.93 4.55 3.68 0.13 5.26 42.92 7.17 7 5.67 0.21 4.78 42.61 7.19 5.93 4.89 0.29 6.52 Note: All measures are from IMD, World Competitiveness Yearbook 2002. The survey measures are all reported on a 0-10 scale, with 10 indicating the most positive perception. 35 Table 7b. Infrastructure-related factors -- Weaknesses: Turkey vs comparators Turkey Demography and business values GDP per capita (USD at PPP) Employment (% of population) Adult literacy (% of population over 15 years) Secondary school enrolment (% relevant age group) Female labour force (% of total labour force) Employee training in companies (survey) Physical and financial infrastructure Electricity costs for industrial clients (USD/kWh) Adequacy of energy infrastructure (survey) Computers per capita (per 1000 people) Technological cooperation between companies (survey) Credit flows from banks to business (survey) Venture capital for business development (survey) Czech. Republic Hungary Poland 6,175 29.1 84.6 51 26.4 4.03 9,151 37.1 99.0 87 45.1 3.74 14,485 45.8 99.0 100 44.7 5.61 12,663 37.4 99.0 97 44.5 5.78 .082 3.94 53 4.00 2.84 1.97 .037 5.57 122 4.03 3.39 3.42 .043 7.94 179 6.17 3.28 3.17 .050 6.69 176 5.19 4.52 3.48 Note: All measures are from IMD, World Competitiveness Yearbook 2002. The survey measures are all reported on a 0-10 scale, with 10 indicating the most positive perception. Figure 1. FDI inflows: Turkey vs comparators 10000 9000 Turkey 8000 Czech Republic Hungary USD millions 7000 Poland 6000 5000 4000 3000 2000 1000 0 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 Year 36 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 Figure 2. M&A-related inflows: Turkey vs comparators 10000 9000 Turkey 8000 Czech Republic Hungary USD millions 7000 Poland 6000 5000 4000 3000 2000 1000 0 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 Year Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics CD-ROM; UNCTAD, UNCTAD, World Investment Report, selected years. Figure 3. Privatisation revenues: Turkey vs comparators 14000.0 12000.0 Turkey Czech Republic 10000.0 Hungary USD millions Poland 8000.0 6000.0 4000.0 2000.0 0.0 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 Year 37 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 Figure 4. Case studies (1) The Eurogold investment MARKET HISTORY - Turkey possesses a rich and diverse array of minerals - Enactment of Mining Law in 1985 - Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) regulation enacted in 1993 EUROGOLD COMPANY • Formerly Eurogold but subsequently purchased by Normandy Mining Ltd • Registered in 1989 as 100% FDI company • Found gold reserves of 24,000 tons DYNAMICS OF EUROGOLD CASE LOCAL INHABITANTS OF OVACIK REGION WENT TO LITIGATION OPERATING UNDER SPECIAL PERMIT: PERMANENT SOLUTION NOT ACHIEVED LONG-LASTING AND REPEATED LEGAL PROCEDURES (2) The Cargill investment MARKET HISTORY - 29 companies in traditional beet sugar production - 80% of capacity of beet sugar state-owned - 5 private companies in starch-based sugar production CARGILL COMPANY • US-based but Dutch registered • Began starch-based sugar production in 1990 • USD 90 mn. investment at Orhangazi, January 1998 DYNAMICS OF CARGILL CASE - LOBBYING FROM BEET SUGAR PRODUCERS - INAPPROPRIATE PERMISSION OF HIGH PLANNING BOARD REGULATORY BODY UNABLE TO CREATE A LEVEL PLAYING FIELD 4 PENDING COURT CASES SINCE 2001 ON CONSTRUCTION, DISCHARGE & EMISSION UNPREDICTABLE INTRODUCTION OF QUOTAS 38 OPERATING UNDER SPECIAL PERMISSION: PERMANENT LEGAL SOLUTION REQUIRED UNDER-CAPACITY PRODUCTION Figure 4 (cont’d). Case studies (3) The Iş-Tim mobile telecom investment MARKET HISTORY - Revenue share agreements between TT and Turkcell and Telsim in 1994 - Telecom Authority established by Law 4502 in 2000 - Third GSM licence was allocated to İŞ-TİM in 2000 - Another GSM Licence was granted to AYCELL (state-owned) İŞ-TİM ARİA COMPANY • 3rd GSM Operator of Turkey • Consortium of İş-Bank and Telecom Italia • Paid a licence fee of USD $ 2.5 billion MARKET SHARES (by end 2002) - Turkcell 64..3 % - Telsim 30.2 % - Aria 4.7 % - Aycell 0.8 % • Started to operate March 2001 DYNAMICS OF İŞ-TİM CASE RULE-MAKER UNABLE TO CREATE A LEVEL PLAYING FIELD ROAMING AGREEMENT COULD NOT BE SIGNED 39 ARBITRATION Figure 5. Investment climate reform areas 40 T.C. BAŞBAKANLIK HAZİNE MÜSTEŞARLIĞI DOĞRUDAN YABANCI YATIRIM RAPORU 25 Kasım 2005 İÇİNDEKİLER Sayfa Tablolar Listesi i I- Yurt İçinde Doğrudan Yabancı Yatırımlar 1 1- Yabancı Sermaye İstatistikleri 1 2- Uluslararası İlişkiler 2 3 3- Yatırım Danışma Konseyi ve Yatırım Ortamını İyileştirme Faaliyetleri 3.1. Yatırım Danışma Konseyi 3 3.2. Yatırım Ortamını İyileştirme Koordinasyon Kurulu (YOİKK) 4 II- Yurt Dışında Doğrudan Yatırımlar 17 TABLOLAR LİSTESİ Sayfa Tablo-1: Yabancı Sermayeli Şirketlerin Sayısı Tablo-2: Kuruluş Türlerine Göre Yabancı Sermayeli Şirketler 1 2 Tablo-3: Yabancı Sermayeli Şirketlerin Sayılarının Sektörlere Göre Dağılımı 3 Tablo-4: Yabancı Sermayeli Şirketlerin Kuruluş Türleri Açısından Sektörlere Göre Dağılımı Yabancı Sermayeli Şirketlerin Sermaye Büyüklüğü Açısından Sektörlere Göre Dağılımı 4 Tablo-6: Yabancı Sermayeli Şirketlerin Sayısının Ülkelere Göre Dağılımı 6 Tablo-7: Tablo-9: Yabancı Sermayeli Şirketlerin Kuruluş Türleri Açısından Ülkelere Göre Dağılımı Yabancı Sermayeli Şirketlerin Sermaye Büyüklüğü Açısından Ülkelere Göre Dağılımı Doğrudan Yabancı Yatırımlar (Fiili Girişler) 9 Tablo-10: Yabancı Sermayeli Şirketlerin Yatırımlarına Verilen Teşvik Belgeleri 10 Tablo-11: Ülkeler ve Yıllar İtibariyle Türkiye’nin Yurt Dışına Toplam Sermaye İhracı Ülkeler ve Sektörler İtibariyle Türkiye’nin Yurt Dışına Toplam Sermaye İhracı Ülke Grupları İtibariyle Türkiye’nin Yurt Dışına Toplam Sermaye İhracı Ülke Grupları İtibariyle Türkiye’nin Yurt Dışına Toplam Sermaye İhracının Sektörel Dağılımı Tablo-5: Tablo-8: Tablo-12: Tablo-13: Tablo-14: i 5 7 8 18 19 20 21 I- YURT İÇİNDE DOĞRUDAN YABANCI YATIRIM 1- Yabancı Sermaye İstatistikleri Doğrudan yabancı yatırım istatistikleri; ülkemizde kurulan yabancı sermayeli şirketler, mevcut şirketlere yapılan iştirakler ve şube sayıları baz alınarak hazırlanmıştır. Bu istatistiklere istinaden hazırlanan tablolar, 1954 yılından 2005 yılı Ekim ayına kadar geçen sürede ülkemize gelen doğrudan yabancı yatırımların yorumlanmasında katkı sağlamaktadır. 17 Haziran 2003 tarihinde yürürlüğe giren 4875 sayılı “Doğrudan Yabancı Yatırımlar Kanunu” ile doğrudan yabancı yatırımların gerçekleştirilmesinde izin ve onay sistemi kaldırılarak, bilgilendirme sistemine geçilmiştir. 2005 yılı Ekim ayı sonu itibariyle 9.778 adet yabancı sermayeli şirket ve şube kurulmuş olup, 1.929 adet yerli sermayeli şirkete de yabancı sermaye iştiraki gerçekleşmiş olup, toplamda 11.707 adet yabancı sermayeli şirket ülkemizde faaliyette bulunmaktadır (Tablo-1). 4875 sayılı “Doğrudan Yabancı Yatırımlar Kanunu”nun 17 Haziran 2003 tarihinde yürürlüğe girmesiyle şirket sayılarında hızlı bir artış gözlenmiş ve 2003 yılında yabancı sermayeli şirket sayısı bir önceki yıla oranla %88,4 oranında artmıştır. 17 Haziran 2003-31 Ekim 2005 döneminde, kurulan yabancı sermayeli şirket sayısı, önceki yıllarda kurulan toplam şirket sayısının %86,5’sine tekabül etmektedir (Tablo-2). 11.707 adet yabancı sermayeli şirketin, başta toptan ve perakende ticaret olmak üzere, imalat sanayi, gayrimenkul kiralama ve iş faaliyetleri sektörlerinde faaliyette bulundukları görülmektedir (Tablo-3). İmalat sanayiinde faaliyette bulunan yabancı sermayeli şirketlerde tekstil ürünleri imalatı birinci sırada yer alırken, bunu gıda ürünleri içecek imalatı ile kimyasal madde ve ürünleri imalatı izlemektedir. “Doğrudan Yabancı Yatırımlar Kanunu” nun yürürlüğe girdiği tarihten sonra ülkemizde faaliyete geçen 5.429 adet yabancı sermayeli şirketin 232 adedinde kayıtlı sermaye 500.000 doların üzerindedir (Tablo-5). 11.707 adet yabancı sermayeli firmanın ülke gruplarına göre dağılımına bakıldığında ise AB ülkeleri ortaklı firma sayısının 6.076 adet ile birinci sırada yer aldığı görülmektedir (Tablo-7). AB ülkeleri ortaklı yabancı sermayeli firmaların içinde Almanya 2.013 adet firma ile birinci sırayı alırken onu Hollanda (922 adet) ve İngiltere (907 adet) izlemektedir (Tablo-7). 17.06.2003 – 31.10.2005 tarihleri arasında faaliyette bulunan AB ülkeleri ortaklı yabancı sermayeli firmaların 128 adedinde kayıtlı sermaye 500.000 doların üzerindedir (Tablo-8). T.C. Merkez Bankası tarafından yayımlanan ödemeler dengesi istatistiklerine göre; 2004 Ocak-Eylül döneminde 2.180 milyon ABD Doları olan fiili giriş, 2005 yılı aynı döneminde yüzde 71,6 oranında artarak, 3.742 milyon dolara ulaşmıştır (Tablo-9). 2005 Ocak-Eylül döneminde nakit sermaye girişinin %88,5’i AB ülkeleri kaynaklıdır. Bu oran 2004 yılının aynı döneminde %81,6 olarak gerçekleşmiştir. 1 Yabancı sermayeli şirketlerce gerçekleştirilecek yatırımlar için, 2005 yılında Ekim ayı sonu itibariyle 173 adet teşvik belgesi düzenlenmiştir. Bu yatırımların toplam tutarı 2.785,9 milyon ABD Doları değerindedir (Tablo-10). Söz konusu yatırım teşvik belgelerinde öngörülen toplam yatırım tutarının (2.785,9 milyon ABD Doları) %54,6’ı yabancı ortaklar tarafından karşılanacaktır. 173 adet Yatırım Teşvik Belgesinin 136 adedi imalat, 28 adedi hizmetler, 2 adedi tarım, 7 adedi de madencilik sektörlerinde düzenlenmiştir. 2- Uluslararası İlişkiler Ülkemiz girişimci sermayesinin yabancı ülkelere açılması, aynı zamanda yabancı sermaye ve ileri teknolojinin ülkemize gelmesi yolu ile ekonomimizin küreselleşen dünya ekonomisi içinde etkin bir şekilde yer alması, genel ekonomik politikaların ana hedefleri arasındadır. Bu çerçevede, ülkemizde yapılan yabancı yatırımların korunması ve daha fazla yabancı yatırım gelişinin özendirilebilmesi için, yatırım ve ticari ilişkilerimizin yoğun olduğu veya bu ilişkilerin genişlemesine yönelik potansiyele sahip olduğu düşünülen ülkelerle, Yatırımların Karşılıklı Teşviki ve Korunması (YKTK) Anlaşmalarının imzalanmasına 1962 yılında başlanmıştır. Ülkemizin sermaye ihraç eder hale gelmesi ile bu süreç hızlandırılmıştır. Bu kapsamda 2005 yılında Avustralya, Tayland ve Birleşik Arap Emirlikleri ile müzakereleri tamamlanan YKTK Anlaşmaları imzalanmış olup, 2005 Kasım ayı itibari ile 74 ülke ile imzalanmış bulunan YKTK Anlaşmaları’ndan 54’ü yürürlüğe girmiştir. OECD “Yatırımlar Komitesi” kapsamındaki çalışmalar ve OECD – Çok Uluslu Şirketler Rehberi Ulusal Temas Noktası fonksiyonunu Hazine Müsteşarlığı Yabancı Sermaye Genel Müdürlüğü (YSGM) üstlenmiştir. Ayrıca, bir Avrupa-Akdeniz inisiyatifi olan Avrupa-Akdeniz Yatırım Promosyon Ajansları Ağı (ANIMA) platformunda da Hazine Müsteşarlığı YSGM ulusal koordinasyon noktası olarak görev yapmaktadır. Yine çok taraflı ilişkiler kapsamında, Ekonomik İşbirliği Teşkilatının Bölgesel YKTK Anlaşması müzakereleri ve promosyon amaçlı çalışmaları takip edilmekte ve DTÖ’nün “yatırımlar” odaklı bazı çalışmalarına katılım sağlanmaktadır. 2 3- Yatırım Danışma Konseyi Ve Yatırım Ortamını İyileştirme Faaliyetleri 3.1. Yatırım Danışma Konseyi Yatırım Danışma Konseyi (YDK), yatırımların önündeki engellerin azaltılması ve Türkiye'nin uluslararası alanda yatırım yeri olarak imajının güçlendirilmesi ve yatırım ortamının iyileştirilmesi alanında hükümet tarafından yapılan çalışmalara uluslararası bir bakış açısı kazandırılması amacıyla dünyanın önde gelen çokuluslu şirket yöneticilerinin katılımıyla oluşturulan bir platformdur. YDK'nin oluşturulmasında hedeflenenler aşağıda sıralanmıştır: • • • Çokuluslu şirketlerin üst düzey yöneticilerinin, yatırım yeri seçimi konusundaki bilgi birikimlerinden faydalanarak, Türkiye'deki yatırım ortamının iyileştirilmesi çalışmalarına uluslararası bir perspektif kazandırmak, Türkiye'nin dünya ekonomisinde sahip olduğu rekabet gücünün artırmasına yönelik çalışmalara katkı sağlamak, Türkiye'nin yatırım ortamının iyileştirilmesi konusunda sağladığı ilerlemelerin, uluslararası alanda duyurulmasına katkıda bulunmaktır. YDK bu hedefler doğrultusunda ilk toplantısını Başbakan Sn. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan'ın başkanlığında 15 Mart 2004 tarihinde İstanbul'da gerçekleştirmiştir. Toplantıda, Konsey Üyeleri tarafından, Türkiye'nin yatırımcılar nezdinde rekabet gücünü artırabilmesi için öncelikle uygulamaya konması gereken tedbirler sıralanmıştır. Bu tedbirler arasında, idari ve bürokratik engellerin kaldırılması, yatırım yeri temini için imkanların genişletilmesi, KOBİ’lerin güçlendirilmesi, eğitim ve altyapı imkanlarının iyileştirilmesi, yargı hizmetlerine etkinlik kazandırılması, vergi ve yatırım teşvikleri konusunda iyileştirmeler yapılması gibi farklı alanlara ilişkin hususlar yer almıştır. Konsey toplantısında gündeme gelen önerilerle ilgili olarak alınan tedbirleri Sayın Başbakan’a ve Üyelere sunmak üzere, ilgili kurum ve kuruluşların yanısıra YOİKK Teknik Komiteleri’nin sağladığı bilgiler doğrultusunda Hazine Müsteşarlığı tarafından bir “İlerleme Raporu” hazırlanmıştır. Müsteşarlık internet sayfasında da yayımlanan İlerleme Raporu’nda, belirlenen alanlarda Konsey’in ilk toplantısından sonra uygulamaya konan tedbirler ve bu alanlarda halen yürütülmekte olan çalışmalar detaylı olarak yer almaktadır. 29 Nisan 2005 tarihinde Sn. Başbakan’ın başkanlığında İstanbul'da gerçekleştirilenYDK’nin ikinci toplantısına 19 çokuluslu şirketlerin üst düzey yöneticileri, Dünya Bankası, IMF ve Avrupa Yatırım Bankası gibi uluslararası kuruluşların başkanları ile Türk özel sektör temsilcileri katılmıştır. 2005 yılında yapılan bu toplantıda, YDK üyeleri 2004 yılında gerçekleştirilen toplantı sonucunda belirtilen hususlarla ilgili olarak İlerleme Raporu’nda yer alan gelişmelerle ilgili olarak Türkiye'nin sağladığı başarıları takdirle karşılamışlardır. Toplantının sonuç bildirisinde katılımcılar, birinci toplantı sonucunda belirlenen başlıklardaki gelişmelerin takibine devam edilmesi ve “Sosyal Güvenlik”, “Kurumsal Yönetim” alanında da tedbirler alınması gerektiğini vurgulamışlardır. 3 3.2. Yatırım Ortamını İyileştirme Koordinasyon Kurulu (YOİKK) Makro ölçekde elde edilen başarılı sonuçların yanı sıra, ülkemizde yatırım ortamını hem yerli hem de uluslararası yatırımcılar açısından daha cazip hale getirmek için oluşturulan YOİKK çalışmalarına devam etmektedir. Şu ana kadar belirlenen anahtar reform alanlarının hemen hemen hepsinde tatmin edici gelişmeler kaydedilmiştir. Bu gelişmelerden bazıları aşağıda yer almaktadır. “İş yeri açma ve çalışma ruhsatlarına ilişkin yönetmelik” 10 Ağustos 2005 tarihinde yürürlüğe girmiştir. Yönetmelik ile işyeri açma ve çalıştırma ruhsatlandırmasında yerel yönetimlerin yetkileri artırılırken ruhsat alımında bürokrasi azaltılmıştır. Bunun yanısıra, aynı tarihte “Gayri Sıhhi Müesseseler Yönetmeliği” yürürlükten kaldırılmıştır. Kamu kesimi, özel kesim ve sivil toplum kuruluşları arasındaki işbirliğini geliştirmek, kaynakların yerinde ve etkin kullanımını sağlamak ve yerel potansiyeli harekete geçirmek suretiyle, ulusal kalkınma plânı ve programlarda öngörülen ilke ve politikalarla uyumlu olarak, bölgesel gelişmeyi hızlandırmak, sürdürülebilirliğini sağlamak ve bölge içi gelişmişlik farklarını azaltmak üzere “Bölgesel Kalkınma Ajanslarının Kuruluşu, Koordinasyonu ve Görevleri Hakkında Kanun Tasarısı” hazırlanmıştır. Bölgesel Kalkınma Ajansları’nın il birimleri, başvuruların yapılacağı, takip ve koordine edileceği tek mercii olacaktır. Anılan tasarı, Meclis Genel Kurulu’ndadır. 16 Nisan 2005 tarihinde yürürlüğe giren “5331 sayılı Kanun” kapsamında; KOBİ tanımına ilişkin esaslar, Sanayi ve Ticaret Bakanlığı’nca hazırlanacak ve Bakanlar Kurulunca yürürlüğe konulan yönetmelikle belirlenecektir. Buna istinaden, “Küçük ve Orta Büyüklükteki İşletmelerin Tanımı, Nitelikleri ve Sınıflandırması Hakkında Yönetmelik” 18 Kasım 2005 tarihinde yayımlanarak yürürlüğe girmiştir. Anılan yönetmelikle, Avrupa Birliği mevzuatına uyumlu tek bir KOBİ tanımı yapılarak, bu tanımın, içinde "KOBİ", "Orta Büyüklükteki İşletme", "Küçük İşletme" veya "Mikro İşletme" terimleri geçen tüm kurum ve kuruluşların mevzuat ve programlarına uygulanması sağlanmaktadır. Elde edilen bu kazanımların yanısıra, YOİKK kapsamında yapılan çalışmalara ivme kazandırmak amacıyla, Mayıs 2005 tarihinde, yatırım ve yatırımcılarla doğrudan ilgili bakanlıklar ve özel sektör temsilcilerinin daimi üye olduğu bir “Yönlendirme Komitesi” kurulmuştur. Yönlendirme Komitesi ayda bir kere toplanmakta, Teknik Komite Başkanları ile istişare yapmak suretiyle Teknik Komitelerin çalışmalarının hızlandırılmasını ve öncelikli konuların belirlenerek YOİKK gündemine getirilmesini sağlamaktadır. 4 Uluslararası İşletme Geliştirme Enstitüsü (Institute for Management Development-IMD) tarafından her yıl, ekonomik performans, devlet kurumlarının etkinliği, iş aleminin etkinliği, altyapı başlıkları altında toplanan 314 farklı gösterge üzerinden yapılan değerlendirmeler sonucunda elde edilerek yayımlanan Dünya Rekabet Gücü Sıralaması’nda da Türkiye’nin 2005 yılı sıralamasındaki değişim, son dönemde alınan tedbirlerin etkisini ortaya koyar niteliktedir. 2004 yılında 60 ülke arasında rekabet gücü sıralamasında 55. sırada yer alan Türkiye bu yıl 7 sıra ilerleyerek 48. sıraya yükselmiştir. Bu ilerleme ile Türkiye, kendisiyle belirli açılardan kıyaslanabilir, Yunanistan, Brezilya, İtalya, Rusya ve Polonya’nın önünde yer almıştır. 2005 ayında yayımlanan rekabet gücü sıralamasına baz teşkil eden verilerin, bu yılın başında toplandığı düşünülecek olursa yıl içinde ulaşılan performansın yansıltılmadığı sıralama sonuçlarının Türkiye’yi daha da üst sıralara taşıyacağını söylemek mümkündür. Dünya Rekabet Gücü Sıralamasında Değişiklik 2004-2005 -8 Türkiye Çek Cum. İsviçre Macaristan Finlandiya Hollanda Norveç İrlanda Almanya İtalya İsveç Avusturya Portekiz Yunanistan İspanya Slovakya -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6 8 lu m u Ol D z su m u Ol Kaynak:IMD (Uluslararası İşletme Geliştirme Enstitüsü) Dünya Rekabet Yıllığı 2005 Nitekim Türkiye’nin son dönemde yatırım ortamının iyileştirilmesi konusunda atmış olduğu adımların olumlu sonuçlarını, kıyaslamalı olarak ortaya koyan farklı kaynaklara dayalı değerlendirmeler de vardır. Dünya Bankası ile Avrupa Yeniden Yapılanma ve Kalkınma Bankası tarafından yayımlanan “İş Ortamı ve Girişimci Performans Anketi” (Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey -BEEPS), Türkiye’nin bu anlamda 2002 ve 2005 yıllarında çekilen iki farklı fotoğrafını kıyaslamaktadır. Ülkemizdeki 559 şirketin katılımıyla gerçekleştirilen anket sonuçlarına göre, 3 yıllık dönemde; • vergi, • makro ekonomi, • hükümet politikaları, • yolsuzluk, rekabeti önleyici uygulamalar ve • maliyetin finansmanı konularında önemli ilerlemeler sağlanmıştır. 5 Bu kapsamda, sözkonusu çalışmada açıkça ifade edilen, Türkiye’de son üç yıllık dönemde bürokratik formalitelerin önemli ölçüde azaltılmış olduğu hususu, yine Dünya Bankası’nın ülkelerin iş ortamını değerlendiren diğer önemli bir çalışması, “2006 İş Yapma Raporu”nun (2006 Doing Business Report) aynı mahiyetteki değerlendirmelerini destekler niteliktedir. Alınan tedbirlerle, 9 güne indirilen Türkiye’de iş kurma süresinin Dünyadaki en kısa sürelerden biri olduğu yine bu çalışmada yer almaktadır. Anket sonuçlarına göre, son dönemde sıkça gündeme gelen bir diğer husus olan adalet hizmetlerinin etkinliği ile ilgili olarak da olumlu bazı gelişmelerden sözetmek mümkündür. Aynı anketin uygulandığı Avrupa Birliği’nin yeni üyesi olan sekiz ülke ile kıyaslandığında, Türkiye’de adalet mekanizması ankete katılan firmalara göre daha etkin işlemekte ve kararların uygulanması konusunda daha güvenilir görülmektedir. İncelenen dönemde altyapı imkanlarının farkedilir ölçüde iyileştirildiği ve iş piyasasına ilişkin düzenlemeler konusunda Türkiye’nin sözkonusu yeni AB üyesi ülkelere göre daha iyi durumda olduğu da yine anketin bulguları arasında yer alan diğer olumlu gelişmelerdir. Ayrıca, Türkiye’nin ekonomik potansiyeli ile orantılı olarak Doğrudan Yabancı Yatırımların artırılması, bu meyanda YOİKK kapsamında faaliyetlerini sürdürmekte olan 10 Teknik Komitenin çalışmalarının ele alınarak bu çalışmalar sonucunda yürürlüğe giren mevzuat ve iyileştirilen uygulamaların etki analizlerinin yapılabilmesi için perspektif oluşturulması ve Avrupa Birliği (AB) mevzuatına uygunluğunun eşleştirilmesi amacıyla bir Eşleştirme Projesi başlatılmıştır. 6 TABLO:1- YABANCI SERMAYELİ ŞİRKETLERİN SAYISI ( Adet) 1954-1999 (Kümülatif) Ocak Şubat Mart Nisan Mayıs 830 309 341 386 309 Haziran Temmuz 343 341 Ağustos 330 Eylül Ekim Kasım Aralık Toplam 309 343 353 386 4.580 2000 22 31 54 38 48 35 44 24 45 27 70 54 492 2001 46 40 32 35 37 54 38 48 38 47 49 40 504 2002 39 34 38 41 44 40 53 41 45 43 35 64 517 2003 36 35 41 23 38 37 132 151 160 183 117 188 1.141 2004* 157 114 194 189 225 235 157 140 191 187 165 196 2.150 180 1.310 214 777 229 929 228 940 260 961 271 1.015 268 1.033 213 947 270 1.058 190 1.020 -789 -928 2.323 11.707 2005*-Ekim Toplam * Geçici Veriler Kaynak: Hazine Müsteşarlığı Yabancı Sermaye Genel Müdürlüğü (HM-YSGM) 7 TABLO:2- KURULUŞ TÜRLERİNE GÖRE YABANCI SERMAYELİ ŞİRKETLER (Adet) 1954-1999 Yeni 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004* 2005*-Ekim Toplam 3.928 356 351 371 899 1.608 1.887 9.400 İştirak 495 116 119 123 206 478 392 1.929 Şube Toplam 157 20 34 23 36 64 44 4.580 492 504 517 1.141 2.150 2.323 378 11.707 * Geçici Veriler Kaynak: HM-YSGM 8 TABLO:3- YABANCI SERMAYELİ ŞİRKETLERİN SAYILARININ SEKTÖRLERE GÖRE DAĞILIMI (Adet) ISIC Kodu A B C D Sektörler Tarım, Avcılık ve Ormancılık Balıkçılık Madencilik ve Taşocakçılığı İmalat Sanayii 15 Gıda Ürünleri ve İçecek İmalatı 17 Tekstil Ürünleri İmalatı 24 Kimyasal Madde ve Ürünlerin İmalatı 29 B.Y.S. Makine ve Teçhizat İmalatı 31 B.Y.S. Elektrikli Makine ve Cihazların İmalatı 34 Motorlu Kara Taşıtı , Römork ve Yarı-Römork İmalatı 36 Mobilya İmalatı; B.Y.S. Diğer İmalat Diğer İmalat E F G Elektrik, Gaz ve Su İnşaat Toptan ve Perakende Ticaret, 1954-1999 (Kümülatif) 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004* 2005*-Ekim Toplam 55 11 72 1.229 130 126 162 90 80 105 27 509 54 156 1.690 6 -10 102 8 3 12 11 13 14 2 39 11 14 164 6 2 8 96 8 13 8 6 15 10 4 32 6 25 182 5 1 18 81 7 13 5 7 5 8 6 30 7 18 220 27 2 14 277 19 70 26 21 23 18 15 85 9 30 445 30 2 33 372 49 61 46 28 19 19 30 120 17 140 929 25 3 42 382 34 69 33 29 14 16 39 148 9 275 663 154 21 197 2.539 255 355 292 192 169 190 123 963 113 658 4.293 51 1.514 125 506 309 85 270 17 14 45 64 1 2 4.580 10 140 14 40 49 10 62 --6 18 --492 7 153 22 56 50 6 45 1 3 4 14 --504 12 195 13 45 46 16 43 --6 11 --517 22 366 57 64 93 14 92 3 7 21 42 1 -1.141 17 839 73 79 219 8 236 3 12 27 43 --2.150 37 553 73 136 228 17 408 7 17 38 70 1 2 2.323 156 3.760 377 926 994 156 1.156 31 53 147 262 3 4 11.707 Motorlu Taşıtlar ve Motosikletlerin Satışı, Bakımı ve Onarımı; H I J K L M N O P Q 50 Motorlu Taşıt Yakıtının Perakende Satışı 51 Motorlu Taşıtlar ve Moto. Dışında Kalan Top. Tic. ve Tic. Komis. 52 Motorlu Taşıtlar ve Moto. Dışında Kalan Perakende Tic. Oteller ve Lokantalar Ulaştırma, Haberleşme ve Depolama Hizmetleri Mali Aracı Kuruluşların Faaliyetleri Gayrimenkul Kiralama ve İş Faaliyetleri Kamu Yönetimi ve Savunma, Zorunlu Sosyal Güvenlik Eğitim Hizmetleri Sağlık İşleri ve Sosyal Hizmetler Diğer Toplumsal, Sosyal ve Kişisel Hizmet Faaliyetleri Evlerde Yaptırılan Hizmet İşleri Uluslararası Örgütler ve Temsilcilikleri Toplam * Geçici Veriler Kaynak: HM-YSGM 9 TABLO:4- YABANCI SERMAYELİ ŞİRKETLERİN KURULUŞ TÜRLERİ AÇISINDAN SEKTÖRLERE GÖRE DAĞILIMI (Adet) ISIC Kodu Sektörler A B C D Tarım, Avcılık ve Ormancılık Balıkçılık Madencilik ve Taşocakçılığı İmalat Sanayii 15 Gıda Ürünleri ve İçecek İmalatı 17 Tekstil Ürünleri İmalatı 24 Kimyasal Madde ve Ürünlerin İmalatı 29 B.Y.S. Makine ve Teçhizat İmalatı 31 B.Y.S. Elektrikli Makine ve Cihazların İmalatı 34 Motorlu Kara Taşıtı , Römork ve Yarı-Römork İmalatı 36 Mobilya İmalatı; B.Y.S. Diğer İmalat E F G Elektrik, Gaz ve Su İnşaat Toptan ve Perakende Ticaret, Diğer İmalat 2004 Yeni İştirak 2005 -Ekim Şube Toplam Yeni İştirak Şube Toplam 22 -20 270 37 41 36 21 11 16 22 86 11 110 686 8 2 9 91 12 18 8 7 5 3 7 33 5 25 225 --4 11 -2 2 -3 -1 2 1 5 18 30 2 33 372 49 61 46 28 19 19 30 120 17 140 929 17 2 32 306 30 48 25 24 11 14 35 119 5 244 507 7 1 9 67 4 18 8 3 3 1 3 27 4 27 145 1 -1 9 -3 -2 -1 1 2 -4 11 25 3 42 382 34 69 33 29 14 16 39 148 9 275 663 10 614 62 57 160 5 193 3 11 19 41 --1.608 7 209 9 21 44 1 38 -1 7 1 --478 -16 2 1 15 2 5 --1 1 --64 17 839 73 79 219 8 236 3 12 27 43 0 0 2.150 28 419 60 108 178 11 369 6 13 31 55 1 2 1.887 9 124 12 28 42 5 33 -4 7 13 --392 -10 1 -8 1 6 1 --2 --44 37 553 73 136 228 17 408 7 17 38 70 1 2 2.323 Motorlu Taşıtlar ve Motosikletlerin Satışı, Bakımı ve Onarımı; H I J K L M N O P Q 50 Motorlu Taşıt Yakıtının Perakende Satışı 51 Motorlu Taşıtlar ve Moto. Dışında Kalan Top. Tic. ve Tic. Komis. 52 Motorlu Taşıtlar ve Moto. Dışında Kalan Perakende Tic. Oteller ve Lokantalar Ulaştırma, Haberleşme ve Depolama Hizmetleri Mali Aracı Kuruluşların Faaliyetleri Gayrimenkul Kiralama ve İş Faaliyetleri Kamu Yönetimi ve Savunma, Zorunlu Sosyal Güvenlik Eğitim Hizmetleri Sağlık İşleri ve Sosyal Hizmetler Diğer Toplumsal, Sosyal ve Kişisel Hizmet Faaliyetleri Evlerde Yaptırılan Hizmet İşleri Uluslararası Örgütler ve Temsilcilikleri Toplam Geçici Veriler Kaynak: HM-YSGM 10 TABLO:5- YABANCI SERMAYELİ ŞİRKETLERİN SERMAYE BÜYÜKLÜĞÜ AÇISINDAN SEKTÖRLERE GÖRE DAĞILIMI (Adet) 2004 ISIC Kodu Sektörler A B C D Tarım, Avcılık ve Ormancılık Balıkçılık Madencilik ve Taşocakçılığı İmalat Sanayii 15 Gıda Ürünleri ve İçecek İmalatı 17 Tekstil Ürünleri İmalatı 24 Kimyasal Madde ve Ürünlerin İmalatı 29 B.Y.S. Makine ve Teçhizat İmalatı 31 B.Y.S. Elektrikli Makine ve Cihazların İmalatı 34 Motorlu Kara Taşıtı , Römork ve Yarı-Römork İmalatı 36 Mobilya İmalatı; B.Y.S. Diğer İmalat E F G Elektrik, Gaz ve Su İnşaat Toptan ve Perakende Ticaret, H I J K L M N 50 Motorlu Taşıt Yakıtının Perakende Satışı 51 Motorlu Taşıtlar ve Moto. Dışında Kalan Top. Tic. ve Tic. Komis. 52 Motorlu Taşıtlar ve Moto. Dışında Kalan Perakende Tic. Oteller ve Lokantalar Ulaştırma, Haberleşme ve Depolama Hizmetleri Mali Aracı Kuruluşların Faaliyetleri Gayrimenkul Kiralama ve İş Faaliyetleri Kamu Yönetimi ve Savunma, Zorunlu Sosyal Güvenlik Eğitim Hizmetleri Sağlık İşleri ve Sosyal Hizmetler Diğer İmalat 200.000$ 500.000$ 2005 -Ekim Toplam <50.000$ 50.000$ 200.000$ 30 33 372 49 61 46 28 19 19 30 120 17 140 929 14 2 25 221 18 39 19 17 5 11 20 92 4 152 447 8 -7 112 11 22 6 7 7 3 15 41 5 93 166 -1 6 29 2 2 5 4 2 1 3 10 -19 28 3 -4 20 3 6 3 1 -1 1 5 -11 22 25 3 42 382 34 69 33 29 14 16 39 148 9 275 663 -12 2 5 10 2 4 --2 17 839 73 79 219 7 236 3 12 27 22 380 45 90 159 9 299 5 13 28 9 135 22 32 50 2 88 1 2 6 3 21 4 6 13 -13 -2 1 3 17 2 8 6 6 8 1 -3 37 553 73 136 228 17 408 7 17 38 2 --97 43 0 52 1 2 1.523 15 --587 1 --119 2 --94 70 1 2 2.323 <50.000$ 50.000$ 200.000$ 17 1 18 211 25 37 25 16 10 10 19 69 8 95 662 6 -6 91 10 18 13 7 6 2 2 33 2 31 226 6 -3 32 8 3 5 2 2 -4 8 1 8 27 1 1 6 38 6 3 3 3 1 7 5 10 6 6 14 14 593 55 54 147 2 197 3 10 17 1 209 16 17 43 3 28 -2 8 2 25 -3 19 -7 ---- 35 --1.477 6 --471 ---105 >500.000$ 200.000$ 500.000$ >500.000$ Toplam Motorlu Taşıtlar ve Motosikletlerin Satışı, Bakımı ve Onarımı; O P Q Diğer Toplumsal, Sosyal ve Kişisel Hizmet Faaliyetleri Evlerde Yaptırılan Hizmet İşleri Uluslararası Örgütler ve Temsilcilikleri Toplam Geçici Veriler Kaynak:HM-YSGM 11 2.150 TABLO:6- YABANCI SERMAYELİ ŞİRKETLERİN SAYISININ ÜLKELERE GÖRE DAĞILIMIa (Adet) Ülkeler AB Ülkeleri (25) Almanya Hollanda İngiltere Fransa İtalya Diğer AB Ülkeleri Diğer Avrupa Ülkeleri (AB Hariç) İsviçre Rusya Federasyonu Kuzey Kıbrıs T.C. Ukrayna Bulgaristan Diğer Kuzey Afrika Ülkeleri Diğer Afrika Ülkeleri Kuzey Amerika A.B.D. Kanada Orta Amerika ve Karayipler Güney Amerika Yakın ve Orta Doğu Ülkeleri İran Irak Suriye Suudi Arabistan Azerbeycan Diğer Diğer Asya Çin Halk Cum. Japonya Güney Kore Cum. Pakistan Afganistan Diğer Avustralya ve Yeni Zellanda Diğer Okyanusya ve Kutup Böl. Ülkeleri Toplam a Not: 1954-1999 (Kümülatif) 2.363 833 368 317 228 188 429 569 202 162 58 26 19 102 52 18 307 283 24 32 5 928 302 133 129 80 67 217 268 73 44 37 21 17 76 11 27 4.580 2000 286 82 70 34 25 25 50 41 10 18 2 4 1 6 36 1 6 -4 13 -73 16 12 7 1 7 30 27 12 2 3 1 3 6 3 6 492 2001 260 70 42 41 14 26 67 50 16 16 -4 4 10 7 2 37 35 2 4 2 81 20 18 4 2 12 25 51 16 10 12 2 1 10 -10 504 2002 236 67 46 35 22 17 49 51 20 13 -3 4 11 14 1 45 41 4 1 -114 29 27 13 2 14 19 44 13 6 4 2 5 14 1 10 517 2003 475 159 73 68 33 32 110 144 17 50 8 10 19 40 21 11 65 58 7 3 -285 113 41 19 6 41 65 123 51 6 18 11 5 32 1 13 1.141 Yabancı sermayeli şirketler, kuruluş türlerine göre yeni şirket kuruluşlarını, mevcut bir şirkete iştirakleri ve şube kuruluşlarını içermektedir. Firma adedinde baskın ülke, sermaye büyüklüklerinde ise ortağın ülkesi esas alınmıştır. * Geçici Veriler 12 Kaynak: HM-YSGM 2004* 1.087 381 145 144 75 81 261 299 34 110 23 28 29 75 27 18 111 101 10 8 4 385 135 55 21 16 61 97 174 59 15 18 10 5 67 21 16 2.150 2005*-Ekim 1.369 421 178 268 61 52 389 292 27 107 17 28 29 84 36 13 101 87 14 9 2 352 109 57 32 17 50 87 127 24 6 14 9 6 68 13 9 2.323 Toplam 6.076 2.013 922 907 458 421 1.355 1.446 326 476 108 103 105 328 193 64 672 605 65 70 13 2.218 724 343 225 124 252 540 814 248 89 106 56 42 273 50 91 11.707 TABLO:7- YABANCI SERMAYELİ ŞİRKETLERİN KURULUŞ TÜRLERİ AÇISINDAN ÜLKELERE GÖRE DAĞILIMI a (Adet) Ülkeler AB Ülkeleri (25) Almanya Hollanda İngiltere İtalya Fransa Diğer AB Ülkeleri Diğer Avrupa Ülkeleri (AB Hariç) Rusya Federasyonu İsviçre Bulgaristan Ukrayna Kuzey Kıbrıs T.C. Diğer Kuzey Afrika Ülkeleri Diğer Afrika Ülkeleri Kuzey Amerika A.B.D. Kanada Orta Amerika ve Karayipler Güney Amerika Yakın ve Orta Doğu Ülkeleri İran Azerbeycan Irak İsrail Suriye Diğer Diğer Asya Afganistan Çin Halk Cum. Japonya Güney Kore Cum. Diğer Avustralya ve Yeni Zellanda Diğer Okyanusya ve Kutup Böl. Ül Toplam a 2004 Yeni 827 290 108 116 57 52 204 216 84 26 20 16 18 52 22 13 78 69 9 3 2 296 113 43 38 28 15 59 129 51 11 8 7 48 13 8 1.608 İştirak 227 80 33 25 17 23 49 75 24 6 9 10 5 21 4 4 28 27 1 4 2 83 22 17 16 6 6 16 38 7 6 0 6 13 6 7 478 2005 -Ekim Şube 33 11 4 3 7 0 8 8 2 2 0 2 0 2 1 1 5 5 0 1 0 5 0 1 1 0 0 3 7 1 1 2 2 3 2 1 64 Toplam 1.087 381 145 144 81 75 261 299 110 34 29 28 23 75 27 18 111 101 10 8 4 385 135 61 55 34 21 79 174 59 18 10 15 64 21 16 2.150 Yeni İştirak 1.137 335 140 237 43 55 327 242 94 21 23 24 16 64 30 9 74 65 9 8 1 272 91 40 41 20 23 57 98 6 21 5 11 67 10 6 1.887 Yabancı sermayeli şirketler, kuruluş türlerine göre yeni şirket kuruluşlarını, mevcut bir şirkete iştirakleri ve şube kuruluşlarını içermektedir. Firma adedinde baskın ülke, sermaye büyüklüklerinde ise ortağın ülkesi esas alınmıştır. 13 Geçici Veriler Kaynak: HM-YSGM Not: 207 74 35 29 8 6 55 45 13 4 6 3 0 19 6 3 22 18 4 1 1 77 18 10 16 6 9 18 25 0 3 1 3 18 2 3 392 Şube 25 12 3 2 1 0 7 5 0 2 0 1 1 1 0 1 5 4 1 0 0 3 -----3 4 0 0 0 0 4 1 0 44 Toplam 1.369 421 178 268 52 61 389 292 107 27 29 28 17 84 36 13 101 87 14 9 2 352 109 50 57 26 32 83 127 6 24 6 14 89 13 9 2.323 TABLO:8- YABANCI SERMAYELİ ŞİRKETLERİN SERMAYE BÜYÜKLÜĞÜ AÇISINDAN ÜLKELERE GÖRE DAĞILIMI a (Adet) Ülkeler AB Ülkeleri (25) Almanya Hollanda İngiltere Fransa İtalya Diğer AB Ülkeleri Diğer Avrupa Ülkeleri (AB Hariç) İsviçre Rusya Federasyonu Kuzey Kıbrıs T.C. Ukrayna Bulgaristan Diğer Kuzey Afrika Ülkeleri Diğer Afrika Ülkeleri Kuzey Amerika A.B.D. Kanada Orta Amerika ve Karayipler Güney Amerika Yakın ve Orta Doğu Ülkeleri İran Irak Suriye Suudi Arabistan Azerbeycan Diğer Diğer Asya Çin Halk Cum. Japonya Güney Kore Cum. Pakistan Afganistan Diğer Avustralya ve Yeni Zellanda Diğer Okyanusya ve Kutup Böl. Ül Toplam <50.000$ 756 266 94 111 51 58 176 211 20 72 19 21 22 57 15 15 74 67 7 7 3 251 76 36 12 8 48 71 118 39 10 13 7 3 46 17 10 1.477 50.000$ 200.000$ 224 74 29 24 18 15 64 51 6 21 1 6 6 11 10 3 22 21 1 -1 114 58 16 7 6 9 18 41 19 1 2 3 2 14 1 4 471 2004 200.000$ >500.000$ 500.000$ 56 51 25 16 11 11 6 3 1 5 3 5 10 11 18 19 3 5 9 8 3 --1 -1 3 4 1 1 --8 7 7 6 1 1 1 ---12 8 1 -3 --2 1 1 3 1 4 4 7 8 1 -1 3 2 1 ----3 4 2 1 -2 105 97 Toplam 1.087 381 145 144 75 81 261 299 34 110 23 28 29 75 27 18 111 101 10 8 4 385 135 55 21 16 61 97 174 59 15 18 10 5 67 21 16 2.150 a <50.000$ 911 287 118 196 40 33 237 198 18 73 13 18 20 56 27 10 61 55 6 7 2 211 68 29 18 8 28 60 86 11 4 6 9 4 52 7 3 1.523 50.000$ 200.000$ 331 96 42 54 16 13 110 64 6 25 2 8 4 19 8 3 26 20 6 1 -116 35 22 10 5 20 24 32 11 2 7 -2 10 4 2 587 Yabancı sermayeli şirketler, kuruluş türlerine göre yeni şirket kuruluşlarını, mevcut bir şirkete iştirakleri ve şube kuruluşlarını içermektedir. Firma adedinde baskın ülke, sermaye büyüklüklerinde ise ortağın ülkesi esas alınmıştır. Geçici Veriler Kaynak: HM-YSGM Not: 14 2005-Ekim 200.000$ >500.000$ 500.000$ 64 63 22 16 9 9 10 8 2 3 3 3 18 24 19 11 2 1 8 1 1 1 1 1 2 3 5 4 1 ---7 7 6 6 1 1 1 ---18 7 4 2 4 2 4 -2 2 2 -2 1 5 4 -2 ---1 ----5 1 2 -2 2 119 94 Toplam 1.369 421 178 268 61 52 389 292 27 107 17 28 29 84 36 13 101 87 14 9 2 352 109 57 32 17 50 87 127 24 6 14 9 6 68 13 9 2.323 TABLO:9- DOĞRUDAN YABANCI YATIRIMLAR (Fiili Girişler) (Milyon $) Sermaye Diğer Sermaye* Sermaye Giriş 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 Ocak Şubat Mart Nisan Mayıs Haziran Temmuz Ağustos Eylül 2005 Ocak-Eylül 2004 Ocak-Eylül Çıkış Net Kullanım Geri Ödeme Toplam Net Giriş Çıkış Net Gayrimenkul (Net) Toplam (Net) 934 914 852 953 813 1.707 3.288 590 659 1.225 -49 -192 -47 -13 -30 -725 -22 -5 -8 -100 885 722 805 940 783 982 3.266 585 651 1125 -------512 324 555 --------98 -236 -258 -------414 88 297 934 914 852 953 813 1.707 3.288 1.102 983 1.780 -49 -192 -47 -13 -30 -725 -22 -103 -244 -358 885 722 805 940 783 982 3.266 999 739 1422 --------987 1343 885 722 805 940 783 982 3.266 999 1.726 2765 88 259 97 264 109 202 1.057 508 734 3.318 983 -30 -2 -76 -169 -1 -36 -5 -1 -13 -333 -5 58 257 21 95 108 166 1.052 507 721 2.985 978 7 13 52 5 9 31 14 42 41 214 475 -15 --103 -21 -212 -63 --9 18 -405 -147 -8 13 -51 -16 -203 -32 14 33 23 -227 328 95 272 149 269 118 233 1.071 550 775 3.532 1.458 -45 -2 -179 -190 -213 -99 -5 -10 5 -738 -152 50 270 -30 79 -95 134 1.066 540 744 2.758 1.306 118 91 130 69 122 132 92 131 99 984 874 168 361 100 148 27 266 1.158 671 843 3.742 2.180 Not: Kaynak: T.C.Merkez Bankası * Yabancı Sermayeli Firmaların Yabancı Ortaklarından Aldıkları Kredi Geçici Veriler 15 TABLO:10- YABANCI SERMAYELİ ŞİRKETLERİN YATIRIMLARINA VERİLEN TEŞVİK BELGELERİ Belge Adedi Toplam Yatırım (Milyon $) Yabancı Ortak Payı (%) 251 198 228 225 11.459,6 2.546,9 1.429,7 1.747,1 45,6 38,6 40,5 72,4 21 22 20 23 23 21 21 9 16 16 21 26 239 79,2 278,9 126,0 132,3 130,7 304,0 148,8 193,2 43,9 91,2 235,1 2.107,1 3.870,3 48,3 50,2 33,5 41,0 56,6 46,9 55,8 56,5 41,0 67,6 69,1 55,5 41,2 10 24 16 27 11 19 19 10 17 20 257,6 554,0 58,1 153,2 162,3 65,1 126,6 32,3 910,2 466,5 45,4 55,0 61,5 79,1 88,0 75,2 47,1 66,1 45,7 58,1 2005 Ocak-Ekim 173 2004 Ocak-Ekim 192 2.785,9 1.528,1 54,6 47,2 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 Ocak Şubat Mart Nisan Mayıs Haziran Temmuz Ağustos Eylül Ekim Kasım Aralık Toplam 2005 Ocak Şubat Mart Nisan Mayıs Haziran Temmuz Ağustos Eylül Ekim Kaynak: HM-YSGM 16 II- YURT DIŞINDA DOĞRUDAN YATIRIMLAR Türk Parası Kıymetini Koruma Hakkında 32 sayılı Karar’ın 13. maddesine göre; Türkiye’de yerleşik kişilerin yurtdışında veya Türkiye’deki serbest bölgelerde yatırım yapmak veya ticari faaliyette bulunmak üzere şirket kurmaları, ortaklığa katılmaları ve şube açmaları için, 5 milyon dolar veya eşiti dövize kadar nakdi sermayeyi bankalar veya özel finans kurumları aracılığıyla, ayni sermayeyi ise gümrük mevzuatı hükümleri çerçevesinde ihraç etmeleri serbest olup, 5 milyon dolar veya eşiti döviz miktarını aşan nakdi ve/veya ayni sermaye ihracına Hazine Müsteşarlığı’nın bağlı bulunduğu Bakanlıkça izin verilmektedir. Bu çerçevede, 1 Ocak 2005–31 Ekim 2005 tarihleri arasında, Türkiye’de yerleşik kişilere toplam 1,27 milyar dolar tutarında sermaye çıkış izni verilmiştir. Bu dönem içerisinde, Türk yatırımcılar tarafından yurt dışında kurulan şube/şirket veya iştirak edilen firma sayısı 27’ye, toplam sermaye ihracı ise 671 milyon dolar tutarına ulaşmıştır. Yurt dışına doğrudan sermaye ihracında bulunan Türkiye’de yerleşik kişilere ait gerek bankalar, özel finans kurumları, gümrük idareleri, gerekse bizzat bu kişilerce T.C. Hazine Müsteşarlığına intikal ettirilen bilgi ve belgeler çerçevesinde oluşturulan kayıtlara göre, Türkiye’de yerleşik kişilerce 1980 yılından itibaren 2005 yılı Ekim ayı sonu itibariyle yurt dışında toplam 1609 adet şube/şirket kuruluşunda bulunulmuş veya kurulu şirketlere iştirak edilmiş olup, 7.791.083.984,-ABD Doları tutarında sermaye ihracı gerçekleştirilmiştir. 2000 ve 2001 yıllarında yurt dışına doğrudan yatırım amacıyla gerçekleştirilen sermaye ihracı tutarlarında, diğer yıllara nazaran büyük artışlar meydana gelmiştir. 2000 yılındaki artışın en önemli nedenini, vergi avantajı sağlayan Hollanda’ya özellikle Türk mali sektörü ve kısmen imalat sektörü tarafından gerçekleştirilen büyük miktarlı sermaye ihraçları oluşturmaktadır. 2001 yılı içerisinde de mali sektör tarafından vergi avantajı sağlayan ülkelere sermaye ihracı gerçekleştirilmeye devam edilmiş olmakla birlikte, 2001 yılındaki artışın hemen hemen tamamı Türkiye Petrolleri Anonim Ortaklığının (TPAO) Azerbaycan ve Orta Asyadaki yatırımlarını artırmasından kaynaklanmıştır. Türkiye’den gerçekleştirilen sermaye ihracı toplamı, 2002 ve 2003 yıllarında 400 milyon ABD Doları civarındaki tutarla istikrarlı bir seyir izlemiş olup, 2004 yılında %100’ün üzerinde artarak 856 milyon ABD Doları tutarını bulmuştur. 2004 yılındaki artış, büyük oranda TPAO’nun enerji yatırımları ile Hollanda aracılığıyla diğer ülkelere gerçekleştirilen telekomünikasyon ve imalat yatırımlarından kaynaklanmıştır. 2005 yılında, Rusya Federasyonu, Ukrayna ve Türki Cumhuriyetlerdeki yatırımlar dikkat çekmektedir. Hollanda’daki vergi avantajından yararlanmak isteyen Türkiye’de yerleşik kişiler, bu yıl da diğer ülkelerdeki büyük ölçekli yatırımlarını Hollanda’dan finanse etmeye devam etmektedirler. 2005 yılı içerisinde de TPAO tarafından, büyük enerji projelerinin finansmanını teminen sermaye ihraçları gerçekleştirilmiştir. Bankalar, özel finans kurumları ve yatırımcılar tarafından intikal ettirilen bilgiler doğrultusunda, 2005 yılında Türkiye’de yerleşik kişilerce gerçekleştirilen sermaye ihraç tutarının 2004 yılı tutarını aşacağı tahmin edilmektedir. 2005 yılındaki sermaye ihraç tutarları, imalat ve enerji sektöründe gerçekleştirilen büyük ölçekli yatırımlardan oluşmaktadır. 17 TABLO 11-ÜLKELER VE YILLAR İTİBARİYLE TÜRKİYE'NİN YURTDIŞINA TOPLAM SERMAYE İHRAC FİRMA SAYISI İHRAÇ EDİLEN SERMAYE 1998* ÜLKE A.B.D. ALMANYA ARJANTIN ARNAVUTLUK AVUSTURYA AZERBAYCAN BAHAMA ADALARI BAHREYN BELÇIKA BEYAZ RUSYA BIRLESIK AR.EMR. BOSNA HERSEK CUM. BREZILYA BULGARISTAN CAYMAN ADALARI CEBELITARIK CEK CUMHURIYETI CEZAYIR CIN DANIMARKA ENDONEZYA FAS FINLANDIYA FRANSA GÜNEY AFR. CUMH. GÜNEY KORE GÜRCISTAN HINDISTAN HOLLANDA HOLLANDA ANTILLERI HONG KONG INGILTERE IRAK IRAN IRLANDA ISPANYA ISRAIL ISVIÇRE ITALYA JAPONYA JERSEY ADALARI K.K.T.C KANADA KATAR KAZAKISTAN KIRGIZISTAN KUVEYT LETONYA LIBERYA LIBYA LITVANYA LÜBNAN LÜKSEMBURG MACARISTAN MAKEDONYA MALEZYA MALTA MEKSIKA MISIR MOLDOVA MONAKO CUMH. NIJERYA NIUE OZBEKISTAN PAKISTAN POLONYA ROMANYA RUSYA FED. SINGAPUR SLOVAKYA SUDAN SURIYE SUUDI ARABISTAN TACIKISTAN TAYLAND TAYVAN TUNUS FİRMA SAYISI 36 90 1 1 6 98 1 6 13 1 3 1 20 4 6.799.025 3.000.000 11.756.221 1.020.000 265.375 19.980 1.340.134 4.240.937 1.000.000 2 17 3 31.857.037 8.708.918 11 1 27 3 5 45 11.600.875 21.574 614.430.182 550.000 343.780 237.776.324 2 9 2 1.806.799 17.908.949 7.886 53 15 1 1 3 10 5 2 3 8 FİRMA SAYISI 1999 60.158.852 281.413.686 12.000.000 34.722 16.692.815 112.554.746 474.410 24.235.000 50.781.550 4 2 3 2 1 32 6 1 5 80 2 İHRAÇ EDİLEN SERMAYE 80.368.595 479.428 78.064 2.838.120 45.763.990 299.948 72.099.409 22.638.222 42.152.230 15.604.169 2 6 11.054.353 18.040.403 180.000 1.056.516 29.268 İHRAÇ EDİLEN SERMAYE FİRMA SAYISI 2001 İHRAÇ EDİLEN SERMAYE (ABD Doları) FİRMA SAYISI 2002 7 7 67.371.225 32.346.345 8 9 2.838.652 112.809.832 10 12 1 1 2 6.000.000 10.953.897 16.475.308 3 1 3 1 15.062 2.098 417.691.457 2 3 2 1 13.500.000 1.452.481 25.000 137.000 3 19.484.078 3 1.000.000 27.000 133.400 401.734 İHRAÇ EDİLEN SERMAYE FİRMA SAYISI 2003 6.303.686 3.985.839 1 2 28.800 733.627 177.374.137 49.999 187.500 58.613 2 569.200 7 9.299.104 İHRAÇ EDİLEN SERMAYE 2004 4 11 3.582.355 2.919.135 3 4 4 298.686.623 1 1 1.766.867 7.152.643 10.005.493 1 1 1 TOPLAM FİRMA SAYISI (01.01.2005-31.10.2005) 2 2.506.500 2 5.646.074 1.486.766 365.662 269.367.176 2 1 55.404 1 42.532 3 339.257 3 1 235.000 9.790.134 1 1 1 1 7 5.119.944 1.000 713.290 12.096 1.121.333 1.642.738 4 2.006.402 80.000 5 2.131.525 1 1.800.000 93.333 4.949.837 6.000.000 1 1 264.942 3 83.500 25.887.959 1.000.000 1 3 1 458.002 125.000 61.000 3 231.708 200.000 4.977.371 200.000 489.749 343.000 21.500 1 1 2 10.000 21.089 10.367.048 1.770.000 1 3 47.729.497 6 2 1.640.210 942.000 146.562 1 7.672.500 10.200.000 4 1.113.459 11 49.415.443 6 746.046.593 11 463.355.694 10 157.705.981 10 1 2 347.300 199.273.129 5 70.872.716 3 11.544.177 3 195.738 4 584.070 1 6.500.000 754.777 128.421 1 1 1 2 1 184.900 4.079.510 865.049 6 1 1 2 1 11 4 312.103 4.842.163 4.865 42.000 3.183.000 937.817 70.000 13.882.949 444.921 40.851.961 346.327 3 252.120 3 47.260 1 2 2 5 16.483.572 100.000 50.000 13.813.697 9 1.503.197 12 1 3 2 2.980.000 3 302.295.684 728.344 469.339 1 200.000 1 206.968.744 1 1 1 278.643 0 3.035.456 35.582 3 1.828.489 431.844 93.220 150.736 106.774 47.910.789 1.300.000 10 1 199.354.910 6.000 1.376.001 465.741 3 6.768.290 1.218.300 1 1.115.292 1.316.581 215.662 2 2 1.175.114 125.187 1 2 89.858 4.004.383 18 810.162 50 49.055 2.705.728 248.000 1 6 1 138.000 4.888.151 6.800 593.308 7 0 825.933 12.421.069 1 8.532.000 2.000.000 2 1 1 12.824.501 15.344 85.227 2 1.500.000 2 187.934 0 4.168 102.799.714 3 564.901 4.959.634 165.200 1 725.000 3 4.413.840 1 2 1.296.000 9.140 50.187 2 206.750 1.009.500 6 1.085.257 16.520.225 12 11 3.957.582 7.366.240 3.877.748 3 1.705.126 1.487.629 69.794.250 3.119.383 12.854.461 442.160 16.662.097 1.961.566 332.470 10.200.000 1.292.570 50 2 6 90 62 3 12.178.055 678.786 1.253.725 75.793.479 99.197.557 162.000 5 1 1 115.407.256 40.000.000 47.670 1 1 1 1 40.040.754 2 307.693 2 1 1 2 8.301.500 359.340 1.108.100 100.435 2 5.623.954 1 435.000 607.879 21.445.435 2.522.541 1 9 4 1.540.248 34.392.843 13.298.406 332.500 1 5.353 39.372 1 1 1 150.000 2 4 1 482.110 1.283.571 45.399.830 5 1 140.000 3.720.000 375.000 1 7.922 2 497.380 8 7 1 1.661.000 1 47.840 1 1.140 4.030.093 388.118 541.465 2 10 7 313.259 8.039.588 1 2 1 1 54.225 1.785.000 1.785.000 2 373.447 10.081.604 6.104.874 218.627 17.790 1 1 4 3.794.555 20 23 26.938.916 4.057.037 1 2 43.850.000 762.090 1 1 125.139 4 1 1 60.000 2.462.156 390.000 75.000 2 150 262.880 856.347.836 759.995 TURKS AND CAICOS ISLANDS TÜRKMENISTAN UKRAYNA UMMAN URDÜN VIRGIN ADALARI YUNANISTAN İHRAÇ EDİLEN SERMAYE 581.452.038 10.000.000 8.528.198 6 FİRMA SAYISI 1.100.000 6 3 1 1 1 6 FİRMA SAYISI 2000 10 8 2 1 İHRAÇ EDİLEN SERMAYE 1 928 *31.12.1998 tarihi itibarıyla kümülatif toplam 2.128.546.343 1 1 4.271.394 833.948 101 185.750 649.908.806 3 4 7.286.054 1.955.300 1 2 17.236.394 767.500 89 1.189.972.388 1 2 6.026.323 126.330 2 7.878.535 65.960 1 5.030.134 1.124.957 1 2 98 900.000 64.505.000 52.233 1.458.862.464 4 1 104 910.746 8.904.258 189.795 425.657.073 1 1 112 821.110 187.740 410.643.984 18 2 9.998.000 60.000 10.007.028 27 317.068 671.145.090 72.455 İHRAÇ EDİLEN SERMAYE TOPLAM 80 143 1 5 11 118 2 12 18 2 10 4 1 45 5 1 8 10 13 2 1 4 3 35 3 1 16 1 86 5 5 63 1 9 18 5 2 37 20 1 6 188 2 2 79 16 2 1 1 8 3 1 19 9 8 3 12 1 12 5 1 2 1 62 2 11 138 94 3 4 2 3 7 1 1 2 5 1 25 39 1 3 10 6 1.609 186.680.367 461.877.722 12.000.000 7.565.350 39.802.452 1.891.641.888 10.704.409 39.380.750 52.419.848 105.000 1.280.457 25.117.357 3.000.000 67.723.574 1.021.000 9.713.290 481.304 27.884.129 4.790.814 4.262.437 1.000.000 1.410.002 146.089 94.277.095 10.478.918 200.000 30.622.416 21.574 2.485.188.336 1.856.000 2.067.081 520.990.538 0 19.722.839 31.948.769 1.653.727 135.220 84.971.471 108.752.683 78.064 2.908.120 79.057.826 844.869 188.000 442.207.572 24.132.893 2.980.000 725.000 1.100.000 19.365.968 1.487.629 0 249.894.761 43.143.867 13.345.238 481.532 26.463.597 499.340 8.193.850 432.905 10.200.000 1.688.610 585.000 37.054.215 678.786 7.920.372 158.402.760 170.400.956 162.000 2.053.078 2.003.627 2.225.630 4.030.093 0 1.140 125.139 5.316.640 9.998.000 57.551.356 20.632.716 390.000 19.194.595 118.847.868 1.195.466 7.791.083.984 TABLO 12- ÜLKELER VE SEKTÖRLER İTİBARİYLE TÜRKİYE'NİN YURTDIŞINA TOPLAM SERMAYE İHRACI (1980 - Ekim 2005 dönemi kümülatif toplam ÜLKE ADI A.B.D. ALMANYA BANKACILIK 63.407.829 369.512.249 DİĞER 1.748.000 264.851 DİĞ. MALİ HİZ. ENERJİ 15.000 ARJANTIN ARNAVUTLUK AVUSTURYA AZERBAYCAN 6.000.000 36.899.355 4.752.872 1.820.433.668 BAHAMA ADALARI BAHREYN 37.958.250 İMALAT İNŞAAT 55.500.000 50.896.561 12.000.000 5.833.688 646.581 88.436 28.641.075 654.410 1.500.000 908.700 1.536.550 28.800 6.000 2.066.515 431.930 23.199.687 3.528.331 40.000 BEYAZ RUSYA BIRLESIK AR.EMR. 15.141.101 BREZILYA BULGARISTAN 450.000 22.792.671 120.000 1.011.000 CAYMAN ADALARI CEBELITARIK 157.900 48.000 3.000.000 11.430.244 216.757 138.122 30.000 CEZAYIR 25.807.959 CIN DANIMARKA ENDONEZYA 1.384.249 1.329.000 4.113.039 1.000.000 FAS 68.000 264.808 50.000 10.000 FINLANDIYA 15.670.351 365.339 104.000 260.017 56.676.838 GÜNEY AFR. CUMH. 3.000.000 GÜNEY KORE GÜRCISTAN 3.795.582 HINDISTAN HOLLANDA 330.268.217 3.261.119 6.000 111.575.270 22.142.064 HOLLANDA ANTILLERI 21.574 882.096.682 12.592.124 7.218.003 IRAN IRLANDA 50.000 26.050.262 43.072 ISPANYA 2.379.105 12.110.141 10.049.999 435.556 47.050.430 65.000 1.033.700 9.790.134 1.682.522 158.565 32.924.712 10.000 225.200 4.846 224.304 407.133 3.461.814 149.398 257.001 51.966.452 ITALYA 57.118 189.784 9.333.333 1.350.002 146.089 16.611.548 7.478.918 600.000 16.762.131 5.959 890.671.867 6.000 184.018.093 300.000 206.854.278 17.803.802 3.469.226 1.275.701 41.290 2.120.281 176.733.956 1.300.000 2.067.081 169.560.056 1.877.748 44.000 334.954 135.220 10.408.194 4.947.911 ISRAIL ISVIÇRE 16.085 13.120.552 638.138 102.761.194 28.613 82.240 JAPONYA 61.937.015 KANADA 587.185 844.869 0 2.428.661 964.365 392.812 43.794.023 16.593.766 188.000 2.069.459 165.200 KATAR KAZAKISTAN KIRGIZISTAN 32.308.530 2.048.000 200.724 2.495.000 287.673.037 30.000 3.700.723 2.031.372 12.882.630 KUVEYT LETONYA 19.980 3.755.002 3.597.367 41.125 133.416 2.908.120 1.203.106 19.013.506 5.325.927 2.980.000 5.723.640 58.948 38.770.663 3.000.000 1.100.000 19.365.968 LITVANYA MAKEDONYA 1.462.629 89.500.000 2.601.297 12.691.122 26.961.054 40.528.528 471.032 350.160 6.120 MALEZYA MALTA 300.001 11.746.000 9.140 47.670 11.145.037 MEKSIKA MISIR 7.430.615 322.200 MOLDOVA 100.000 10.200.000 MONAKO CUMH. NIJERYA 1.292.570 396.040 23.683.533 235.000 3.595.243 75.267.118 42.841.420 35.000 59.578 300.000 NIUE OZBEKISTAN 4.618.132 PAKISTAN 196.050 443.786 POLONYA ROMANYA RUSYA FED. 20.036.637 70.234.716 98.129 108.238 2.112.501 50.000 SINGAPUR SLOVAKYA 4.924 2.993.136 12.549.600 4.474.796 4.320.205 37.602.146 52.593.848 78.000 1.993.500 2.003.627 2.225.630 77.000 SURIYE SUUDI ARABISTAN 1.500.000 435 50.000 4.900 7.112.181 97.938 49.000 554.312 4.030.093 TAYLAND 1.140 125.139 999.995 TAYVAN TUNUS 4.316.645 TURKS AND CAICOS ISLANDS 9.998.000 2.884.904 UKRAYNA 59.100 2.254.530 41.695.410 5.033.166 1.049.543 9.400.797 8.617.302 34.000 UMMAN URDÜN VIRGIN ADALARI 65.231.110 YUNANISTAN TOPLAM (01.01.1980-31.10.2005) 25.000 121.687.707 4.902 129.294 131.372 13.518.559 499.340 763.235 10.270 585.000 8.201.600 SUDAN TÜRKMENISTAN 43.500 215.000 725.000 LIBYA MACARISTAN 834.000 5.540.277 250.000 LIBERYA LÜKSEMBURG 500.000 1.407.723 78.064 JERSEY ADALARI K.K.T.C TOPLAM ULAŞTIRMA (01.01.1980-31.10.2005) 935.000 16.027.810 200.000 9.458.744 HONG KONG INGILTERE TURİZM 9.713.290 CEK CUMHURIYETI FRANSA TİCARET 56.790.850 22.213.247 1.422.500 BELÇIKA BOSNA HERSEK CUM. MADENCİLİKSİGORTACILIK TELEKOMUN. 1.368.950.553 40.576.476 1.037.808.789 72.455 1.786.949 272.040 2.158.682.508 1.614.617.699 186.555.349 26.824.457 19.047.140 5.146.966 326.791.890 19 500.403 3.851.123 390.000 75.000 44.712.500 733.675 920.854.473 2.803.794 7.117.309 4.001 94.727.324 185.750 9.547.500 186.680.367 461.877.722 12.000.000 7.565.350 39.802.452 1.891.641.888 10.704.409 39.380.750 52.419.848 105.000 1.280.457 25.117.357 3.000.000 67.723.574 1.021.000 9.713.290 481.305 27.884.129 4.790.814 4.262.437 1.000.000 1.410.002 146.089 94.277.095 10.478.918 200.000 30.622.416 21.574 2.485.188.336 1.856.000 2.067.081 520.990.538 19.722.839 31.948.769 1.653.727 135.220 84.971.471 108.752.683 78.064 2.908.120 79.057.826 844.869 188.000 442.207.572 24.132.893 2.980.000 725.000 1.100.000 19.365.968 1.487.629 249.894.761 43.143.867 13.345.238 481.532 26.463.597 499.340 8.193.850 432.905 10.200.000 1.688.610 585.000 37.054.215 678.786 7.920.372 158.402.760 170.400.956 162.000 2.053.078 2.003.627 2.225.630 4.030.093 1.140 125.139 5.316.640 9.998.000 57.551.356 20.632.716 390.000 19.194.595 118.847.868 1.195.466 7.791.083.984 TABLO 13- ÜLKE GRUPLARI İTİBARİYLE TÜRKİYE'NİN YURTDIŞINA TOPLAM SERMAYE İHRACI (ABD Doları) Ülke Grupları Afrika Batı Avrupa Doğu Asya ülk. Doğu Avrupa-Balkan ülk. K.K.T.C. Kuzey Amerika Latin Amerika Off-shore merkezleri Orta Asya ve Kafkas ülk. Orta Doğu Toplam 1998* 15.777.589 1.405.751.640 4.066.498 216.951.084 45.763.990 60.458.800 15.000.000 100.929.627 258.010.223 5.836.892 2.128.546.343 1999 2.542.090 410.139.600 612.242 106.766.570 13.882.949 42.597.151 0 1.456.516 71.182.585 729.103 649.908.806 2000 1.241.500 954.660.462 0 52.199.982 16.483.572 67.471.225 359.340 23.569.000 53.399.013 20.588.294 1.189.972.388 2001 825.933 598.814.469 0 51.735.333 1.503.197 2.838.652 140.000 67.141.734 728.463.146 7.400.000 1.458.862.464 2002 42.494.952 167.383.641 1.040.512 11.328.159 6.303.686 0 9.141.757 186.343.360 1.621.006 425.657.073 *1998 yılı: 1980 yılı itibariyle kümülatiftir. 20 2003 4.294.755 67.217.601 200.000 14.770.177 810.162 3.582.355 0 9.621.110 307.247.532 2.900.292 410.643.984 2004 5.960.550 215.643.641 3.143.878 23.842.972 49.055 1.766.867 0 10.720.290 587.492.246 7.728.337 856.347.836 (01.01.2005-31.10.2005) 3.204.375 316.574.876 543.000 43.138.293 564.901 2.506.500 0 10.198.000 291.072.235 3.342.911 671.145.090 Toplam 76.341.744 4.136.185.930 9.606.130 520.732.570 79.057.826 187.525.236 15.499.340 232.778.034 2.483.210.340 50.146.834 7.791.083.984 TABLO 14- ÜLKE GRUPLARI İTİBARİYLE TÜRKİYE'NİN YURTDIŞINA TOPLAM SERMAYE İHRACININ SEKTÖREL DAĞILIMI (1980 - Ekim 2005 dönemi, kümülatif toplam, ABD Doları) Ülke Grubu Afrika Batı Avrupa Doğu Asya ülk. Doğu Avrupa-Balkan ülk. K.K.T.C. Kuzey Amerika Latin Amerika Off-shore merkezleri Orta Asya ve Kafkas ülk. Orta Doğu Toplam FİNANSAL HİZM. 0 1.958.185.613 21.574 151.807.045 68.066.399 63.422.829 0 117.067.898 53.334.950 0 2.411.906.308 ENERJİ 25.807.959 12.592.124 0 2.462.430 0 0 0 9.713.290 2.108.106.705 0 2.158.682.508 İMALAT 14.424.079 1.161.811.680 3.149.160 181.371.197 964.365 55.500.000 15.000.000 654.410 163.866.551 17.876.257 1.614.617.699 İNŞAAT MADENCİLİK TELEKOMUN. 20.076.816 3.000.000 10.000 130.400.608 82.240 240.694.931 0 0 0 19.398.135 12.578.400 134.000 392.812 30.000 2.031.372 5.833.688 450.000 1.500.000 0 0 0 1.786.949 0 10.500.000 4.190.202 10.683.817 52.844.447 4.476.140 0 19.077.140 186.555.349 26.824.457 326.791.890 21 TİCARET 13.002.910 572.266.596 5.864.546 144.268.113 1.203.106 56.790.850 499.340 73.084.178 45.157.536 8.717.298 920.854.473 TURİZM 0 31.253.534 127.064 7.696.321 5.723.640 935.000 0 7.367.309 41.624.457 0 94.727.324 ULAŞTIRMA 19.980 2.618.329 0 745.343 58.948 500.000 0 2.600.000 3.004.900 0 9.547.500 DİĞER 0 26.280.275 443.786 271.587 587.185 2.592.869 0 10.004.000 396.774 0 40.576.476 TOPLAM 76.341.744 4.136.185.929 9.606.130 520.732.571 79.057.826 187.525.236 15.499.340 232.778.034 2.483.210.340 50.146.834 7.791.083.984